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Abstract 
The economic effect of environmental issues has emerged as one the most important research 
topics over the past several decades. This thesis investigates the impact of increasing 
environmental risk on stock market reactions to firms’ major financing policies, including bank 
loans, seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and dividend payouts, and documents the findings and 
implications in three empirical chapters. Throughout the three empirical chapters, 
methodologically, a difference-in-differences framework was used to exploit a shift in the 
stringency of environmental regulations that exogenously drive the environmental risk facing 
firms, namely, the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in December 2007 in Australia. In 
particular, the difference in stock market reactions was compared between polluters, firms that 
are by definition exposed to higher environmental risk, and controlling non-polluters in the 
post-Kyoto period relative to the pre-Kyoto period. In this empirical setting, the endogeneity 
concerns, that is, the causal impacts between environmental risk and stock market reactions, 
have been significantly alleviated. 
The first empirical chapter, Chapter 2, presents the finding that, overall, the stock market 
reacted significantly and positively to bank loan announcements. However, bank loan 
announcements of polluting borrowers elicited more positive stock price response relative to 
controlling non-polluting borrowers, and the difference was significantly larger following the 
introduction of more stringent environmental policies, that is, the period subsequent to the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Further, the loan announcement effect was more pronounced 
among borrowers in poorer information environments, as characterised by smaller borrowers, 
higher return volatility and smaller loans. The results are robust to alternative event windows 
and model specifications. Contrary to the criticism that banks are losing their ‘specialness’, the 
results suggest that banks provide certification over borrower environmental risk, and the 
xiv 
certification value increases as the level of stringency of environmental policies and 
information asymmetry of borrowers rise. 
The second empirical chapter, Chapter 3, presents the finding that, overall, the stock market 
reacted significantly and negatively to SEO announcements. However, the market responded 
more negatively to SEO announcements of polluting issuers than to those of controlling non-
polluting issuers, and the reaction difference was significantly larger in the post-Kyoto period. 
The effect was robust after controlling for various event windows, model specifications and 
endogeneity using propensity score matching. Further analysis revealed that the negative effect 
was weaker if a SEO was underwritten, and even turned positive if the underwriters were the 
most reputable investment banks. In contrast, similar analysis on rights offers showed 
indistinguishable market reactions between polluting and non-polluting issuers. The results 
provide evidence on how the information asymmetry associated with SEO issues drives the 
negative impact of increasing environmental risk on issuer market value, and how this market 
imperfection can be partially resolved by investment banks through underwriting services. 
In the third empirical chapter, Chapter 4, several findings are documented. First, relative to 
controlling non-polluters, in the post-Kyoto period, polluters were more likely to decrease cash 
dividend payments. Secondly, polluters reserved more cash. Thirdly, polluters more frequently 
announced obtaining external finance such as bank loans or SEOs. Fourthly, the market reacted 
more positively around the days when polluters went ex-dividend and the effect was more 
pronounced for more financially constrained payers. Finally, in one to two years subsequent to 
the ex-dividend day, polluting payers exhibited better operating performance and higher buy-
and-hold abnormal returns than non-polluting payers. These results indicate that firms facing 
higher environmental risk are more likely to encounter financial constraints, and support the 
view that constrained firms tend to rely more on internal financial resources by cutting 
dividends and holding more cash. Further, the evidence suggests that dividend payments are 
xv 
an effective way for polluters to publicly reinforce their commitments on future earnings to 
outside investors. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
--- 
1.1 AIMS AND MOTIVATIONS 
Corporate social responsibility has become a key research topic in recent years (Lindahl et al. 
2014; Zhang, X 2014), and one of the most important aspects in this area is the environment 
because of an increasing level of societal interest (Martínez‐Ferrero & Frías‐Aceituno 2015; 
Shao et al. 2014). For example, the high level of public attention paid to environmental and 
social issues has led to a substantial increase in the frequency of information dissemination in 
this field (Frias‐Aceituno, Rodriguez‐Ariza & Garcia‐Sanchez 2013; Patten 2002). 
Additionally, a vast amount of literature has been dedicated to investigating the impact of 
corporate environmental performance on firm financial performance, and mixed results have 
been reported (Horváthová 2010; Przychodzen & Przychodzen 2015). Another strand of 
literature has contributed evidence on the effects of environmental regulations on equity risk 
and returns, and shown inconclusive findings, depending on the environmental friendliness of 
the industry (Ramiah, Martin & Moosa 2013). 
The concept of the environment, particularly climate change, is related to a wide range of 
issues, including the consumption of water, energy and biodiversity among others (Boiral, 
Henri & Talbot 2012; Pulver 2007; Stubbs & Cocklin 2008), that may have different economic 
effects in terms of costs and benefits to corporations. This thesis focuses on greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, which have been well documented as the main cause of climate change 
(Gallego-Álvarez, Segura & Martínez-Ferrero 2015). Companies across the globe, as part of 
and under the strict scrutiny of society, have been putting unprecedented efforts into aligning 
2 
themselves with the international initiatives aimed at reducing GHG emissions that were put 
forward in the Kyoto Protocol (Gallego-Álvarez, Segura & Martínez-Ferrero 2015). 
To enhance our understanding of the economic impact of emerging environmental issues, this 
thesis investigated various financial policies of firms operating in industries associated with 
different levels of pollution. The highest polluting industries are (1) oil, gas and consumable 
fuels; (2) electric utilities; (3) gas utilities; (4) independent power producers and energy traders; 
(5) multi-utilities; (6) chemicals; (7) construction materials; (8) metals and mining; and (9) 
paper and forest products (Carbon Disclosure Project [CDP] 2012). Firms in these polluting 
industries would be expected to present different financial characteristics, such as stock returns, 
capital structure, financial constraints and capital expenditure, from those in low-emission or 
non-polluting industries. The differences can be attributed to the joint effects of various levels 
of costs and benefits related to dealing with environmental issues facing corporations. 
One of the main sources of corporate environment-related costs and benefits is the introduction 
of stringent environmental regulations that require companies to do extra work to serve the 
purpose of environment protection, that is, to reduce emissions to certain levels as agreed to in 
the Kyoto Protocol. Even though there have been some attempts to estimate the economic 
impact of these environmental regulations, the effects of these strict policies on corporate 
financial performance and other corporate finance strategies in a comprehensive setting remain 
unexplored (Hashmi & Al-Habib 2013; Okereke 2007; Weinhofer & Hoffmann 2010), 
particularly in relation to the recent global financial crisis (Fidrmuc & Korhonen 2010). In 
general, any possibility of a firm experiencing a decline in benefits or an increase in costs 
because of environment-related activities is by definition referred to as environmental risk.  
The objectives of this thesis were, therefore, to provide comprehensive empirical evidence on 
the linkages between environmental risk and corporate financing policies, which have been 
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under-researched. Specifically, three empirical chapters help to explain these relationships. The 
first empirical chapter presents an investigation into stock market reactions to bank loan 
announcements of polluting relative to non-polluting borrowers. In the second empirical 
chapter, the stock market reactions to SEO announcements of polluting relative to non-
polluting issuers are examined. The third empirical chapter addresses the level of financial 
constraints associated with polluters relative to non-polluters through their cash dividend 
policies, and the market reactions when the polluters pay cash dividends. With regard to the 
identification strategy, in all empirical chapters, a shift was exploited in the stringency of 
environmental policies in Australia that arguably exogenously affects the environmental risk 
facing firms: the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in December 2007. This cut-off point 
enabled better identification of the causal impact of environmental risk on the announcement 
effects of corporate financing policies. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides detailed definitions of polluters and 
non-polluters and Section 1.3 discusses the background on environmental policies in Australia 
in light of the Kyoto Protocol ratification. These two sections lay the foundation for the 
identification strategy that was employed in all three empirical chapters. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 
present the key findings and contributions of the three empirical chapters, respectively. 
1.2 POLLUTERS AND NON-POLLUTERS 
Given the unavailability of comprehensive time-series data on firm-level environmental risk, 
that is, the GHG emissions or energy consumption of firms listed on the Australia Stock 
Exchange (ASX), the polluting nature of industries was relied on to classify the sample firms 
into two groups, namely, polluters and non-polluters. Polluters were defined as firms operating 
in industries identified as ‘environmentally sensitive’, that is, the biggest GHG emitters or 
energy consumers. ‘Polluting’ firms are more likely to face environmental issues, that is, 
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climate change, that may lead to serious financial consequences. The financial consequences 
can be in the form of environment-related management and accounting costs, clean-up costs, 
compliance and litigation costs or reputation damage costs, among others. 
Because this study examined the market performance of firms, the industry-based definition of 
polluters needed to be aligned with investors’ perceptions of the industries whose nature of 
operation exposes their firms to higher environmental risk relative to others. Two further sub-
criteria needed to be satisfied: (1) the industry classification system is globally recognised, 
standardised and widely adopted by investors on the ASX market; and (2) the term 
‘environmental risk’ is narrowed down to its main subset ‘carbon risk’, which can be captured 
through reported or estimated carbon emissions. 
For the first criterion, the three-letter ASX code of each sample firm was matched with the 
corresponding Global Sector Classification Standard (GICS)1 to identify its relevant sector and 
industry. The GICS system comprises 10 sectors aggregated from 24 industry groups, 68 
industries and 154 sub-industries that have officially been used to classify ASX-listed firms 
since 1 July 2002, which covers the sample period in this thesis well.  
For the second criterion, reports by investors were followed to identify the GICS industries that 
emit the most GHG as well as consume the most energy as described by the Greenhouse Gas 
Protocol (GHG Protocol).2 Among the 10 GICS sectors, three sectors—energy, utilities and 
materials—are well recognised as the highest GHG emitters. For example, according to AMP 
Capital,3 energy, utility and materials were the largest (total 85%) contributors to ASX200 
                                                          
1 The GICS is a joint Standard and Poor/Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) product aimed at 
standardising industry definitions worldwide (source: http://www.asx.com.au/products/gics.htm).  
2 http://www.ghgprotocol.org/ 
3 AMP Capital is a leading Australian investment house with A$165.4 billion in funds under management. They 
were among the first to sign on to the Principles for Responsible Investment in 2007 and have broadly considered 
environmental, social and corporate governance issues in equity investment strategies and advice (source: 
http://www.ampcapital.com.au/about-us/esg-and-responsible-investment). 
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GHG emission intensity as of the end of August 2015. With regard to GHG emission 
investment risk, as measured by carbon emission cost, which is equal to the estimated equity-
based tonnes of emissions times the assumed carbon price of AUD 50/tonne CO2-e, the energy, 
materials and utilities sectors topped the list, accounting for 33%, 21% and 19%, respectively, 
of the total carbon cost of the 10 GICS sectors in the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) World Index (AMP Capital 2016). 
To address the possible concern that some industries within these three sectors could be less 
emission intensive, the CDP4 was consulted to identify the highest emitting industries within 
the energy, utilities and materials sectors. To this end, firms classified into the nine following 
GICS industries were defined as polluters: (1) oil, gas and consumable fuels; (2) electric 
utilities; (3) gas utilities; (4) independent power producers and energy traders; (5) multi-
utilities; (6) chemicals; (7) construction materials; (8) metals and mining; and (9) paper and 
forest products (CDP 2012). 
1.3 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN AUSTRALIA 
This section briefly presents an overview of the development of environmental protection 
regulations in Australia in light of their material contribution to the increasing environmental 
risk associated with Australian entities. The focus is on the policies that aim to reduce carbon 
emissions and energy consumption because they expose firms, especially those in carbon-
intensive industries, to higher carbon risk, which is the main subset of environmental risk. In 
addition, these policies have attracted the most attention of market participants recently.  
                                                          
4 The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) represents 822 institutional investors holding over US$100 trillion in 
assets around the globe to help reveal the risk, especially climate change risk, in their investment portfolios 
(source: https://www.cdp.net/en-US/Pages/About-Us.aspx). 
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The key message from this discussion is the growing importance of reducing carbon emissions 
as an urgent tool to cope with climate change and the policy implications of risk facing 
Australia businesses. Two main sources of environmental regulatory risk are discussed here: 
(1) the stringency of environmental policies and (2) the heightened uncertainty about future 
regulations. It is obvious that both of these sources have become significantly more viable in 
the period subsequent to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the Australian Government 
in December 2007. 
1.3.1 The International Development of Carbon Emissions Reduction Schemes 
In recent years, there have been increasing concerns about climate change and the growing 
levels of GHG emissions. As a result, international organisations and the governments of a 
high number of developed nations have been prompted to implement strong carbon reduction 
policies and actions. Accordingly, a wide range of GHG emissions reduction schemes have 
been enacted, for example, cap-and-trade systems and adaptation rebates that either establish a 
pricing mechanism for carbon or introduce low carbon technologies and practices 
(Subramaniam et al. 2012). 
Internationally, the Kyoto Protocol was signed by the member countries of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1997 and came into effect in 2005 
(United Nations Environmental Programme [UNEP] 2006). The Protocol is an internationally 
binding agreement whereby participating countries commit to cutting down GHG emissions to 
satisfy national reduction targets (Talberg & Swoboda 2013; UNEP 2006). Regionally and 
nationally, GHG emissions trading schemes have been legislated in some countries, including 
European countries under the European Union (EU) (Talberg & Swoboda 2013). The European 
Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which was introduced in 2005, was the first cap-
and-trade scheme in the world. The launch of the EU ETS was aimed at reducing GHG 
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emissions and it currently covers approximately 12,000 heavy-energy-using installations in the 
power generation and manufacturing industry, accounting for over 40% of all EU emissions 
(Talberg & Swoboda 2013). In addition, some regional programmes are operational in the 
United States (US), Canada and Japan. For instance, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 
the first compulsory cap-and-trade system in the US, was signed into law in 2009 by nine states 
to reduce carbon emissions from the power sector (Talberg & Swoboda 2013). 
1.3.2 The National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Scheme in Australia 
In Australia, the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (NGER Act) provides 
the legislative framework for the NGER scheme.5 This scheme is a single national framework 
for reporting and disseminating company information about GHG emissions, energy 
production, energy consumption and other information specified under the NGER Act. The 
NGER scheme is administered by the Clean Energy Regulator. 
Of note, under the NGER Act, businesses (either as an individual facility or as a corporate 
group) emitting more than threshold tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent, or consuming more 
than threshold megawatt hours of electricity or threshold million litres of fuel in a financial 
year are required to register, to collect data and keep records, and to report their GHG 
emissions, energy production and consumption to the Clean Energy Regulator by 31 October 
each year following the financial year reporting period. The Clean Energy Regulator then 
publishes Scope 1 GHG emissions, Scope 2 GHG emissions and net energy consumption for 
each registered corporation under the NGER Act that meets the publishing thresholds. Of direct 
relevance here, the carbon emissions publishing thresholds are corporate groups with Scope 1 
and Scope 2 GHG emissions combined that are equal to or greater than 125 kilotonnes for 
                                                          
5 Source: Clean Energy Regulator website (www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/national-greenhouseand-energy-
reporting/pages/default.aspx). 
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reporting year 2008–09, 87.5 kilotonnes for reporting year 2009–10, and 50 kilotons for 
reporting year 2010–11 and all subsequent reporting years. Finally, the NGER Act also 
provides for greenhouse and energy audits of reporting corporations registered under the Act 
and the establishment of a register of greenhouse and energy auditors. Audits are used to 
determine whether registered corporations are complying with the NGER Act. 
1.3.3 Abolition of the Carbon Pricing Mechanism in Australia 
The decision to introduce a carbon pricing mechanism (CPM) in Australia was made after years 
of debate and discussion on the best ways to reduce Australia’s GHG emissions (Subramaniam 
et al. 2015). In 2007, the Australian Government signed the Kyoto Protocol, which aimed to 
reduce the collective GHG emissions of developed countries by at least 5% below 1999 levels 
during the 2008–2012 commitment period. In 2008, the Garnaut Climate Change Review, 
commissioned by the Australian Government to conduct an independent study of the impacts 
of climate change on the Australian economy, released its final report. One of the 
recommendations of the report was the introduction of an emissions trading system 
(Subramaniam et al. 2015). Following this, in late 2008, the Australian Government proposed 
an emissions trading system called the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS), but the 
scheme was finally rejected by the Senate in 2009. In 2011, the Australian Labor government 
announced its ‘Securing a Clean Energy Future’ plan, and subsequently, the Clean Energy 
Legislative Package was introduced, a feature of which is the CPM. 
The change in the Australian Government from a Labor to a Liberal Coalition party following 
the federal election in late 2013 brought a dramatic turnaround in carbon-related policy and 
legislation in Australia (Subramaniam et al. 2015). The newly elected government introduced 
a package of bills to repeal the Clean Energy Legislative Package from 1 July 2014 and also 
proposed its Direct Action Plan to meet its target of reducing emissions by 5% below 2000 
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levels by 2020 through the Emissions Reduction Fund scheme (Subramaniam et al. 2015). The 
new government’s attempt to repeal the carbon tax failed because the repeal bill was rejected 
by the Senate in late 2013. Finally, the repeal legislation received Royal Assent on 17 July 
2014 and the bills as part of this package are now law, with effect from 1 July 2014. The 
abolition of the carbon tax was expected to lower costs for Australian businesses and ease cost 
of living pressures for households.6 
1.4 MAIN FINDINGS 
The first empirical chapter, Chapter 2, documents several key findings derived from a hand-
collected sample of 759 bank loan announcements made by firms listed on the ASX during the 
period 2001–2013. Overall, it was found that the stock market reacted significantly and 
positively to bank loan announcements. Further, the stock market reacted more positively to 
the bank loan announcements of polluting borrowers than to those of non-polluting borrowers, 
and the difference was mainly observed in the post-Kyoto Protocol ratification period. In 
addition, the positive market response was more pronounced among polluters in poorer 
information environments as characterised by smaller borrower size, higher return volatility 
and smaller loan size. The results were robust to alternative event windows and model 
specifications. 
The second empirical chapter, Chapter 3, documents several key findings derived from a 
sample of 3,625 SEO and 2,204 rights announcements of firms listed on the ASX over the 
period 2001–2013. Overall, it was found that the stock market reacted significantly and 
negatively to SEO announcements. Further, the market responded more negatively to SEO 
announcements of polluting issuers than to those of non-polluting issuers, and the reaction 
                                                          
6 Source: Australian Government, Department of the Environment website 
(https://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/repealing-carbon-tax). 
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difference was significantly larger in the post-Kyoto period. The effect was robust after 
controlling for alternative event windows, model specifications and endogeneity using 
propensity score matching (PSM). In addition, the relative negative effect on the polluting 
issuers was weaker if the SEOs were underwritten, and even became positive if the 
underwriters were the most reputable investment banks. In contrast, a similar analysis on rights 
offers showed indistinguishable market reactions between polluting and non-polluting issuers. 
The third empirical chapter, Chapter 3, documents several key findings derived from a sample 
of all firms listed on the ASX during the period 2001–2013. First, relative to controlling non-
polluters, in the post-Kyoto period, polluters were more likely to reduce cash dividend payouts. 
Secondly, polluters reserved more cash. Thirdly, polluters more frequently announced 
obtaining external finance such as bank loans or SEOs. Fourthly, the market reacted more 
positively around the days when polluters went ex-dividend and the effect was more 
pronounced for more financially constrained payers. Finally, in the one to two years subsequent 
to the ex-dividend day, polluting payers exhibited better operating performance and higher 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) than non-polluting payers. 
1.5 CONTRIBUTIONS 
This thesis contributes to the literature and policy implications in several ways. First, it 
contributes to the recent debate on whether banks are still special given the recent unsupportive 
evidence on the insignificant market reaction to a population of bank loans that comprise both 
announced and non-announced loans (Maskara & Mullineaux 2011); negative bank loan 
abnormal returns using data from emerging markets such as China (Bailey, Huang & Yang 
2011; Gan et al. 2014; Huang, Schwienbacher & Zhao 2012); negative long-term market 
reactions (Billett, Flannery & Garfinkel 2006); and the emergence of other non-bank financial 
institutions that also provide debt financing, and the development of secondary markets for 
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loans, which may reduce banks’ monitoring incentives (Gande & Saunders 2012). By showing 
significantly positive market reactions to bank loan announcements made over the period 
2001–2013 in Australia, this thesis confirms the uniqueness function of bank loans in 
mitigating information asymmetry associated with borrowers. In addition, it provides evidence 
on the environmental information content of bank loan announcements, indicating that stock 
investors value the additional information on borrowers’ environmental risk conveyed through 
bank loan decisions and that such effect is more pronounced in relation to firms with a higher 
degree of information asymmetry. These findings confirm the hypothesis that bank loan 
announcements provide external environmental disclosure and show solid evidence on socially 
responsible investment opportunities for equity investors. Next, the thesis provides supporting 
evidence on the effectiveness of stringent environmental regulations by showing that markets 
appreciate stricter environmental considerations in bank loan screening and monitoring 
processes to comply with these regulations (i.e., the market provided greater rewards to 
polluters who successfully obtained loans in the post-Kyoto period). These findings provide 
important implications for policymakers who seek to improve environmental protection via 
effective bank monitoring of ‘polluting loans’ that may damage the environment in the long 
term, especially in Australia where bank loans are still the main source of financing for 
businesses. 
Second, the thesis adds to the extensive empirical literature that examines the stock price effects 
of SEO announcements in the following ways. This study is among the first to establish a 
relationship between environmental risk and market reaction to firm SEO announcements. 
Further, it contributes to the debate on the wealth impact of non-financial regulations7 such as 
environmental policies. By demonstrating that the stock responses to SEO announcements 
                                                          
7 Non-financial regulations refer to any regulations that do not primarily deal with macro-economic, fiscal or 
monetary issues, but rather with social and environmental issues. 
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declined more for polluters than for non-polluters in the tougher environmental regulatory 
period (i.e., the post-Kyoto period), the study provides supporting evidence for the 
effectiveness of strict environmental regulations. This finding provides important implications 
for policymakers who pursue non-financial regulations to protect the natural environment, 
which has become a key global challenge. 
Third, the thesis confirms the previous observation that financially constrained firms tend to 
rely more on inside financial resources, as indicated by cutting dividends and increasing cash 
holdings, than unconstrained firms do. In addition, it provides supporting evidence for the 
signalling role of dividend-paying decisions through which good-quality firms reinforce their 
financial health and future prospects with outside investors, thereby separating themselves 
from non-payers. Further, it identifies that increasing environmental risk significantly and 
positively drives corporate financial constraints. This evidence suggests a mechanism to better 
understand the environmental–financial performance relationship that is the subject of long-
standing debate in the literature. Moreover, the study establishes the role of stringent 
environmental policies in enforcing the financial impact of environmental risk. Overall, these 
findings provide important directions for corporate financial managers who pursue optimal 
financing plans in light of their firms’ exposures to environmental risk and implications for 
environmental regulators who seek financial tools to protect the natural environment. 
A final contribution of the thesis concerns the methodology. Specifically, the thesis is among 
the first to examine the event of the Kyoto Protocol ratification by setting out a quasi-natural 
experiment. This technique enabled a better identification strategy to establish the causal 
impacts of environmental risk on the financing announcement effects. In other words, the 
endogeneity concerns, that is, environmental risk and stock market reactions may be jointly 
determined, could be significantly alleviated, making the empirical evidence more reliable.  
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This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2, the first empirical chapter, presents an investigation 
into stock market reactions to bank loan announcements of polluting borrowers relative to those 
of non-polluting borrowers. Chapter 3, the second empirical chapter, examines the stock market 
reactions to SEO announcements of polluting issuers relative to those of non-polluting issuers. 
Chapter 4, the third empirical chapter, addresses the level of financial constraints associated 
with polluters relative to those of non-polluters through their cash dividend policies, and the 
market reactions when the polluters pay cash dividends. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Environmental Risk, Bank Loans and Stock Market Reaction 
--- 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Banks, in developed markets, have been theoretically and empirically proven to provide 
‘special’ certification service over borrowers’ creditworthiness, and stock investors translate 
that certification effect into positive abnormal returns around bank loan announcements8 
(Aintablian & Roberts 2000; Best & Zhang 1993; Billett, Flannery & Garfinkel 1995; James 
1987; Lummer & McConnell 1989). Apart from bank and loan features, the existing literature 
mainly focuses on borrowers’ financial characteristics to explain the certification effect (Fields 
et al. 2006; Hadlock & James 2002; Slovin, Johnson & Glascock 1992). However, the 
increasing environmental risk of borrowers could potentially change the creditworthiness and, 
eventually, the certification value of bank loans (Aintablian, Mcgraw & Roberts 2007; 
Thompson & Cowton 2004; UNEP 1997). Hence, this chapter aimed to provide fresh insights 
into the impact of environmental risk of borrowers on stock market reaction to bank loan 
announcements in Australia. Further, this chapter empirically investigated how this 
certification effect changed following the introduction of more stringent environmental policies 
(i.e., the period subsequent to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by Australian Government) 
and the mechanism through which the effect works.  
Banks themselves have motivations to investigate borrowers’ environmental risk in their 
lending decisions for several reasons. First, regulators have recently enacted more stringent 
                                                          
8 See Section 2.2.2 for a summary of the related theories and Table 2.2 for a literature review of empirical studies 
on why banks are ‘special’. 
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environmental policies and market participants have increasingly imposed stricter views on 
firms committing activities that are potentially harmful to the natural environment (Moosa & 
Ramiah 2014). Therefore, actions that show that banks do care about protecting the 
environment, especially through their main activity of lending, will boost the banks’ reputation 
in the markets. Second, the literature has established a strong link between environmental 
performance and the financial performance of borrowers (Ambec & Lanoie 2008; Clarkson et 
al. 2011; Gallego-Álvarez, Segura & Martínez-Ferrero 2014; Iwata & Okada 2011). Hence, 
better management of firm environmental risk can eventually result in better management of a 
firm’s financial ability to pay back the loan on time, which is central to banks’ credit risk 
management. 
Banks have relative advantages in evaluating borrowers’ environmental risk in the following 
ways. First, banks possess superior screening and monitoring powers over other market 
participants because of their ability to access the private information of prospective borrowers 
(Diamond 1991; Fama 1985). Thus, publicly announced approvals of bank loans are likely to 
be perceived by investors as additional favourable news related to the borrowing firms, leading 
to positive abnormal returns for these borrowing firms (James 1987). This finding is referred 
to as evidence of the ‘uniqueness’ or ‘specialness’ of bank loans, which has spurred empirical 
research on this topic (see Table 2.2). Second, the literature shows that banks have become 
more aware of the importance of borrowers’ environmental risk as one of the criteria of their 
lending decisions (Coulson & Monks 1999; Thompson 1998b; Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 
2008). For example, to restrict borrowing firms from undertaking excessive environmentally 
sensitive activities9 that may deteriorate borrowers’ abilities to repay loans, banks can 
                                                          
9 Environmental sensitive activities are those that (1) have the capacity to contaminate land, water, air or other 
natural resources; (2) require a licence or permit to use natural resources, without which they cannot operate; (3) 
require a licence for emissions and discharges, without which they cannot operate; (4) may incur penalties for 
environmental reasons; or (5) may need to remediate contaminated land or install equipment to treat waste. 
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incorporate restrictive environmental covenants into loan contracts (Case 1999), and/or require 
an environmental risk premium in borrowing costs (Barannik 2001; Chava 2014). Therefore, 
market participants would expect that banks will be able to access private information on 
borrowers’ environmental risk in order to conduct reliable environmental assessment and 
management. Hence, approval of a bank loan may indicate that the borrower will have 
satisfactory environmental risk, at least over the term of the loan contract.  
Given the serious shortage of firms’ environmental information, announcements of bank loan 
approvals can be regarded as an external source of environmental disclosure to stock investors 
(Aintablian, Mcgraw & Roberts 2007). To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, Aintablian, 
Mcgraw and Roberts (2007) conducted the first and only empirical study exploring the 
relationship between bank loan approvals, borrowers’ environment risk and market reaction to 
bank loan announcements. Using Canadian data, the authors found that stock prices reacted 
positively to announcements of bank loan approvals to both polluters10 and non-polluters, but 
the positive response was more pronounced for the polluters. This finding is evidence of the 
existence of bank certification effects related to borrowers’ environmental risk. However, the 
study suffers from several disadvantages. First, the data sample is relatively small11 and covers 
the period 1988–1997 when banks’ considerations of borrowers’ environmental risk were 
relatively weak.12 Second, how banks’ certification effects change following the introduction 
of stringent environmental protection policies and quality of borrowers’ information 
environment had not yet been addressed. Third, the robustness of the results, that is, after 
controlling for different event windows, bank and loan explanatory factors, was not fully tested. 
                                                          
10 Authors define an announcing borrower as a polluter if it belongs to one of five specified industries: oil and 
gas, metals and minerals, paper and forest products, gold and precious minerals, and industrial products. 
11 The sample consists of only 152 bank loan announcements in Canada in comparison with 200–300 
announcements on average reported in bank loan announcements studies (see Table 2.2). 
12 More specific bank commitments to environmental protection have been introduced mainly since the end of the 
last century, including the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative 1997 and the Equator 
Principles 2013. 
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The above discussions lead to the main research question of this study: How does 
environmental risk affect stock market reaction to bank loan announcements? In other words, 
the aim was to revisit the ‘specialness’ concept of bank loans, that is, the signalling effect of 
bank lending, with a particular focus on the environmental nature of the borrowers. To do so, 
four testable hypotheses were developed and an empirical investigation conducted of stock 
price impacts of bank loan announcements in Australia during the period 2001–2013 using the 
well-established event study methodology of Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and James (1987). 
The first step was to investigate the announcements effect to assess whether banks can certify 
the general quality of borrowers by providing additional information to the market in Australia, 
and how this certification effect changes over time. The second step was to examine whether 
environmental information of borrowers is conveyed through bank loans by investigating the 
stock market reactions to bank loan announcements made by two groups of borrowers, namely, 
polluters and non-polluters, which were classified based on the polluting nature (i.e., GHG 
emissions and energy consumption) of their industries. The third step was to test whether banks 
convey more valuable environmental information of borrowers to stock markets through their 
loan decisions during periods of tougher environmental regulations. To test the environmental 
regulation impacts, the sample was split into two subsamples using the end of year 2007, when 
former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd officially ratified the Kyoto Protocol. This cut-off point is 
popularly recognised as the starting point of the Australian Government’s stringent 
environmental protection regulations (Ramiah, Martin & Moosa 2013). The final step was to 
examine whether the quality of the borrowers’ information environment is a mechanism of the 
certification effect of bank loans.  
Australia provides a unique setting to test the linkage between bank loans, borrower’s 
environmental risk and stock market performance for the following reasons. First, according 
to the Climate Change Review Update 2011, Australia is one of the most polluting countries 
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in the developed world based on per capita GHG emissions (Garnaut 2011). Consequently, 
Australian regulators have introduced a large number of stringent environmental policies to 
which both banks and firms have to comply (Moosa & Ramiah 2014; Ramiah, Martin & Moosa 
2013). Second, Australia’s banks have shown their willingness to be environmentally 
responsible by voluntarily participating in key global environmental protection initiatives, 
leading to market expectations of growing environmental considerations in bank lending 
processes. In addition, market participants have been increasingly aware of the indirect impact 
of banks’ monitoring on the natural environment via granting loans to firms associated with 
environmentally sensitive issues. Nevertheless, there are very few studies that quantify the 
wealth effect of environmental regulations on bank loans. 
This analysis shows that banks are able to provide certification on borrowers’ environmental 
risk, and that these certification effects have become more valuable in the period of tougher 
environmental regulations and a poorer information environment. Specifically, it was found 
that stock markets react positively to bank loan announcements in Australia, and these positive 
reactions are more pronounced for polluters than for non-polluters, which is consistent with the 
literature. Further, it was found that market reactions to bank loan announcements have been 
more pronounced for polluters than for non-polluters subsequent to the Kyoto ratification. In 
addition, the difference in market responses between polluters and non-polluters is more 
pronounced in poorer information environments as characterised by smaller borrower size, 
higher return volatility and smaller loans. The results are robust to controlling for different 
event windows, various firm, loan and bank characteristics, pre-Kyoto timespans and economic 
shocks (i.e., the Global Financial Crisis).13 
                                                          
13 We also assess the potential confounding effect of Global Financial Crisis (GFC). First, in the regressions that 
separate the bank loan abnormal returns between before and after the Kyoto Protocol ratification in Australia: Y 
= POST + Controls, the coefficient on the POST dummy is insignificant. This insignificance helps unwind the 
concern of the GFC because GFC affects all firms and the existence of such effect should lead to a significant 
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These findings make several important contributions to the literature. First, they contribute to 
the recent debate on whether banks are still special in light of the unsupportive empirical 
evidence on (1) insignificant market reactions to a population of bank loans that are either 
publicly announced or not announced (Maskara & Mullineaux 2011); (2) negative bank loan 
abnormal returns using data from emerging markets such as China (Bailey, Huang & Yang 
2011; Gan et al. 2014; Huang, Schwienbacher & Zhao 2012); (3) negative long-term market 
reactions (Billett, Flannery & Garfinkel 2006); and (4) the emergence of other non-bank 
financial institutions that also provide debt financing, and the development of secondary 
markets for loans, which may reduce banks’ monitoring incentives (Gande & Saunders 2012). 
By showing significantly positive market reactions to bank loan announcements made over the 
period 2001–2013 in Australia, the uniqueness function of mitigating information asymmetry 
associated with borrowers of bank loans is confirmed. 
Second, the findings provide evidence on the existence of the environmental information 
content of bank loan announcements, indicating that stock investors acknowledge the 
additional valuable information on borrowers’ environmental risk conveyed through bank loan 
decisions, and that acknowledgement is more pronounced for firms presenting a higher level 
of information asymmetry to their outside investors. These findings confirm the hypothesis that 
bank loan announcements provide external environmental disclosure and show solid evidence 
on socially responsible investment opportunities for equity investors. 
                                                          
coefficient in these regressions. Second, in our Difference-in-Difference (DiD) research design, we compare the 
difference in bank loan announcement effects between polluters (treatment firms) and non-polluters (control 
firms) in the post relative to the pre-Kyoto periods. We do so by estimating models in this form: Y = POLLUTER 
+ POST + POLLUTER*POST + Controls. The coefficient of the interaction term, POLLUTER*POST, captures 
the relative change in Y of polluters (compared to that of non-polluters) subsequent to the Kyoto Protocol 
ratification. As a result, the effects of GFC on polluters are offset by the effects of GFC on non-polluters. Finally, 
we include year fixed effects in all main regressions, which also (at least partly) control for economy-wide macro-
economic conditions (including the crisis) year by year.  These logics apply to all remaining analyses in 
subsequent chapters where we also adopt DiD model specifications. 
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Third, the study provides supporting evidence for the effectiveness of stringent environmental 
regulations by showing that markets appreciate stricter environmental considerations in bank 
loan screening and monitoring processes to comply with these regulations, that is, by providing 
greater rewards to polluters who successfully obtain loans in the post-Kyoto period. These 
findings provide important implications for policymakers who seek to improve environmental 
protection via effective bank monitoring of ‘polluting loans’ that may damage the environment 
in the long term, especially in Australia where bank loans are still the main source of financing 
for businesses. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 provides background information 
on Australian banks with environmental protection responsibilities and a literature review. 
Section 2.3 discusses the development of testable hypotheses. Section 2.4 is devoted to the 
description of data collection and summary statistics. The research methodology is provided in 
Section 2.5. The empirical results are displayed and discussed in Section 2.6. Finally, Section 
2.7 provides the conclusion and implications. 
2.2 RELATED LITERATURE 
2.2.1 Environmentally Responsible Lending 
Since the onset of the twenty-first century, Australian banks have been under four main sources 
of pressure to be environmentally responsible: (1) the internal management of environmental 
risk associated with borrowers as part of loan screening and monitoring processes, (2) 
voluntary commitments to global environmental protection initiatives, (3) external monitoring 
of bank environmental responsibilities and (4) strict regulations of environmental protection in 
Australia. 
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Similar to other banks around the globe, Australian banks have begun to increasingly 
incorporate environmental risk considerations into their lending practices, particularly since 
the enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act 1980 (CERCLA, also known as Superfund liability) in the US (Ganzi et al. 1998; Jeucken 
2010; Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008). According to Case (1999) and Thompson and Cowton 
(2004), the environmental risk faced by banks has three dimensions: direct risk, indirect risk 
and reputational risk. Specifically, direct risk is when a lender takes possession of a security in 
the form of a contaminated liability and becomes liable for clean-up costs potentially beyond 
the value of the original loan. Indirect risk is when losses from environmental damage or 
increased costs due to the introduction of more stringent environmental regulations cause a 
borrower to default on a loan. Reputation risk is when a lender is associated with an 
environmental disaster experienced by a borrower.  
Under CERCLA there have been some cases in which lenders have had to take responsibility 
for the environmental damage caused by insolvent borrowers, such as the case involving the 
Maryland Bank and Trust Company and Fleet Factors Corporation in the US (Bouma, Jeucken 
& Klinkers 2001; Ganzi et al. 1998; Jeucken 2010; Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008). Therefore, 
to better manage credit risk, or borrower ability to repay loans on time, Australian banks have 
been increasingly evaluating borrower environmental performance in their loan screening and 
monitoring processes, especially for borrowers who have been involved in environmentally 
sensitive activities. 
The growing perception of indirect impacts of financial institutions on natural environments 
has led to a series of global environmental protection initiatives. Typically, all four major 
Australian banks (the Big 4)—the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ), 
the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), the National Australia Bank Limited (NAB) and 
Westpac Banking Corporation (Westpac)—are signatories to the UNEP Statement by Financial 
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Institutions and the Equator Principles (EP) (International Financial Corporation 2013; UNEP 
1997). The UNEP Statement by Financial Institutions is an initiative of the United Nations 
setting out that identification and quantification of environmental risk should be regarded as 
‘business as usual’ in all operations of financial institutions. The EP was initially introduced 
by the International Financial Corporation in 2003 (the third version was produced in 2013) to 
establish principles on environmental and social risk management for project financing. 
Westpac was one of the founders of the EP, the ANZ and NAB signed up in 2006 and 2007, 
respectively, and most recently, the CBA became the seventy-ninth member of the EP (see 
Table 2.1). By voluntarily participating in these global initiatives, the participating banks are 
committed to environmental protection via their lending practices. In return, the act of sharing 
joint responsibility for resolving global issues such as environmental protection has positive 
reputational effects for the banks.  
Table 2.1: Australian Banks Adopting the Equator Principles 
Institution Adopting Date Joining Order 
Westpac Banking Corporation 04/06/2003 8 
Australia & New Zealand Banking Group 15/12/2006 32 
National Australia Bank 25/10/2007 44 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 26/05/2014 79 
Source: http://www.equator-principles.com/, accessed on 28/08/2014 
Banks’ environmental responsibility has recently been under stricter scrutiny from a wide 
variety of external parties, such as non-government green activists. In Australia, two 
noteworthy examples are Oxfam and Greenpeace reports showing that Australian banks are 
indirectly damaging the environment. Specifically, Oxfam in April 2014 released a report, 
Banking on Shaky Ground, providing evidence that Australia’s Big 4 banks—ANZ, CBA, 
NAB and Westpac—are backing agricultural and timber companies that have been accused of 
land grabbing in developing countries by forcing local people from their homes and farms 
without proper consent or compensation, leaving these communities homeless and hungry 
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(Oxfam 2014). Additionally, Greenpeace, in their recent report Pillars of Pollution, provide 
evidence that the Big 4 banks have been investing billions of dollars in polluting coal power 
stations, despite the huge amounts of money and time they have invested to present themselves 
as socially responsible and environmentally sustainable companies. 
In a developed country such as Australia, the growing perception of broad society of the 
indirect impact of bank lending on the natural environment has increasingly put pressure on 
banks’ environmental responsibility. One notable recent example is an extensive protest 
involving messages from over 100,000 Australians asking the CEOs of Australia’s Big 4 banks 
to rule out financing the Abbot Point coal port expansion on the Great Barrier Reef. Financing 
for this project has been refused by some of the world’s biggest banks, including HSBC, 
Deutsche Bank, the Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays and Citibank, because it is estimated 
that the project will triple Australia’s carbon emissions, locking the country into at least 30 
more years of coal-fired power. 
Finally, the Australian Government has demonstrated strong commitment to environmental 
protection through ratifications of a series of stringent environmental policies, including the 
Kyoto Protocol in December 2007, the Climate Change Review in 2008 and its update in 2011, 
the CPRS in 2008, and the renewable energy scheme in 2010, to list just a few (Moosa & 
Ramiah 2014; Ramiah, Martin & Moosa 2013). These policies are part of the Australian 
Government’s solutions to the issue of being an energy-intensive economy with the highest 
level of per capita emissions in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) group14 (Garnaut 2011). 
                                                          
14 The OECD is an international organisation of countries with highly developed economies and democratic 
governments.  
24 
The solid commitment to environmental protection by the Australian Government has been in 
evidence since the election of former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in 2007. After being sworn 
in, Mr Rudd fulfilled his election promise to protect the environment as one of the most 
important tasks on his agenda by enacting the NGER Act in August 2007 and signing the Kyoto 
Protocol in December 2007 as two of his first actions. By enacting the NGER Act, Australia 
became one of a few countries that requires mandatory reporting on carbon emissions at the 
corporate level,15 thus making organisations accountable for their carbon emissions (Lodhia & 
Martin 2011). Additionally, by adopting the Kyoto Protocol, the Australian Government 
officially shares in the global efforts to mitigate climate change, a key global issue challenging 
sustainable development. These acts were further developed in subsequent years by Prime 
Minsters Julia Gillard and Tony Abbott, and the post-Kyoto period has witnessed a tougher 
environmental regulatory framework than existed previously. 
2.2.2 Theoretical Background 
Modern theory on financial intermediation emphasises the role of banks as delegated monitors 
that have a comparative advantage in acquiring and processing the private information of 
borrowers over other lenders (Boyd & Prescott 1986; Diamond 1984, 1991; Fama 1985; 
Ramakrishnan & Thakor 1984). In other words, the raison d’être of banks is their ‘special’ role 
in mitigating the information asymmetry problem of borrowers (Bhattacharya & Thakor 1993; 
Boot 2000). 
Diamond (1984) argued that financial intermediaries, banks in particular, are delegated by the 
market to monitor loan contracts signed with firms at relatively low cost. Ramakrishnan and 
Thakor (1984) claimed that the existence of financial intermediaries is attributed to their ability 
                                                          
15 The legislation provides a single national framework for the reporting of GHG emissions by organisations that 
meet a certain threshold. The threshold was initially set at 25 kilotonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents for 
corporations and 125 kilotonnes for corporate groups with further reductions in threshold levels for corporate 
groups planned for subsequent years. 
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to solve the informational asymmetry issues and minimise the cost of producing reliable market 
information. Boyd and Prescott (1986) further theoretically interpreted the emergence of 
financial intermediation as the most efficient way of accessing, processing and allocating 
private information, and this was supported by Fama (1985) and Diamond (1991). 
Because of the ‘uniqueness’ feature of banks, Fama (1985) and Mikkelson and Partch (1986) 
argued that there is a signalling effect associated with bank loan approvals. A borrower could 
have itself screened by a bank to seek external certification of its creditworthiness. Therefore, 
it is understandable that market participants adjust their investment behaviours to newly 
announced bank loan approvals. This unique market phenomenon has attracted researchers’ 
attention for decades. 
2.2.3 Related Empirical Evidence 
2.2.3.1 Bank loans and borrowing firms’ abnormal returns 
Numerous attempts have been made to test the proposition of the ‘specialness’ of bank loans 
initially posited by Fama (1985). Empirical studies have mainly focused on the impact of bank 
loan announcements on borrowing firms’ stock returns. The event study methodology has been 
widely employed to measure, test and explain the abnormal returns associated with borrowing 
firms and bank loan announcements. However, it is fair to say that the empirical findings are 
mixed. Key findings in the literature are summarised in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: Studies on the Effects of Bank Loan Announcements on  
Borrowers’ Stock Returns 
References Country Data Period Type of Announcement 
Sample 
Size 
Abnormal 
Return 
Johnson (1997) US 1980–1986 Bank credit agreement 222 Positive 
Best and Zhang (1993) US 1977–1989 Bank credit agreement 491 Positive 
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References Country Data Period Type of Announcement 
Sample 
Size 
Abnormal 
Return 
Billett, Flannery and 
Garfinkel (1995) 
US 1980–1989 Loan 626 Positive 
Fields et al. (2006) US 1980–2003 Bank loans 1,111 Positive 
Hadlock and James (2002) US 1980–1993 Bank loans, Clean 144 Positive 
James (1987) US 1974–1983 Bank loan agreement 80 Positive 
Lee, K-W and Sharpe (2009) US 1995–1999 Bank loans 201 Positive 
Li and Ongena (2014) US 2005–2009 Syndicated bank loans 351 Positive 
Lummer and McConnell 
(1989) 
US 1976–1986 Bank credit agreement 728 Positive 
Marsh (2006) US 1999–2005 Bank loans 217 Positive 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) US 1972–1982 Credit agreements 155 Positive 
Ongena and Roscovan (2013) US 1980–2003 Syndicated bank loans 985 Positive 
Preece and Mullineaux (1996) US 1980–1987 Credit agreements 446 Positive 
Ross (2010) US 2000–2003 Bank loans 1,064 Positive 
Shockley and Thakor (1997) US 1989–1990 
Loan commitments 
purchase 
189 Positive 
Slovin, Johnson and Glascock 
(1992) 
US 1980–1986 Loan agreements 273 Positive 
Slovin, Sushka and Hudson 
(1988) 
US 1982–1985 
Commercial paper 
offering 
35 Positive 
Gande and Saunders (2012) US 1987–2009 
First-trade and post-
trade loans 
1,354 Positive 
Ongena et al. (2014) US 1997–2003 Loan deals 896 Positive 
Billett, Flannery and 
Garfinkel (2006) 
US 1980–2000 Bank loan agreement 10,619 Negative 
Godlewski (2014) France 2000–2009 Large bank loans 253 Negative 
Bailey, Huang and Yang 
(2011) 
China 1999–2004 Bank loans 285 Negative 
Gan et al. (2014) China 1996–2009 Bank loans 607 Negative 
Huang, Schwienbacher and 
Zhao (2012) 
China 2001–2006 Bank loans 424 Negative 
Zhang, Y, Gan and Li (2012) China 1996–2009 Bank loans 607 Negative 
Aintablian, Mcgraw and 
Roberts (2007) 
Canada 1988–1997 Bank loans 152 Positive 
Aintablian and Roberts (2000) Canada 1988–1995 Corporate loans 137 Positive 
Andre, Mathieu and Zhang 
(2001) 
Canada 1982–1995 Bank credit agreement 122 Positive 
Fery et al. (2003) Australia 1983–1999 Signed credit agreement 196 Positive 
Boscaljon and Ho (2005) Asia16 1991–2002 Bank loans 128 Positive 
Qing, Gan and Li (2011) 
Hong 
Kong 
2002–2007 Bank loans 85 Positive 
Source: Synthesised by the researcher 
 
                                                          
16 Countries included in the sample are Hong Kong, Korea, Thailand and Taiwan. 
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a. Positive reactions 
Most research in this area has found that bank loans are ‘unique’ by reporting significant 
positive stock price reactions over various announcement windows. Mikkelson and Partch 
(1986) investigated the stock price reaction to announcements related to different types of 
financing options. They found that over the two-day event period that ends at the announcement 
date, shareholders reacted significantly and positively only to the announcements of credit 
agreements and significantly and negatively to common stock and convertible debt offerings. 
Shareholders’ reactions to the announcement of other types of debt securities such as straight 
debt, private debt placements and term loans were slightly negative but insignificant at all 
conventional levels. 
James (1987) examined the market reactions to firms’ announcements of three different types 
of debt financing activities: commercial bank loans, privately placed debt and public straight 
debt. He found significant and positive stock price responses to the bank loan announcements 
and insignificant reactions to the other two types of announcements. However, significant and 
negative abnormal returns were observed if funds raised via private and public placements were 
used to repay bank loans. These findings support Fama’s (1985) argument that the approval of 
a bank loan is the bank’s accreditation of the borrower’s current and future positive 
performance. The announcement of bank loan approval is then perceived by the market as good 
news associated with the borrowing firms. 
Indeed, findings of Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and James (1987) have generated a motion of 
empirical studies employing the event study methodology to evaluate the information content 
of bank loan announcements. These studies initially investigated announcing firms in 
developed stock markets such as the US, Canada, Europe and Australia, and have recently 
expanded to Asian markets, with a particular focus on China. In general, empirical findings 
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from developed markets show that there are positive abnormal returns associated with the 
announcements of bank loan approvals (see Table 2.2). A potential explanation is that banks 
in developed economies function better in terms of identifying positive cash flow projects.  
To solve the reporting bias17 related to prior studies, Fery et al. (2003) took into account both 
public and non-public announcements of signed credit agreements to the markets in Australia. 
They found that there was no significant market response to non-published loans but a 
significant and positive reaction to published ones. In addition, positive excess returns were 
observed only for public announcements of loans given by a single bank rather than multiple 
lenders. These results advocate the prior research conducted in US and Canadian markets 
emphasising the value of the lender–borrower relationship. 
Recently, researchers have been paying more attention to developing economies. Boscaljon 
and Ho (2005) focused on bank loan announcements in Asian countries and their data sample 
period covers before, during and after the Asian crisis in 1997. They found significant and 
positive market responses to 128 bank loan announcements during the entire sample period. 
However, bank loans approved prior to the crisis did not establish any significant impact on 
borrowing firms’ market performance. In contrast, the market reacted positively and 
significantly to bank loan announcements made during and after the crisis. Thus, the authors 
concluded that the value of lender–borrower relationships is positively associated with the level 
of economic uncertainty. 
b. Negative reactions 
Although most prior studies have found a positive relation between bank loan announcements 
and borrowers’ market performance, a number of studies in recent years have reported negative 
                                                          
17  Fery et al. (2003) argue that if disclosure of a certain type of news is not compulsory, then favourable news is 
more likely to be published than non-favourable news. Therefore, studies that use only publicly announced news 
may present some ‘reporting bias’ problems. 
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findings, especially those focusing on the Chinese markets (Bailey, Huang & Yang 2011; Gan 
et al. 2014; Huang, Schwienbacher & Zhao 2012; Zhang, Y, Gan & Li 2012) (see Table 2.2). 
Bailey, Huang and Yang (2011) examined 285 bank loans announced by Chinese listed firms 
for the period 1999–2004 and found that the average cumulative abnormal return was −391 
basis points and significant at the 5% level. The negative findings are robust for various lengths 
of event windows. These findings were attributed to the government-controlled banking system 
over the sample period. It is well documented that bank loan decisions are highly subject to 
political connections rather than purely commercial objectives in China (Allen, F, Qian & Qian 
2005; Chen, G, Firth & Xu 2009). Therefore, bank loans are more likely to be granted to poor 
performing firms such as state-owned enterprises, which sends negative signals to the markets. 
These outcomes have been confirmed by other studies. For example, Huang, Schwienbacher 
and Zhao (2012) found negative market reactions to 424 bank loan announcements made by 
public companies in China during the period 2001–2006. The authors argued that the negative 
response was heightened for firms with vulnerable minority shareholders’ protection. They 
explained that bank loans can be treated as an abusive tool for major shareholders to gain 
personal benefits at the expenses of other shareholders. Thus, announcements of such loans are 
perceived as bad news by the market and result in a decrease in the borrower’s stock prices. 
Similarly, Gan et al. (2014) reported negative and significant findings in their study using 607 
bank loan announcements of Chinese listed companies issued between 1996 and 2009. 
However, these negative findings were not significant after 2005 because of a series of banking 
system reforms initiated in 2005.18 Their results are consistent with findings provided by 
                                                          
18 The reforms include ‘allowing strategic investors, listing of banks’ shares and restricting the share of 
government ownership’ (Gan et al. 2014). 
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Bailey, Huang and Yang (2011) and Huang, Schwienbacher and Zhao (2012), further 
confirming that the loan decisions of Chinese banks are primarily politically driven. 
Negative market reactions to bank loan announcements have also been observed in developed 
markets. Godlewski (2014) employed a sample of 253 bank loans announced by French firms 
over the period 2000–2009. Splitting the entire sample into two subgroups, the ‘bust’ period 
2007–2009 and the ‘boom’ period of 2000–2007, Godlewski found a significant and negative 
stock price response in the former period and insignificant results in the latter. First, the 
negative finding in the bust period is not consistent with the literature, implying that the 
certification value of bank lending does not work during bust periods. Second, the insignificant 
outcome in the boom period is attributed to the lax conditions of bank loans. Therefore, the 
value of bank screening and monitoring effects is not significant, which is consistent with 
findings of Boscaljon and Ho (2005). 
In terms of long-term market performance, Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) found a 
negative and statistically significant market response to bank loan announcements over a three-
year period, which contradicts the positive short-term reaction demonstrated by Billett, 
Flannery and Garfinkel (1995). It is worth noting that these two studies used the same set of 
data covering US bank loans over the period 1980–1989. In addition, the authors demonstrated 
that there was no difference in long-term stock price effects between bank loans and SEOs or 
public debt issues. This result led the authors to cast doubts on the ‘special’ function of bank 
loans that was widely accepted in prior studies. 
c. Insignificant reactions 
Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) also argued that bank loans are not special and that prior 
studies were subject to self-selection bias. In other words, not all bank loan agreements are 
publicly announced because the disclosure of this type of news is not compulsory. As a result, 
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the relatively small samples of bank loan announcements are not adequate representatives of 
the total loans population. To support this argument, Maskara and Mullineaux randomly picked 
200 and 600 bank loans respectively to form two separate data samples from Reuters Loan 
Pricing Corporation’s DealScan database.19 The statistical descriptions of both samples are not 
significantly different from the whole bank loans population from DealScan, implying that both 
samples can be treated as good representatives of the whole data sample. However, only about 
200 of the combined 800 bank loans can be found in the Factiva database, suggesting that only 
around one-fourth of the sample population were publicly announced.20 Further, the authors 
show that the sample of 626 bank loan announcements used by Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel 
(1995) fails to represent the population, because around 35% of their sample are from the 
smallest decile and only 2% are from the biggest decile. Further, only the loan announcements 
in the smallest decile generated significantly positive stock returns. Conversely, the 800 loans 
randomly picked by Maskara and Mullineaux failed to produce significant abnormal returns. 
These striking findings challenge the reliability of findings in the literature that bank loan 
announcements have a positive impact on borrowers’ stock price. 
2.2.3.2 Determinants of borrowing firms’ abnormal returns 
It is widely accepted that abnormal returns are associated with bank loan announcements, as 
summarised in the previous section. Multivariate analysis was employed to detect key 
determinants of these abnormal returns. These key determinants can be categorised into three 
groups: borrower characteristics, loan characteristics and bank characteristics. 
                                                          
19 The DealScan database gathers all loans primarily from the Securities and Exchange Commission filings, large 
loan syndicators, and a staff of reporters and has been widely employed in various studies of loan markets 
(Maskara & Mullineaux 2011). 
20 A publicly announced loan is defined as a loan announcement that is found in the Factiva database, which 
gathers its event stories from 10,000 authoritative sources. 
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a. Borrower characteristics 
Firm characteristics can be further divided into three subgroups in bank loan announcements 
studies. First, empirical evidence shows that borrowers’ asymmetric information is positively 
associated with the magnitude of abnormal returns. The explanation is that investors will 
receive more private information about borrowers through bank loan decisions if firms are not 
very transparent. Various indicators for asymmetric information have been reported in the 
literature, including (1) firm size as proxied by the market value of equity (Johnson 1997; 
Slovin, Johnson & Glascock 1992) and total assets (Andre, Mathieu & Zhang 2001; Fields et 
al. 2006; Ongena & Roscovan 2013), (2) analysts’ earnings forecast errors (Best & Zhang 
1993), (3) stock return volatility as proxied by the standard deviation of daily stock returns 
(Billett, Flannery & Garfinkel 1995; Hadlock & James 2002; Li & Ongena 2014; Ongena & 
Roscovan 2013; Ross 2010) and (4) stock price run-up as proxied by abnormal returns 
accumulated over the days preceding the announcements (Billett, Flannery & Garfinkel 1995; 
Fields et al. 2006; Marsh 2006; Ross 2010). 
Second, borrowers’ risk has been well documented in the literature. Risk associated with 
borrowers includes (1) financial risk, measured by the ratio of total liabilities over total assets 
for the year prior to a loan announcement (Huang, Schwienbacher & Zhao 2012; Li & Ongena 
2014); (2) default risk, measured by credit rating (Aintablian & Roberts 2000); and (3) 
systematic risk, measured by the market model beta (Billett, Flannery & Garfinkel 1995; Marsh 
2006; Ross 2010). A positive relation between financial and default risk and abnormal returns 
is normally expected because firms with excessive risk can be screened through banks’ loan 
appraisal process (Booth & Booth 2006; Demiroglu & James 2010; Jimenez, Salas & Saurina 
2006). However, the empirical findings are diverse (Best & Zhang 1993; Billett, Flannery & 
Garfinkel 1995; Fields et al. 2006; Godlewski 2014; Johnson 1997; Ross 2010). 
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Third, the financial performance of borrowers has been another popular choice in prior studies. 
Surprisingly, most studies have reported an insignificant relationship between borrowers’ 
abnormal returns and their financial performance (Bailey, Huang & Yang 2011; Billett, 
Flannery & Garfinkel 1995; Fields et al. 2006; Johnson 1997; Li & Ongena 2014; Ongena & 
Roscovan 2013; Ross 2010). The insignificant findings suggest that there is little additional 
information on borrowers’ financial performance contained in bank loan announcements. 
However, significant results have been reported by other studies (Huang, Schwienbacher & 
Zhao 2012; Lee, K-W & Sharpe 2009).  
b. Loan characteristics 
Five loan-specific factors have been heavily documented in the literature. First, loan renewals 
have been proven to generate more favourable information on borrowers than loan initiations 
because banks can accumulate more comprehensive information on borrowers through their 
long-term lending relationships (Aintablian & Roberts 2000; Lummer & McConnell 1989). 
Therefore, renewed loans would be expected to generate greater impact on abnormal returns of 
borrowers compared with initialised loans. 
Second, bank loans for repaying debts have proven to be associated with greater market 
reactions than loans that are used for other purposes (Boscaljon & Ho 2005; Lee, K-W & 
Sharpe 2009). However, because of insufficient data to distinguish whether the loans were to 
repay the same or different banks, the authors failed to shed light on whether all of these debt 
repayment loans have a positive impact on stock price reactions. In addition, this significant 
result was not confirmed by James (1987), who reported no difference between the market 
reactions to announcements of loans for refinancing and those of loans for capital expenditure 
purposes.  
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Third, results between loan size and borrowers’ market performance are mixed. Insignificant 
(Gan et al. 2014; Hadlock & James 2002; Johnson 1997; Slovin, Johnson & Glascock 1992), 
negative (Aintablian & Roberts 2000; Billett, Flannery & Garfinkel 2006) and positive 
(Godlewski 2014; Li & Ongena 2014) results have all been reported in previous studies.  
Fourth, loan maturity is another variable documented in the literature. Aintablian and Roberts 
(2000) and Aintablian, Mcgraw and Roberts (2007) found that long-term loans are significantly 
and negatively associated with abnormal returns of borrowers. These findings support James’s 
(1987) argument that shorter maturities result in more frequent revisions that enhance the 
monitoring quality of banks. However, Gan et al. (2014) and Huang, Schwienbacher and Zhao 
(2012), using Chinese data, showed that loan maturity, measured in years, is significantly and 
positively related to abnormal returns. The positive relationship was attributed to the weak 
monitoring power associated with government-led banking system in China.  
Finally, syndicated loans as opposed to single-bank loans also pose mixed effects on the market 
response to bank loan announcements. Most studies have reported an insignificant relationship 
(Fields et al. 2006; Gan et al. 2014; Lee, K-W & Sharpe 2009; Marsh 2006; Ross 2010). Other 
studies have provided positive evidence supporting the argument that investors favour loans 
given by multiple lenders rather than a single one (Boscaljon & Ho 2005; Ongena & Roscovan 
2013). In contrast, other evidence suggests that the market reaction to announcements of 
syndicated loans is significantly smaller than it is to those of loans granted by a single bank 
(Aintablian, Mcgraw & Roberts 2007; Aintablian & Roberts 2000). The negative relationship 
found by Preece and Mullineaux (1996) suggests that the more banks are involved in a loan, 
the more the cost of renegotiation and less contractual flexibility for the borrower, and thus the 
less positive market response. Again, the mixed findings require further study in this area. 
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c. Bank characteristics 
The literature shows that bank characteristics have explanatory power on borrowers’ abnormal 
returns. First, some studies have found that bank size is significantly and consistently positively 
associated with abnormal returns (Johnson 1997; Lee, K-W & Sharpe 2009; Marsh 2006). A 
possible explanation is that big banks are more reputational and thus have more monitoring 
power. Therefore, lending decisions of these high-raking banks can convey more private 
information of borrowers to the markets.  
Second, banks’ credit rating is another proxy for banks’ reputation. Billett, Flannery and 
Garfinkel (1995) found that the market responds more positively if firms can obtain loans from 
highly rated banks. However, this finding was not confirmed by Johnson (1997). 
Third, quality of risk management is also used as a proxy for bank reputation (Johnson 1997; 
Marsh 2006). Johnson (1997) found that higher loan loss provision is associated with smaller 
market reaction, suggesting that banks with bad credit risk profiles generate less certification 
effects from their lending decisions. Similarly, banks tend to relax the lending conditions if 
they can transfer the loan portfolio to third parties, and eventually deteriorate the overall bank 
loan’s quality. This is a possible explanation for the negative evidence reported by Marsh 
(2006).  
Fourth, foreign banks arguably can provide more valuable monitoring services than local banks 
(Ongena & Roscovan 2013). The reason is that foreign banks have to put more efforts into their 
screening and monitoring services to be competitive with local banks that have already 
established their reputation in the local markets. 
Finally, ‘dominant’ banks have been found to be positively associated with the magnitude of 
market reaction (Ross 2010). This positive result indicates that strong certification effects are 
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associated with loans issued by dominant banks. The empirical results remained robust after 
the author used two other dominating banks’ proxies.  
2.2.3.3 Bank loans and borrowing firms’ environmental risk 
Banks have been increasingly aware of the importance of environmental risk of their 
prospective borrowers. It is widely accepted that banks, like other financial institutions, have 
limited direct impact on the natural environment compared with firms in environmentally 
sensitive industries (Bouma, Jeucken & Klinkers 2001; Sarokin & Schulkin 1991). However, 
by granting loans to firms associated with environmental issues, banks expose themselves to 
environmental risks, including direct risk, indirect risk and reputational risk (Case 1999; 
Thompson 1998a, 1998b; Thompson & Cowton 2004; Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008). 
Specifically, according to Thompson and Cowton (2004), direct risk is when a lender takes 
possession of a security in the form of a contaminated liability and becomes liable to clean-up 
costs potentially beyond the value of the original loan. Indirect risk is when losses from 
environmental damage or increased costs due to the introduction of more stringent 
environmental regulations cause a borrower to default on a loan. Reputation risk is when a 
lender is associated with an environmental disaster experienced by a borrower. 
Nonetheless, since the appearance of CERCLA, banks’ awareness of the importance of 
incorporating environmental risk evaluation into their loan appraisal process has significantly 
improved (Coulson & Monks 1999; Thompson 1998b; Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008). 
Specifically, banks have acknowledged that the environmental risk of borrowing firms can 
have considerable financial and reputational impacts on borrowers’ performance, which is 
directly related to the performance and efficiency of banks (Bouma, Jeucken & Klinkers 2001; 
Sarokin & Schulkin 1991; Thompson 1998a). Therefore, to make the right decisions on loan 
approvals, banks need to clearly understand the environmental risk of their potential borrowers 
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in addition to other traditional financial and non-financial aspects. In other words, a bank loan 
approval will carry a signal of bank certification that a borrower’s environmental risk has 
satisfied the bank’s requirements.  
Announcements of bank loan approvals may convey a certain amount of the environmental 
information of the borrowers to the markets. To the researcher’s best knowledge, the work of 
Aintablian, Mcgraw and Roberts (2007) is the only quantitative study examining banks’ 
monitoring power over minimising borrowers’ environmental risk. Their data sample consisted 
of 152 bank loans announced by Canadian firms from 1988 to 1997. Two dummy variables 
were used to represent the borrowers’ environmental risk: (1) an announcing borrower was 
considered a polluter if it belonged to one of five specified industries—oil and gas, metals and 
minerals, paper and forest products, gold and precious minerals, and industrial products; and 
(2) an announcing firm was subject to a higher number of spill events if it operated in oil and 
gas, metals and minerals, or industrial products industries. They found that the market reacted 
more significantly and positively to announcements of bank loans to polluters than to those of 
non-polluters; and more positively to announcements of bank loans to firms in industries with 
a higher likelihood of experiencing spill events. 
2.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter focuses on the effects of environmental risk on borrowers’ market performance 
once they are funded by banks and how these effects change with the level of stringency of 
environmental regulations, conditional on the quality of the information environment. Such 
stock price effects reflect the information accumulated through each stage of the bank lending 
process, starting with banks’ credit appraisal of prospective borrowers’ environmental risk 
leading to banks’ decisions on loan approvals, then firms’ decisions on the announcement of 
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these approvals and, finally, stock market reactions to firms’ announcements. Arguments to 
support the development of four testable hypotheses for this study will now be presented. 
First, the Australian bank system is internationally recognised as transparence, profitability and 
resilience. The main activity of Australian banks is still lending, which is the main external 
financing source for Australian firms. In addition, the political connection factor that drives 
negative market reactions to bank loan approvals in developing markets such as China seems 
not to exist in Australia because the government owns few shares in Australian banks. Hence, 
the incentives of profit maximisation encourage banks to provide valuable screening and 
monitoring services to the market in Australia. 
Hypothesis 2.1: There are significantly positive abnormal returns around bank loan 
announcements in Australia. 
Second, studies have reported that banks have increasingly incorporated considerations of 
borrowers’ environmental risk into their credit appraisal process because of more restricted 
environmental regulations and the banks’ voluntary participation in environmental protection 
initiatives (Coulson & Monks 1999; Thompson 1998b; Weber, Fenchel & Scholz 2008). 
Further, a decrease in firms’ environmental risk (i.e., a reduction in emissions of GHG and 
energy consumption) can significantly improve firms’ financial performance (Albertini 2013; 
Gallego-Álvarez, Segura & Martínez-Ferrero 2014; Iwata & Okada 2011). In return, the 
strengthened financial ability can guarantee positive cash flows for borrowers to pay back the 
loans successfully. Therefore, it was expected that firms with satisfactory environmental risk 
would be able to secure bank loans.  
Third, Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) pointed out that firms with a high level of information 
asymmetry to investors tend to publicly announce their bank loans. Since mandatory disclosure 
of environmental information (i.e., carbon emissions and energy consumptions) is not yet 
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required for all firms in Australia, stock investors would be expected to suffer from a serious 
shortage of this type of information. Further, Berthelot, Cormier and Magnan (2003) suggested 
that firms associated with environmental issues are more likely to voluntarily disclose their 
environmental information. For the above reasons, it was expected that borrowers would 
consider announcing bank loans as an action of voluntary disclosure of environmental 
information, which benefits themselves through the banks’ certification function. 
Fourth, Aintablian, Mcgraw and Roberts (2007) reported that the market reacts significantly 
and positively to bank loan announcements of both polluters and environmental friendly firms 
and that the magnitude of market reaction is larger for the announcements of polluters. These 
results can be attributed to the severe shortage of environmental information available to 
investors, which leads to greater certification values of bank loans to polluting borrowers. 
Hypothesis 2.2: Ceteris paribus (i.e., that borrower, bank and loan characteristics are fixed), 
polluters produce higher bank loan announcement abnormal returns relative to non-polluters. 
Fifth, in the period of stricter environmental regulations (i.e., increase in compliance costs or 
restrictions on the number and level of environmentally sensitive business activities in which 
a firm can be involved), firms in environmentally sensitive industries expose themselves to 
more environmental risk. In response to these tougher policies, banks are expected to allocate 
more resources to borrowers’ environmental risk management aimed at performing credit risk 
management and promoting their reputation with policymakers and customers. Borrowers are 
also motivated to announce bank loan approvals as an additional disclosure on their 
environmental information to stock investors and, eventually, benefit themselves through the 
certification effect of bank loans. Shareholders, therefore, will award more (i.e., bidding up 
stock prices) to polluters who are deemed less likely to successfully secure bank loans as a 
result of more stringent environmental regulations.  
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Hypothesis 2.3: Ceteris paribus (i.e., that borrower, bank and loan characteristics are fixed), 
the difference of bank loan abnormal returns between polluters and non-polluters is 
significantly larger following more stringent environmental policies (i.e., the post-Kyoto 
ratification period). 
Finally, in a poor information environment (i.e., high return volatility, small firm size or small 
loan amount), investors tend to rely more on the additional information provided by banks 
through their loan decisions. Given the lack of credible environmental information, during 
periods of strict environmental policies, the certification of a borrower’s environmental risk 
will, therefore, be more highly appreciated by investors if the borrower exposes their investors 
to a higher level of information asymmetry. 
Hypothesis 2.4: Ceteris paribus (i.e., that borrower, bank and loan characteristics are fixed), 
the impact of environmental policies on the relationship between borrowers’ environmental 
risk and bank loan announcement abnormal returns is more pronounced for borrowers in 
poorer information environments. 
2.4 DATA DESCRIPTION 
2.4.1 Bank Loan Announcements 
Bank loan announcements of all ASX public companies from 2001 to 2013 were manually 
collected via the SIRCA database. Several key words were used to search the announcement 
articles under the Australian Company Announcements section of SIRCA. Key words used 
were ‘bank loan’, ‘bank credit’, ‘bank debt’, ‘bank borrowing, lending, financing, funding’, 
‘syndicated loan’, ‘credit line, ‘revolving loan’ and ‘loan extension, expansion, renewal, 
approval’, following the literature. To ensure the sample was not contaminated by other firm-
specific events, bank loan announcements that were made together with other price-sensitive 
41 
events, such as earnings reports, equity issuances, dividend distributions, mergers and 
acquisitions and board changes, were excluded. Then each ‘clean’ loan announcement was 
examined to collect relevant information for the analysis, including the date of the 
announcement (the date specified in the original announcement article) and the announcing 
firm’s identity, loan characteristics and lending bank’s identity. This search produced a sample 
of 759 announcements. 
Each announcing borrower was then matched with its daily stock prices from the Datastream 
database and the firms’ financial information from the Morningstar DatAnalysis database using 
the borrower’s three-letter listing code registered with the ASX as an identifier. The numbers 
of observations differed across variables depending on the availability of data from SIRCA, 
Datastream and DatAnalysis.  
Table 2.3 provides the names, definitions and descriptive statistics of the main borrower, bank 
and loan characteristics for the full sample. Overall, more than half (53%) of the borrowers 
were polluters (see Section 1.2 for a detailed definition of polluter). Regarding profitability, 
the sample firms on average incurred a loss for the year prior to the announcing year with a 
return on assets (ROA) of −3%. The sample firms appeared to rely more on equity for long-
term financing when the ratio of long-term debt to equity was 0.84, which is lower than 1. Such 
companies held 13% of cash relative to their total assets and presented relatively good growth 
opportunities, with a Tobin’s Q of 1.58, which is greater than 1. 
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Table 2.3: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Definitions Data source N Mean SD 
  
    
Panel A: Main variables  
POLLUTER 
Dummy variable indicating whether an announcing borrower operates to a polluting 
industry SIRCA & 
DatAnalysis 
759 0.526 0.500 
POST Dummy variable indicating whether a loan is announced in the post-Kyoto period 759 0.708 0.455 
POLLUTER*POST Interaction term of POLLUTER and POST dummies 751 0.345 0.476 
      
Panel B: Control variables 
LNASSETS Log transformation of total assets DatAnalysis 740 19.641 2.322 
ROA Return on total assets DatAnalysis 740 −0.032 0.641 
D/E Ratio of long-term debt to equity DatAnalysis 730 0.840 2.360 
CASH Ratio of cash balance to total assets DatAnalysis 735 0.130 0.170 
TOBINQ 
Tobin’s Q (Total assets + market value of equity − book value of equity) / total 
assets 
DatAnalysis 735 1.580 1.190 
REVOL 
Standard deviation of daily stock return over 100 trading days from −109 to −10 
relative to announcement date 
Datastream 735 0.035 0.022 
RUNUP Cumulative return of borrower’s stock return during estimation period Datastream 735 −0.020 0.420 
BIG4 
Dummy variable indicating a loan is financed by one of the Big 4 banks, National 
Bank of Australia, Westpac Bank, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Australia and 
New Zealand Banking Group Limited 
SIRCA 625 0.580 0.490 
LOANINI Dummy variable indicating a loan is granted for the first time SIRCA 759 0.490 0.500 
SYND Dummy variable indicating a loan is syndicated SIRCA 742 0.500 0.500 
LNMATURITY Log transformation of loan maturity SIRCA 556 0.940 0.820 
The table presents the variable names, definitions, data sources and descriptive statistics for the main and control variables considered in this study. The 
statistics include the number of observations (N), the mean and standard deviation (SD). The primary source is the SIRCA database, from which bank loan 
announcements were manually collected. The announcing firm’s identity, e.g., the ASX listing code and the firm’s name, bank and loan characteristics were 
then obtained from each announcement. The loan announcement was matched with firm characteristics from DatAnalysis using the announcing firm’s identity. 
The announcing firm’s stock prices were sourced from Datastream. 
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A majority (58%) of the loans were financed by at least one of the Australian Big 4 banks 
(NAB, Westpac, CBA and ANZ). The Big 4 banks could be involved in the loan as either a 
sole lender or a member of syndication.  
Almost 50% of the loans were granted for the first time. Best and Zhang (1993) were followed 
to classify a loan as new, that is, if the announcement article indicated that the loan was new 
or there was no discussion that it was an extension, revision or replacement of an existing loan. 
Otherwise, the loan was classified as revised. Half of the loans were funded by a syndication, 
which is a group of more than one lender. The loans were medium term with an average 
maturity of 3.2 years. 
2.4.2 Polluting and Non-Polluting Borrowers 
As discussed in Section 1.2, firms classified as one of the nine following GICS industries were 
defined as polluters: (1) oil, gas and consumable fuels; (2) electric utilities; (3) gas utilities; (4) 
independent power producers and energy traders; (5) multi-utilities; (6) chemicals; (7) 
construction materials; (8) metals and mining; and (9) paper and forest products (CDP 2012). 
Firms identified in other GICS industries were defined as non-polluters. 
Table 2.4 presents the descriptive statistics and tests for significance of mean difference (t test) 
of the main borrower, bank and loan characteristics between the polluters and non-polluters 
used in this study. The two-tailed tests show that polluters on average were smaller in size 
(smaller in total assets), less profitable (smaller ROA), using less leverage (smaller debt relative 
to equity), facing more financial constraints (holding more cash relative to total assets), 
presenting greater growth opportunities (higher Tobin’s Q ratio), having higher return volatility 
(higher standard deviation of stock returns), using less reputable banks (less likely to be 
financed by Australia’s Big 4 banks), and borrowing more from new loans (more loan 
initiations) and less from syndications.  
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics on Polluting and Non-Polluting Borrowers 
Variables 
Polluter   Non-polluter   t test (P v. NP) 
N Mean SD   N Mean SD   
Mean 
Diff. 
t stat. 
          
 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
CAR(0,4) 387 0.022 0.005  348 0.008 0.006  0.014 1.84* 
CAR(−3,3) 387 0.023 0.006  348 0.009 0.005  0.014 1.80* 
           
Panel B: Control variables 
LNASSETS 390 19.113 0.122  350 20.230 0.110  −1.116 −6.72*** 
ROA 390 −0.081 0.044  350 0.023 0.009  −0.104 −2.20** 
LEV 389 0.527 0.077  341 1.203 0.163  −0.676 −3.90*** 
CASH 390 0.186 0.010  345 0.071 0.006  0.115 9.88*** 
TOBINQ 389 1.849 0.071  346 1.285 0.043  0.565 6.62*** 
REVOL 387 0.037 0.001  348 0.033 0.001  0.004 2.28*** 
RUNUP 387 −0.007 0.022  348 −0.029 0.022  0.021 0.69 
BIG4 343 0.385 0.026  282 0.823 0.023  −0.438 −12.29*** 
LOANINI 399 0.632 0.024  360 0.339 0.025  0.293 8.41*** 
SYND 388 0.451 0.025  354 0.551 0.026  −0.100 −2.73*** 
LNMATURITY 249 1.004 0.052  307 0.896 0.044  0.108 1.59 
The table displays numbers of observations (N), means and standard deviations (SD) for 
dependent variables (CARs) and control variables (borrower, bank and loan characteristic) by 
polluters and non-polluters. It also reports the results of two-tailed t tests of the mean difference. 
All explanatory variables are defined as in previous tables. The *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
2.5 METHODOLOGY 
2.5.1 Calculation of Announcement Abnormal Returns 
The first step was to calculate abnormal returns over various event windows that contained the 
announcement date for each firm. Following the literature, the standard event study 
methodology developed by Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and James (1987) was adopted. 
Specifically, for each firm, abnormal returns were calculated using a market model with 
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parameters estimated over an estimation window of (−109, −10) (a 100-day period beginning 
109 days before and ending 10 days before the announcement date of day 0), of the form:  
    =    +        +      (2.1)  
where     is the individual announcing firm i’s log return on day t within the 100-day 
estimation window;     is the log return on the ASX All Ordinaries index on day t;    and    
are the parameters to be estimated over the estimation window.  
Abnormal returns (    ) were then defined as the residuals or prediction errors (   ) of this 
model, specified as follows: 
     =     −      +         (2.2) 
where      is the abnormal return of announcing firm i on day t within the event window, and 
            are estimated using Equation 2.1. For the purpose of this study, daily abnormal 
returns of 11 days ranging from five days before to five days after the announcement day (day 
0) were examined for statistics and significance. 
The abnormal returns were then standardised to conduct the tests of statistical significance, as 
follows: 
      =  
    
   
  (2.3) 
    =  [  
 [1 +  
1
 
+  
(    −     )
 
∑      −      
  
   
]]
 
   (2.4)  
where     is the respective standard deviation of the prediction errors obtained from the market 
model;   
  is the residual variance of the market model regression for announcing firm i; M is 
the number of days in the estimation window (100); and     is the mean market return over the 
estimation period.  
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For each event day t, a Z statistic was computed to test the null hypothesis that      = 0 as 
follows: 
  =          √ (2.5) 
where       is the mean      ; and N is the number of       in the sample. 
The formulas to calculate cumulative abnormal returns and standardised cumulative abnormal 
returns over the event window (  ,   ) are as follows: 
    (  ,   ) =        
  
    
(2.6)  
     (  ,   ) =  
∑    
  
       
    −     + 1
 (2.7) 
For the purpose of this study, five conventional event windows including two asymmetric (two-
day CAR(0,1) and five-day CAR(0,4)) and three asymmetric ones (three-day CAR(−1,1), 
seven-day CAR(−3,3) and eleven-day CAR(−5,5)) were investigated for statistics and 
significance. For each event window (  ,   ), the Z statistic was computed to test the null 
hypothesis that     (  ,   ) =  0 as follows: 
  =       (  ,   )   √ (2.8) 
where      (  ,   ) is the mean      (  ,   ); and N is the number of      (  ,   ) in the 
sample. 
To control for the possibility that abnormal returns were not normally distributed, in addition 
to parametric tests, non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank tests were employed for all the daily 
and cumulative abnormal returns mentioned above to confirm the results. The Wilcoxon signed 
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rank test had a null hypothesis of no difference in magnitudes between the negative and positive 
abnormal return (or cumulative abnormal return). 
2.5.2 Regression Models 
In the second stage, to test the effect of polluters and the post-Kyoto period on the magnitude 
of stock price reactions to bank loan announcements, cross-sectional ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions were run with cumulative abnormal returns estimated in the first stage as 
the dependent variables. The baseline regression models were as follows:  
     =    +             +             
 
   
 (2.9) 
     =    +         +             
 
   
 (2.10) 
     =    +             ∗       +              
 
   
+ (Industry &Year) FE (2.11) 
where      is the cumulative abnormal return of announcing firm i;           is a dummy 
indicating whether announcing firm i is a polluter;       is a dummy indicating whether 
announcing firm i is observed in the post-Kyoto period;           ∗       is an interaction 
term;           is a list of the borrower, loan and bank characteristics of announcing firm i. 
All variables are defined in Table 2.3.  
In Equation 2.9, the coefficient of the POLLUTER dummy,   , captures the mean difference 
in cumulative abnormal return between polluters and non-polluters for the whole sample 
period, 2001–2013. In Equation 2.10, the coefficient of the POST dummy,   , measures the 
mean difference in cumulative abnormal return between the post- and pre-Kyoto periods of all 
sample firms (all announcing borrowers). Of interest is the coefficient of the interaction term 
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in Equation 2.11,   , which represents the change in cumulative abnormal return for polluters 
relative to the change in cumulative abnormal return for non-polluters subsequent to the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in Australia. A positive    is consistent with the market 
expectation that banks will impose stricter views on a borrower’s environmental risk in a period 
of more stringent environmental regulations (i.e., the post-Kyoto period), thereby allocating 
more resources to environmental assessment and providing more valuable certification services 
to borrowers that are perceived as polluters by stock investors. In Equation 2.11, POLLUTER 
and POST dummies are not included as their impacts on cumulative abnormal return are 
absorbed by industry and year fixed effects. 
2.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section first discusses the univariate results with regard to the stock market reactions to 
bank loan announcements for the full sample, and for subsamples of polluters and non-
polluters. The multivariate results relating the cumulative abnormal returns to the borrower, 
bank and loan variables are then reported to confirm the results obtained from the univariate 
tests. One asymmetric event window (five-day CAR(0,4)) was selected for the main 
regressions and one symmetric window (seven-day CAR(−1,1)) for the robustness check. 
These event windows were chosen as the best options after all relevant criteria were considered, 
including (1) capturing delayed reactions, (2) minimising the effects of confounding events, 
(3) reflecting weak information leakage and (4) following traditions of event study. 
2.6.1 Univariate Analysis on Bank Loan Announcement Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns 
Table 2.5 displays the univariate results of the market reaction to bank loan announcements. 
Among 759 bank loan announcement articles obtained from the SIRCA database, only 735 
observations had sufficient stock price data (i.e., 100 daily stock returns ranging from 109 days 
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to 10 days prior to the announcement day) for the abnormal return calculations. Panel A reports 
the daily abnormal returns ranging from five days before to five days after the announcement 
day with corresponding mean (%), z statistics, standard deviations (SD), minimum value (min), 
maximum value (max), percentage of abnormal return being greater than zero, and non-
parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test. Panel B presents similar statistics for various cumulative 
abnormal returns around the announcement day, including two asymmetric (two-day CAR(0,1) 
and five-day CAR(0,4)) and three asymmetric ones (three-day CAR(−1,1), seven-day 
CAR(−3,3) and eleven-day CAR(−5,5)). 
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Table 2.5: Abnormal Returns around Bank Loan Announcements in Australia 
Event day or window (0: 
announcement day) 
Mean (%) z test SD (%) Min (%) Max (%) 
Percentage of 
AR (or CAR) > 
0 (%) 
Wilcoxon 
signed rank 
test 
        
Panel A: Daily Abnormal Returns (ARs) 
−5 −0.16 −2.39** 3.97 −18.12 47.28 48.16 −1.46 
−4 −0.18 −0.41 4.12 −32.57 26.15 48.16 −1.05 
−3 0.11 −1.18 3.77 −15.54 26.86 48.03 −1.62 
−2 −0.14 −0.52 3.86 −23.12 23.71 48.44 −1.79 
−1 0.13 0.41 3.87 −22.99 29.36 52.65 1.09 
0 1.10 8.98*** 5.25 −26.25 51.24 58.10 5.25*** 
1 0.27 0.67 5.67 −51.86 50.60 50.61 0.69 
2 0.14 −0.07 4.89 −49.21 32.81 49.66 −0.15 
3 0.05 0.55 4.34 −25.79 55.70 48.71 −1.06 
4 −0.05 −0.44 4.27 −38.85 29.30 48.30 −1.41 
5 −0.16 −2.17** 4.58 −54.88 25.58 48.98 −1.04 
        
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
(0;1) 1.37 6.82*** 7.01 −51.91 51.58 57.01 4.90*** 
(−1;1) 1.50 5.80*** 7.78 −51.94 60.73 55.37 4.60*** 
(0;4) 1.52 4.34*** 10.51 −67.54 70.59 55.10 3.70*** 
(−3;3) 1.66 3.34*** 10.81 −63.04 78.42 51.84 2.65*** 
(−5;5) 1.12 1.03 13.16 −58.14 76.56 50.61 1.40 
The table presents abnormal returns around 735 bank loan announcements in Australia during the sample period 2001–2013. The 
abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) were calculated using the market model and standard event study 
methodology. The estimation window for calculating the market model parameters was [−109, −10]. AR and CAR were tested for 
significance using a two-tailed z test. The Wilcoxon signed rank test had a null hypothesis of no difference in magnitudes between the 
negative and positive AR (or CAR). The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Overall, the daily abnormal returns before and after the announcement day did not present a 
clear pattern, with both positive and negative numbers. Even though the z test showed that 
average abnormal returns on day −5 and +5 were significantly negative at 0.16%, these results 
were not supported by the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Days other than the announcement day 
mainly had negative abnormal returns (more than 50% of abnormal returns were negative) that 
were not significantly different from zero, indicating weak evidence on the information leakage 
of bank loans. 
Most notably, both the z test and the Wilcoxon rank test confirmed that the abnormal return on 
announcement day was significantly positive, with an average of 1.10%. This result is similar 
in size to those of almost all previous studies conducted in developed markets (Aintablian & 
Roberts 2000; James 1987; Lummer & McConnell 1989; Ongena & Roscovan 2013; Preece & 
Mullineaux 1996; Slovin, Johnson & Glascock 1992). This empirical evidence from recent data 
on the Australian market advocates the theory on the specialness of bank loans, confirming the 
certification and signalling effects associated with bank loan announcements.  
The magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns increased to 1.37% over the two-day 
window CAR(0,1), to 1.50% over the three-day window CAR(−1,1), to 1.52% over the five-
day window CAR(0,4), and to 1.66% over the seven-day window CAR(−3,3), and these were 
all significant using both parametric and non-parametric tests. However, when the event 
window extended to 11 days covering five days before and after the announcement day, 
CAR(−5,5) decreased to 1.13% and was no longer significant. These findings show that the 
information content of bank loans is fully reflected in stock price movements a couple of days 
around the announcement, providing evidence of the delayed market reaction to bank loan 
announcements and supporting the view of a semi-strong level of market efficiency in 
Australia.  
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Panel A of Table 2.4 displays the five-day CAR(0,4) and seven-day CAR(−3,3) of polluting 
and non-polluting borrowers and the t test of mean difference between these two groups. For 
example, the results show that, on average, polluters produced 2.2% compared with the merely 
0.8% five-day cumulative abnormal returns generated by non-polluters. Hence, on average, 
investors of polluters earned 1.4% cumulative abnormal returns higher than those of non-
polluters and the difference was significant at the 10% level. 
Table 2.6 reports the cumulative abnormal returns over various windows around bank loan 
announcements made in each year over the sample period 2001–2013. The results show that 
bank loans elicited positive cumulative abnormal returns in almost all years and were 
statistically significant for several years in both the pre- and the post-Kyoto periods. Regarding 
the volume of the announcements, bank loans were more frequently announced in the post 
period, with 524 compared with 211 observations in the pre-Kyoto period. In sum, there was 
no clear pattern in the yearly bank loan announcement abnormal returns before and after the 
Kyoto Protocol ratification.  
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Table 2.6: Bank Loan Announcement Abnormal Returns by Year 
Year N 
1-Day Window   2-Day Window   3-Day Window   5-Day Window   7-Day Window   11-Day Window 
AR(0)  CAR(0;1)  CAR(−1;1)  CAR(0;4)  CAR(−3;3)  CAR(−5;5) 
Mean (%) t test   Mean (%) t test   Mean (%) t test   Mean (%) t test   Mean (%) t test   Mean (%) t test 
                   
Panel A: Pre-Kyoto Period 2001–2007 
Overall 211 1.19 3.16***  1.22 2.15**  1.65 2.66***  0.75 1.05  1.25 1.58  0.46 0.48 
2001 17 3.11 1.86*  5.76 1.69*  4.57 1.12  5.44 1.91*  3.15 1.05  0.87 0.31 
2002 14 1.11 1.09  −0.76 −0.53  −1.31 −1.00  −1.59 −0.82  −3.99 −1.83*  −2.01 −0.46 
2003 24 3.42 1.58  3.13 1.43  2.37 1.05  2.58 0.79  2.32 0.65  0.69 0.18 
2004 28 1.17 2.15**  1.45 2.45**  2.59 2.15**  0.78 0.53  2.21 1.11  1.83 0.86 
2005 37 0.44 0.55  0.28 0.32  0.98 1.15  0.85 0.83  2.68 1.81*  1.86 0.98 
2006 42 0.89 1.49  2.06 1.74*  2.88 2.41**  2.01 1.4  2.18 1.57  2.13 0.98 
2007 49 0.29 0.49  −0.85 −0.68  0.04 0.03  −2.28 −1.41  −0.87 −0.50  −2.37 −1.22 
                  
Panel B: Post-Kyoto Period 2008–2013 
Overall 524 1.07 4.74***  1.43 5.09***  1.45 4.58***  1.83 3.97***  1.83 3.98***  1.39 2.47** 
2008 80 2.75 2.85***  3.29 3.01***  3.48 3.11***  2.28 1.72*  2.54 1.72*  2.35 1.43 
2009 87 1.18 1.88*  1.47 1.90*  1.71 1.86*  1.02 0.70  1.60 1.39  1.67 1.04 
2010 71 0.55 1.76*  0.30 0.55  0.46 0.85  0.93 1.06  0.91 1.16  −0.16 −0.14 
2011 123 0.61 1.50  0.86 1.94*  0.56 1.05  1.89 2.12**  0.91 1.2  1.08 0.96 
2012 91 0.57 1.61  1.72 2.85***  1.54 2.44**  3.31 3.01***  3.21 2.39**  2.70 2.21** 
2013 72 0.90 2.48**  1.07 1.76*  1.24 1.48  1.22 1.17  2.07 1.70*  0.36 0.23 
The table presents average cumulative abnormal returns on bank loan announcements and two-tailed t test for significance for two subsample periods: Pre-Kyoto period 
2001–2007 and Post-Kyoto period 2008–2013. The former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd officially ratified the Kyoto Protocol at the end of 2007, which is broadly considered 
the starting point of a more stringent environmental regulatory period in Australia. Average AR and CAR and corresponding two-tailed t test for each year in the sample 
period 2001–2013 are also reported. The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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2.6.2 Regression Analysis on Bank Loan Announcement Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns 
This section presents the multivariate analysis of the impacts of polluters compared with those 
of non-polluters on the size of market response to borrowers’ bank loan announcements, as 
well as the change in such responses for polluters compared with the change for non-polluters 
in the period of tougher environmental regulations following the Kyoto Protocol ratification in 
Australia. 
Table 2.7 displays the cross-sectional OLS regressions of the magnitude of market reaction to 
bank loan announcements, as measured by the five-day CAR(0,4) on various borrower, bank 
and loan characteristics, using Equations 2.9 through 2.11. In Models (1) through (3), the only 
control was for borrower characteristics covering almost all important accounting-based 
corporate financial information, including size (proxied by LNASSETS), profitability (proxied 
by ROA), financial leverage (proxied by LEV), financial constraint (proxied by CASH), growth 
opportunity (proxied by TOBINQ), market-based information asymmetry (proxied by REVOL) 
and time-series trend in stock returns (proxied by RUNUP). In Model (4), a further control was 
implemented for bank and loan characteristics. Because of the missing observations on these 
variables, the sample size dropped from 710 in Model (3) to 413 in Model (4). The selection 
of control variables was based on the existing literature that documents their explanatory 
powers over bank loan announcement cumulative abnormal returns. 
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Table 2.7: Environmental Risk and Bank Loan Announcement Abnormal Returns 
Dep. Var.  5-Day CAR 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ind. Var.     
POLLUTER 0.018**    
 [2.17] 
   
POST  0.007   
 
 [0.74]   
POLLUTER*POST   0.107*** 0.151*** 
 
  [2.84] [3.16] 
LNASSETS −0.006*** −0.007*** −0.006** −0.009** 
 [−2.78] [−3.01] [−2.45] [−2.15] 
ROA 0.048* 0.046* 0.029 0.052 
 [1.84] [1.75] [0.94] [1.12] 
D/E −0.002 −0.002 −0.003* −0.000 
 [−1.24] [−1.41] [−1.76] [−0.02] 
CASH −0.071** −0.057** −0.050* −0.049 
 [−2.58] [−2.12] [−1.72] [−1.06] 
TOBINQ 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.014** 
 [0.73] [0.92] [0.99] [2.09] 
REVOL 0.083 0.066 0.201 0.663** 
 [0.38] [0.30] [0.77] [1.99] 
RUNUP −0.058*** −0.057*** −0.057*** −0.062*** 
 [−5.86] [−5.70] [−5.26] [−4.29] 
BIG4    0.002 
 
   [0.11] 
LOANINI    −0.009 
 
   [−0.73] 
SYND    0.010 
 
   [0.69] 
LNMATURITY    0.020** 
 
   [2.33] 
Constant 0.131*** 0.148*** 0.472*** 0.273** 
 [2.66] [2.99] [4.28] [2.13] 
 
    
(Industry & Year) FE No No Yes Yes 
Observations 713 713 710 413 
R-squared 0.077 0.071 0.371 0.431 
The table displays the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions of 5-day cumulative 
abnormal returns CAR(0,4) around bank loan announcements on POLLUTER dummy 
(Model (1)), POST dummy (Model (2)), or an interaction term POLLUTER*POST 
(Model (3) and (4)) and controls. Borrower characteristics are included in Model (1) to 
(3). Both borrower, banks and loan characteristics are included in Model (4). T statistics 
are reported in brackets. All the explanatory variables are defined in previous tables. The 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Model (1) of Table 2.7 shows that the coefficient on the main variable, the POLLUTER 
dummy, is significantly positive at the 5% level, indicating that the polluters produced greater 
abnormal returns following bank loan announcements than the non-polluters. The difference 
 56 
in abnormal returns between polluters and non-polluters is also economically significant. 
Specifically, the estimated coefficient is 0.018, indicating that relative to non-polluters, the 
stock investors of polluters gained 1.8% more abnormal returns over five consecutive trading 
days starting at the loan announcement day than non-polluters. Model (2) reports a positive 
coefficient on the POST dummy. However, it is not significant, indicating that there was no 
difference in cumulative abnormal returns between the post- and pre-Kyoto periods. 
Models (3) and (4) of Table 2.7 show significantly positive coefficients on the interaction term 
POLLUTER*POST, meaning that polluters experienced a greater increase in abnormal returns 
subsequent to the Kyoto Protocol ratification than the non-polluters. The increase in the level 
of market reaction to bank loan announcements in a more stringent environmental regulatory 
period is also economically significant. For example, the estimated coefficient of the 
interaction term in Model (3) is 0.107, suggesting that relative to non-polluters, the polluters 
generated an increase of 10.7% in the abnormal returns around bank loan announcements. 
These results confirm the study’s hypothesis that bank certification or signalling effects over 
borrowers’ environmental risk become more valuable in tougher environmental protection 
regulatory periods.  
With regard to the control variables, the coefficient on LNASSETS is significantly negative, 
confirming previous empirical evidence that bigger borrowers are associated with less 
information asymmetry or fewer abnormal returns on bank loan announcements (Andre, 
Mathieu & Zhang 2001; Fields et al. 2006; Johnson 1997; Ongena & Roscovan 2013; Ross 
2010; Slovin, Johnson & Glascock 1992). In addition, the significantly positive coefficients on 
ROA suggest that borrowers with more profitability are associated with higher abnormal 
returns, which is inconsistent with prior studies that showed insignificant (Bailey, Huang & 
Yang 2011; Billett, Flannery & Garfinkel 1995; Fields et al. 2006; Ongena & Roscovan 2013; 
Ross 2010) or negative results (Huang, Schwienbacher & Zhao 2012; Lee, K-W & Sharpe 
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2009). Further, the significantly negative coefficients on CASH indicate that financially 
constrained borrowers elicit more abnormal returns. This can be attributed to the bank loans 
that alleviate the financial constraints leading to market rewards to such borrowers that faced 
difficulties in accessing finance before successfully obtaining loans. Additionally, the 
significantly negative coefficients on RUNUP show that borrowers that experience higher 
returns before bank loan announcements generate fewer abnormal returns subsequent to the 
announcements, which is consistent with other empirical evidence (Fields et al. 2006; Marsh 
2006; Ross 2010). Moreover, the significantly positive coefficient on LNMATURITY suggests 
that the longer the maturity of the loans, the more positive the stock market reaction. This is 
attributed to the more stable financing policy associated with longer loans that helps to alleviate 
much investor concern over firm financial constraints in the future. Finally, the financial 
leverage of the borrowers and all other bank and loan characteristics do not make sense with 
regard to explaining the abnormal returns.  
2.6.3 Analysis Conditional on Quality of Information Environments 
If banks decreased the information asymmetry of borrowers, it was expected that the effect of 
bank certification over environmental risk would be more pronounced among borrowers in a 
poorer information environment. This is because investors are concerned more about polluters 
characterised by higher information asymmetry and hence bidding lower on those firms’ stock 
prices before the announcements of bank loans. Thus, those opaque polluters are likely to 
experience greater improvements in transparency subsequent to bank loan announcements, 
which in turn results in a larger positive market reaction. 
To test this prediction, an analysis conditional on a borrower’s information environment was 
conducted. Three indicators were employed to capture the information environment: (1) 
borrower size, (2) return volatility and (3) loan size. A small firm may be less transparent to 
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outside investors because of, for example, less analyst or news coverage (Andre, Mathieu & 
Zhang 2001; Slovin, Johnson & Glascock 1992). Similarly, a high volatile stock return may 
indicate the investors’ uncertainty about the fundamental value of the firm, or in other words, 
the firms present a high level of information asymmetry to outside investors (Hadlock & James 
2002; Ross 2010). Finally, a small loan principal may present less interest income and credit 
risk to banks and therefore reduce banks’ incentive to monitor it, thereby providing lower 
quality information regarding the borrower to the market (Aintablian & Roberts 2000; Ongena 
& Roscovan 2013). Hence, a borrower was classified in this study as being in poorer 
information environments if its total assets, return volatility and loan principal amount were 
below (Model (1)), above (Model (3)) and below (Model (5)) the sample firm-level median 
values, respectively. Regressions were then rerun on the bank loans sample using Equation 
2.11 for each of these information environment partitions and were tested as to whether the 
coefficient on the interaction term POLLUTER*POST differed across the partitions. 
 59 
Table 2.8: Environmental Risk and Bank Loan Announcement Abnormal Returns, 
Conditional on Quality of Information Environments 
Dep. Var.    5-Day CAR 
Info. Asymmetry 
Criteria 
 BORROWER SIZE  RETURN VOLATILITY  LOAN SIZE 
 Below 
Median 
 Above 
Median 
 
Above 
Median 
 Below 
Median 
 
Below 
Median 
 Above 
Median 
Model   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Ind. Var.      
   
 
   
POLLUTER*POST  0.157***  −0.059  0.139**  0.012  0.146***  −0.024 
  [2.99]  [−0.94]  [2.43]  [0.19]  [2.64]  [−0.36] 
p-value (two-tailed test 
of coef. diff.) 
 0.003***  0.054**  0.018** 
LNASSETS  −0.010  −0.010*  −0.012**  −0.005*  −0.012*  −0.005 
  [−1.41]  [−1.86]  [−2.20]  [−1.73]  [−1.77]  [−1.40] 
ROA  0.023  0.077  0.027  −0.037  0.053  −0.054 
  [0.55]  [0.85]  [0.57]  [−0.62]  [1.06]  [−1.10] 
D/E  −0.003  0.002  −0.005*  0.015***  −0.002  −0.003 
  [−1.43]  [0.63]  [−1.69]  [3.60]  [−0.86]  [−0.68] 
CASH  −0.032  −0.097  −0.051  −0.001  −0.031  −0.117** 
  [−0.85]  [−1.47]  [−1.15]  [−0.03]  [−0.71]  [−2.46] 
TOBINQ  −0.001  −0.001  −0.001  0.005  −0.001  0.012* 
  [−0.19]  [−0.09]  [−0.20]  [0.83]  [−0.23]  [1.75] 
REVOL  0.477  −0.163  0.286  −0.466  0.249  0.030 
  [1.22]  [−0.39]  [0.68]  [−0.56]  [0.48]  [0.09] 
RUNUP  −0.071***  −0.043**  −0.061***  −0.050**  −0.059***  −0.055*** 
  [−4.61]  [−2.58]  [−3.96]  [−2.33]  [−3.44]  [−3.33] 
Constant  0.519***  0.553***  0.576***  0.066  0.589***  0.431*** 
  [3.08]  [3.89]  [3.62]  [0.91]  [3.38]  [3.67] 
             
(Industry & Year) FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  352  358  356  354  333  377 
R-squared   0.538   0.339   0.467   0.367   0.508   0.388 
The table displays the results of the impact of polluters and post-Kyoto on the bank loan announcement abnormal 
returns, conditional on the information environment. The information environment was defined to be poorer if 
borrowers’ total assets were below median, return volatilities were above median, or loan amounts were below 
median. P-values of chi-squared tests for differences in coefficients of the interaction term POLLUTER*POST 
between the two subsamples are documented. T statistics are reported in brackets. All the explanatory variables 
are defined in previous tables. The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Table 2.8 summarises the results of this analysis. Consistent with expectations, it was found 
that the coefficient on POLLUTER*POST was more positive in the partition indicating poorer 
information environment (i.e., borrowers that are smaller in size, exhibit higher return 
volatilities prior to the bank loan announcements or obtain smaller loan amounts). Thus, the 
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results show that polluters with a poorer information environment benefited more from the 
bank monitoring effect subsequent to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. 
2.7 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
This section presents the results of a robustness check that controlled for alternative event 
windows around the bank loan announcements. Specifically, Equation 2.11 was rerun with 5-
day CAR(0,4) being replaced by two other shorter windows that had been popularly adopted 
in prior studies on bank loan announcement effects: two-day CAR(0,1) and three-day 
CAR(−1,1). The regression results in Table 2.9 show consistently positive coefficients on the 
interaction term POLLUTER*POST, which is supportive of the main results. 
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Table 2.9: Alternative Event Windows around Bank Loan Announcements 
Dep. Var.   2-Day CAR   3-Day CAR 
Model  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Ind. Var.            
POLLUTER*POST  0.091*** 0.087***  0.086*** 0.080** 
  [3.89] [2.85]  [3.23] [2.41] 
LNASSETS  −0.003** −0.005**  −0.003* −0.005* 
  [−1.99] [−2.09]  [−1.67] [−1.72] 
ROA  −0.001 0.034  0.005 0.035 
  [−0.03] [1.14]  [0.23] [1.07] 
D/E  −0.002* −0.003*  −0.001 −0.003* 
  [−1.93] [−1.80]  [−0.91] [−1.66] 
CASH  −0.023 −0.045  −0.010 −0.046 
  [−1.30] [−1.52]  [−0.48] [−1.43] 
TOBINQ  0.002 0.006  −0.002 0.001 
  [0.80] [1.33]  [−0.58] [0.14] 
REVOL  0.237 0.336  0.253 0.415* 
  [1.47] [1.59]  [1.39] [1.79] 
RUNUP  −0.034*** −0.033***  −0.044*** −0.040*** 
  [−5.11] [−3.68]  [−5.81] [−4.00] 
BIG4   −0.004   0.004 
   [−0.43]   [0.36] 
LOANINI   −0.004   −0.002 
   [−0.46]   [−0.22] 
SYND   −0.003   −0.005 
   [−0.35]   [−0.57] 
LNMATURITY   0.015***   0.016*** 
   [2.80]   [2.70] 
Constant  0.104 0.246***  0.068 0.227** 
  [1.53] [3.03]  [0.88] [2.55] 
       
(Industry & Year) FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  710 413  710 413 
R-squared  0.446 0.459   0.419 0.444 
The table reports the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions of 2-day cumulative 
abnormal returns CAR(0,1) (Models (1) and (2)), and 3-day cumulative abnormal 
returns CAR(−1,1) (Models (3) and (4) around bank loan announcements an 
interaction term POLLUTER*POST and controls. Borrower characteristics are 
included in Models (1) and (3). Borrower, banks and loan characteristics are included 
in Models (2) and (4). T statistics are reported in brackets. All the explanatory 
variables are defined in previous tables. The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has empirically revisited the issue of ‘specialness’ of bank loans with a particular 
focus on their certification effect on the borrowers’ environmental risk and the change in the 
certification value in a period of tougher environmental protection regulations and in a poorer 
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information environment. Using a unique hand-collected sample of 759 loan announcements 
relating to Australian firms from January 2001 until December 2013, the abnormal return and 
cumulative abnormal return were computed for the whole period, for subgroups of polluters 
and non-polluters, and for sub-periods of pre- and post-Kyoto ratification. Various borrower, 
bank and loan characteristics that could affect the stock market reactions were then 
investigated.  
Regarding the full sample results over the 2001–2013 timespan, a positive stock market 
reaction to bank loan announcements was found. The results were robust to various event 
windows using both parametric (z test) and non-parametric (Wilcoxon ranked-sum test) test 
statistics. This finding confirms the consensus of positive bank loan specialness that was first 
proved by James (1987) and further evidenced in a wide range of developed markets (see the 
literature review in Section 2.2).  
The borrowers were then classified into two groups, polluters and non-polluters, based on the 
polluting nature (i.e., the relative level of carbon and energy intensity) of their industries to 
examine the stock market reaction to the announcements of bank loans made to borrowers with 
different levels of environmental risk. Next, the sample period was split into two subsamples, 
pre- and post-Kyoto, because most of the new and stringent environmental policies were 
introduced following the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, which is aimed at reducing 
emissions to combat the issue of climate change. To investigate the impact of the post-Kyoto 
period on the change in the stock market reactions to bank loan announcements of polluters 
and non-polluters, the post-Kyoto dummy was interacted with the polluter dummy. It was 
found that over the full period, the market reacted positively to bank loan announcements of 
both polluters and non-polluters, but the positive response was more pronounced for the 
polluters. The findings are consistent with evidence reported for Canadian borrowers by 
Aintablian, Mcgraw and Roberts (2007), indicating that banks provide greater certification 
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value for polluters. It was also found that the gap in the certification value for polluters and 
non-polluters became larger in a more stringent environmental regulatory period (i.e., post-
Kyoto), showing that the markets highly appreciated polluters successfully obtaining bank loan 
financing subsequent to the Kyoto ratification. 
The sample firms were then partitioned using the quality of information environment to test 
whether the higher certification value for polluters was conditional on the level of information 
asymmetry. The relatively higher stock market reaction of polluters was found to be more 
pronounced if the polluters experienced higher information asymmetry, as characterised by 
higher return volatility, smaller size and smaller loan amount, indicating that the information 
environment is an important channel through which banks convey additional environmental 
information associated with borrowers to the market. 
These findings provide some implications for various readers of different interests. First, for 
investors who are interested in stock investment opportunities, evidence of positive abnormal 
returns on the announcement day and various windows around it has been reported. In addition, 
more abnormal returns can be expected if stock investors trade on the bank loan announcements 
of polluters, and the occurrence is even higher when the regulations on environmental 
protections are further restricted or the information environment is poorer. 
Second, as markets do really care about bank decisions on giving loans to polluters, banks can 
improve their reputations by sharing the global efforts in protecting the natural environment by 
providing loans to firms associated with satisfactory environmental risk. By doing so, banks 
can also better manage environmental risk, which is becoming an increasingly important 
component of credit risk management in general. 
Third, as firms need further financing to alter their productions to commit to new environmental 
regulations, policymakers can design such policies that apply specifically to the bank lending 
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process to ensure loans are granted only to ‘green’ projects and businesses. This regulation is 
particularly necessary for a country such as Australia, whose economic growth heavily relies 
on big polluters (i.e., coal and iron ore mining, and petroleum companies).  
Finally, as banks and regulators are imposing stricter views on the bank lending processes, 
firms who wish to secure bank loans definitely need to navigate themselves towards being more 
environmentally friendly. This navigation should be included in corporate long-term business 
strategies.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Environmental Risk, Seasoned Equity Offerings and  
Stock Market Reaction 
--- 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Firms can choose either indirect finance, such as bank loans, or direct finance, such as SEOs, 
as the main external sources to fulfil their investment needs. Firms’ announcements of bank 
loans have been reported to receive positive stock reactions because of the superior bank 
screening and monitoring powers that alleviate much information asymmetry between the 
borrowers’ management and their investors (Diamond 1991; Fama 1985). In contrast, firm 
announcements of SEOs have been shown to produce negative abnormal returns because of 
information asymmetry that exists in the absence of such monitors (Myers 1984; Myers & 
Majluf 1984).21 This fact highlights another important type of financial intermediaries that can 
produce information for the market by certifying the quality of equity issuers through 
underwriting services, that are investment banks (Booth & Smith 1986). Indeed, the existing 
literature mainly employs various aggregate measures of information asymmetry associated 
with the issuers to explain the negative market responses to SEO announcements and document 
the role of underwriters in resolving this market friction (Helou & Park 2001; Slovin, Sushka 
& Hudson 1990).  
                                                          
21 These theories are strongly supported by empirical evidence around the world with most negative abnormal 
returns being reported in the United States and values ranging from −3% to −2% (e.g., Asquith & Mullins 1986; 
Bayless & Chaplinsky 1996; Spiess & Affleck-Graves 1995). 
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Even though the economic impact of information asymmetry in SEOs has been well 
documented in theory, the existing empirical studies face a significant econometric challenge. 
Specifically, the levels of an equity issuer’s information asymmetry and market reaction to its 
SEO announcements are likely to be jointly determined by all other firms’ financial 
characteristics and market conditions. Therefore, it is difficult to draw strong inferences about 
the impact and the role of underwriters in the absence of experimental evidence. The aim of 
the study presented in this chapter was to take a step forward in identifying the role that 
investment banks play in underwriting SEOs. To do so, a quasi-natural experimental 
framework was adopted to overcome the above empirical challenge. 
In particular, the environmental policy changes that commenced with the ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol on 12 December 2007 in Australia was exploited. Internationally, the Kyoto 
Protocol was signed by the member countries of the UNFCCC in 1997 and came into effect in 
2005 (UNEP 2006). The Protocol is an internationally binding agreement whereby 
participating countries commit to cutting down GHG emissions to satisfy national reduction 
targets (Talberg & Swoboda 2013; UNEP 2006). Australia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
means that it officially shares in the global efforts to mitigate climate change, a key global issue 
challenging sustainable development. Since the ratification, the Australian Government has 
demonstrated a strong commitment to environmental protection through ratifications of a series 
of stringent environmental policies, including the Climate Change Review in 2008 and its 
update in 2011, the CPRS in 2008, and the renewable energy scheme in 2010, to list just a few 
(Moosa & Ramiah 2014; Ramiah, Martin & Moosa 2013). These policies are part of the 
Australian Government’s solutions to the issue of being an energy-intensive economy with the 
highest level of per capita emissions in the OECD group (Garnaut 2011). 
The reinforcement in environmental regulations imply additional costs, such as clean-up or 
compliance spending, associated with environmentally sensitive activities (i.e., daily 
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operations and long-term investments) that a firm can undertake. These potential financial 
consequences are referred to as environmental risk, which comes from two main sources: (1) 
stringent environmental regulations and (2) the polluting nature of firms’ industries (Clarkson 
et al. 2008; Dobler, Lajili & Zeghal 2015; Dobler, Lajili & Zéghal 2014; Semenova & Hassel 
2008). Given the lack of mandatory frequent disclosure of environmental information, the 
policy changes may lead to a rise in firms’ environmental risk. The increasing risk will, in turn, 
cause further public uncertainty about the current performance and future prospects of the main 
affected firms (i.e., high carbon emitters) and hence increase their information asymmetries.  
When the polluters issue additional equity to fund their potentially profitable but 
environmentally risky projects, outside investors may suffer from the increased information 
asymmetry and thus react more negatively to the issue (Eckbo & Masulis 1995). However, if 
investment banks can guarantee the quality of the issuer in the form of underwriting contracts, 
the negative reaction may dissipate. Further, the value of such a certification effect may 
increase with the reputation of the underwriters and the incentives associated with greater 
proceeds as the quality of the information produced increases accordingly (Booth & Smith 
1986; Helou & Park 2001; Slovin, Sushka & Hudson 1990). 
These hypotheses were tested by adopting a difference-in-differences empirical strategy that 
compares a treated group of firms with a control group. Treated firms are those that operate in 
the perceived highest carbon emitting industries (i.e., polluters), and controls are those in lower 
emitting industries (i.e., non-polluters). The differences in market reactions to SEO 
announcements of polluters and non-polluters before and after the Kyoto ratification were then 
compared. Since the Kyoto ratification serves as an exogenous shock to polluters and primarily 
does not target any firm’s financial characteristics, this experimental setting can significantly 
relieve the endogeneity concerns (i.e., causality effects), thereby strengthening the reliability 
of the study’s empirical tests (Angrist & Krueger 1999). 
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Three main findings were established. First, relative to controlling non-polluters, after 
controlling for firm, issue and market characteristics, polluters reduced five-day cumulative 
abnormal returns around SEO announcements by 3.7% on average subsequent to the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in Australia. Second, the relative drop in SEO cumulative 
abnormal returns of polluters was less pronounced if the SEOs were underwritten, and even 
turned into positive if the underwriters were the most reputable investment banks. Third, 
similar difference-in-differences analysis on a sample of rights announcements showed 
insignificant change in cumulative abnormal returns for polluters as compared with non-
polluters following the shift in the environmental policies. These results were robust to 
alternative event windows and endogeneity concerns (i.e., using PSM). 
Overall, these findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Myers (1984), Myers 
and Majluf (1984) and Baker and Wurgler (2002), who related the negative market reaction to 
SEO announcements to the level of information asymmetry between managers and investors 
of suing firms. In addition, the evidence on the certifying role of underwriters confirms the 
theories developed by Booth and Smith (1986) and Eckbo and Masulis (1992). 
The present study adds to the extensive empirical literature that has examined the stock price 
effects of SEO announcements in two important ways. First, this research differs from previous 
papers by exploiting changes in environmental policies to design a difference-in-differences 
setting that helped to address endogeneity concerns.22 Second, by doing so, the study is among 
the first to establish the relationship between firm environmental risk and market reaction to 
SEO announcements.  
                                                          
22 Other models directly regress SEO announcement CARs on measures of firms’ information asymmetry. 
Measures in earlier papers include, for example, firm size (Frank & Goyal 2003), return volatility, economic 
conditions (Choe, Masulis & Nanda 1993; Salamudin, Ariff & Nassir 1999), level of communication (Ang & 
Cheng 2011), quality of accruals (Lee, G & Masulis 2009) and institutional ownership (Gao & Mahmudi 2008). 
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Further, the study contributes to the debate on the wealth impact of non-financial regulations 
such as stringent environmental policies. By demonstrating that the stock responses to SEO 
announcements declined more for polluters than for non-polluters in the tougher environmental 
regulatory period (i.e., the post-Kyoto period), the study provides supporting evidence for the 
effectiveness of strict environmental regulations. Specifically, these policies were successful 
in restricting the polluters’ operations by making it more costly for the polluters to raise equity 
capital. This finding provides important implications for policymakers who pursue non-
financial regulations to protect the natural environment, which has become a key global issue. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the background on 
environmental regulations in Australia and provides a literature review. Section 3.3 discusses 
the development of testable hypotheses. Section 3.4 provides a description of the data 
collection and summary statistics. Section 3.5 is devoted to the research methodology. The 
empirical results are displayed and discussed in Section 3.6. Robustness tests are presented in 
Section 3.7. Finally, Section 3.8 provides a conclusion and implications. 
3.2 RELATED LITERATURE 
3.2.1 Theoretical Background 
There are several theoretical streams that predict negative market reaction following the 
announcements of SEOs. The main theories attribute the negative stock responses to the 
information asymmetry between the managers and shareholders, as posited by Myers and 
Majluf (1984). The authors argued that managers are believed to have superior information 
about the firm value over other outsiders, and tend to act for the best interests of the existing 
shareholders at the cost of new investors. Therefore, the managers’ decisions to issue additional 
equity will signal that the current stocks are being overpriced. Consistent with the assumption 
of manager–shareholder information asymmetry, Miller and Rock (1985) developed a 
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theoretical model following which disclosures of financing, including equity offerings, can be 
considered negative dividends that communicate negative issuers’ prospects with outsider 
investors. These negative signals of firms’ quality will then be translated into declines in stock 
prices. 
Another theory evoted to explaining the negative stock price movements around SEO 
announcements is the theory of market timing of Baker and Wurgler (2002). In their model, 
the authors claimed that managers tend to time the market, as measured by market-to-book 
ratio, and issue equity when firms are highest priced. Alternatively, Scholes (1972) developed 
the price pressure hypothesis that attributes stock price reduction to the pressure of an increased 
supply of shares following a new equity issue. This explanation aligns with the argument that 
a company’s shares have a downward sloping demand curve and are non-substitutable as 
proposed by Asquith and Mullins (1986). However, this hypothesis contradicts the popular 
beliefs that stock price is solely driven by future prospects of underlying cash flows and that 
any risk-return combination of a specific stock can be replicable by a suitable portfolio 
construction (Asquith & Mullins 1986). 
3.2.2 Related Empirical Evidence 
The empirical evidence on the share price impacts of SEO announcements has been well 
documented in the literature. Event studies have been widely undertaken to investigate 
abnormal returns around the announcements of additional equity issuances. Even though the 
results have been mixed, negative market reactions have been dominantly reported. A majority 
of earlier studies in this area focused on markets in the US and the first papers were arguably 
published in 1985. In addition, a large number of studies used data from other developed 
countries, such as the United Kingdom (UK), Japan, France, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
the Netherlands, Spain and Canada. A small set of recent research has shifted to emerging 
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markets, including China, Hong Kong, India, Greece and Taiwan. This section will review the 
literature on the wealth effects of SEO announcements and the main determinants of these 
effects. 
3.2.2.1 Seasoned equity offerings and issuers’ abnormal returns 
a. Negative reactions 
A majority of studies on SEO announcement effects used US data and consistently reported 
negative abnormal returns around the announcements. For example, a survey paper by Eckbo 
and Masulis (1995) found average abnormal returns of −3.1% associated with US SEO 
announcements. The first published studies in this field also used US data (see Asquith & 
Mullins 1986; Bhagat, Marr & Thompson 1985; Masulis & Korwar 1986; Mikkelson & Partch 
1986; Pettway & Radcliffe 1985). These studies used SEO announcements in the 1970s to 
1980s and reported negative market responses over a two-day event window that covered the 
announcement day with cumulative abnormal returns ranging from −3.44% to −0.51%. 
Since then, a series of papers examining more recent SEO announcements in the US have 
provided similar findings. For example, G Lee and Masulis (2009) found a two-day abnormal 
returns CAR(0,1) of −2.67% using a sample of 963 equity issue announcements over the period 
1990–2002. Similarly, Demiralp et al. (2011) reported a three-day abnormal returns CAR(−1,1) 
of −.39% employing a dataset of 3,093 SEO announcements over the period 1982–2006. These 
negative responses were also observed in the recent work of Gokkaya and Highfield (2014) 
and Henderson and Zhao (2014).  
Negative stock market reactions to equity offering announcements in other developed countries 
have also been documented. For example, Marsden (2000) found an average two-day CAR(0,1) 
of −1.01% on a sample of 88 rights issue announcements in New Zealand over the period 1976–
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1984. In addition, Armitage (2002), Iqbal (2008) and Slovin, Sushka and Lai (2000) 
documented average CAR(−1,0) of −0.96%, CAR(−1,1) of −1.8% and CAR(−1,0) of −1.88% 
for UK markets, respectively. Gajewski, Ginglinger and Lasfer (2007) reported CAR(0,1) of 
−0.52% for rights share offers and −1.75% for public unit offers using French data. Employing 
data on the Netherlands markets, De Jong and Veld (2001) and Kabir and Roosenboom (2003) 
found CAR(−1,1) of −1.07% and CAR of −2.79%, respectively. Further, Martín‐Ugedo (2003) 
found CAR(−1,0) of −1.25% in Spain. 
Negative abnormal returns have also been reported using data on emerging markets. For 
example, C-C Lee, Poon and Sinnakkannu (2014) found average CAR(−1,0) of −11% on a 
sample of 110 underwritten rights offerings announced in Hong Kong over the period 2003–
2011. Using a dataset of 293 SEO announcements in Taiwan from 1996 to 2001, YM Lin, You 
and Lin (2008) documented average CAR(−3,0) of −0.4%. 
b. Positive reactions 
Even though the negative market reactions to SEO announcements especially hold for the US, 
a few studies have reported positive stock responses for this market. These studies mainly 
focused on the private placement type of equity offerings. For example, investigating abnormal 
returns around 99 announcements of private equity sales, Wruck (1989) found an average 
CAR(−1,0) of 1.89%. Similarly, Hertzel and Smith (1993) found CAR(−3,0) of 1.72% on a 
sample of 106 private placements, which was then supported by Hertzel et al. (2002). Altınkılıç 
and Hansen (2003) reported 1.7% abnormal return on the day of announcements of 1,703 issues 
over the period 1990–1997. More recently, Krishnamurthy et al. (2005), Barclay, Holderness 
and Sheehan (2007) and Wruck and Wu (2009) also provided supporting evidence for the 
positive market reactions to announcements of private placements in the US. 
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Outside the US, positive abnormal returns have been observed more frequently in both 
developed and emerging markets. For example, Maynes and Pandes (2011) found average 
CAR(−1,1) of 6.46% over the period 1993–2001 and 1.24% over the period 2002–2005 by 
examining a sample of 347 announcements of privately placed common stocks in Canada. 
Examining a dataset of 318 open offers in the UK over the period 1991–1995, Armitage and 
Capstaff (2009) found an average CAR(−1,0) of 1.55%. Similarly, positive stock reactions 
have been reported in Greece (e.g., Tsangarakis 1996), Hong Kong (e.g., Ching, Firth & Rui 
2006; Wu, Wang & Yao 2005), Israel (e.g., Hauser, Kraizberg & Dahan 2003), Japan (e.g., 
Cooney, Kato & Schallheim 2003; Kang & Stulz 1996; Kato & Schallheim 1993), Norway 
(e.g., Bøhren, Eckbo & Michalsen 1997), Sweden (e.g., Cronqvist & Nilsson 2005), Taiwan 
(e.g., Cheng, L-Y, Wang & Chen 2014; Liang & Jang 2013) and China (e.g., Chen, X 2015; 
Shahid et al. 2010; Wang, Wei & Pruitt 2006). 
c. Insignificant reactions 
Inconclusive results have also been documented in studies of SEO announcement effects. For 
example, Jegadeesh, Weinstein and Welch (1993), Vijh (2006) and Francis et al. (2010) found 
insignificant three-day abnormal returns CAR(−1,1) in US markets. In countries other than the 
US, insignificant stock reactions have also been reported using SEO data: in Canada (e.g., 
Dong et al. 2012), Ireland (e.g., Corby & Stohs 1998), New Zealand (e.g., Anderson, Rose & 
Cahan 2006) and Malaysia (e.g., Salamudin, Ariff & Nassir 1999). 
3.2.2.2 Determinants of issuers’ abnormal returns 
a. Issuer information asymmetry 
Both the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) and the market 
timing theory of Baker and Wurgler (2002) are based on the assumption of information 
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asymmetry between managers and investors, and that managers tend to issue new equity when 
stocks are overpriced. Accordingly, negative market reactions to announcements of additional 
equity offerings could be predicted and the magnitude of the negative reactions was expected 
to be positively associated with the level of the manager–investor information asymmetry. 
Previous studies on the determinants of SEO announcement abnormal returns have employed 
a wide range of measures to capture an equity issuer’s information asymmetry. Measures of 
earlier papers include firm size (Frank & Goyal 2003), return volatility, economic condition 
(Choe, Masulis & Nanda 1993; Salamudin, Ariff & Nassir 1999), level of communication (Ang 
& Cheng 2011), quality of accruals (Lee, G & Masulis 2009) and institutional ownership (Gao 
& Mahmudi 2008); more recent measures are based on market microstructure (Bharath, 
Pasquariello & Wu 2009).  
b. Issuer demand for equity 
Prior studies have suggested that there are two sources of motivations for firms to issue equity: 
(1) investment-related and (2) leverage-related demand for equity. First, firms are motivated to 
obtain more equity financing when they have positive net present value (NPV) investment 
opportunities that are not fully financed by internally generated cash flows (Myers 1984). If 
the markets believe a firm presents characteristics that show that it has investment-related 
demand for equity rather than pure stock overvaluation, then investors may react less 
unfavourably (Bayless & Chaplinsky 1996). These investment-related motivations can be 
captured through free cash flow, ROA, cash on hand or capital expenditures around the equity 
issue (Bayless & Chaplinsky 1996). Second, if firms are debt constrained, then they are more 
likely to issue additional equity than debt. Leverage-related motivations can be measured by 
leverage ratio, firm size or firm risk (Bayless & Chaplinsky 1996). The higher the measures, 
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the higher the possibility a firm needs to raise equity funds, and the less favourable the market 
reaction to equity issue announcements. 
c. Type of issue 
Most earlier studies on wealth effects of rights offerings concentrated on the US market and 
generally reported negative abnormal returns around rights announcements. However, the US 
studies found less negative market reactions to rights offers relative to other types of equity 
issue, such as firm commitment offerings (Eckbo 2008; Eckbo & Masulis 1992; Smith 1977). 
There are two main reasons to explain the relatively higher abnormal returns associated with 
rights offers. The first explanation is based on the argument that rights issuances often require 
lower flotation costs (Hansen 1988). The second reason attributes the larger price declines on 
commitment offerings to the redistribution of voting rights, which weaken the monitoring 
power, whereas a rights offer does not necessarily involve a dilution of voting rights, hence the 
monitoring effect remains (Eckbo & Masulis 1992). However, if the rights are expected to be 
resold by the existing shareholders, then the severity of manager–investor information 
asymmetry and adverse selection costs become extreme, and could potentially lead to a 
substantial decrease in stock prices.  
More recently, rights issues have become more popular in the UK, Australia, continental 
Europe and Asia than in the US (Eckbo 2008; Eckbo & Masulis 1992). The studies that have 
used data from outside of the US have documented relatively larger negative market responses 
to announcements of rights offerings, for example, in the UK (Slovin, Sushka & Lai 2000), the 
Netherlands (Kabir & Roosenboom 2003), Hong Kong (Ching, Firth & Rui 2006) and New 
Zealand (Marsden 2000). 
Another emerging type of equity offering is private placement. Wruck (1989) assumed that the 
buyers of private placements would be willing to actively participate in the monitoring process 
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over the firm’s managers, which might lead to an improvement in the efficiency and 
correspondingly positive market reactions. Hertzel and Smith (1993) developed a certification 
hypothesis that also predicted positive market reactions to private placements in which 
informed investors certify the issuer’s value by purchasing a large stake of shares. A majority 
of empirical studies on the wealth effects of privately placed equity offerings support those 
hypotheses. For example, Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan (2007) found positive abnormal 
returns in the US and Ching, and Firth and Rui (2006) reported similar results in Hong Kong.  
d. Issue size 
Investors were expected to have downward sloping demand for a firm’s shares. Asquith and 
Mullins (1986) provided supporting evidence for this hypothesis by showing that the level of 
market reactions to announcements of equity offerings is negatively associated with the size of 
the issues, as measured by the dilution ratio.23 
e. Issue purpose 
Firms can issue equity to either finance new investments or retire existing debts. In addition, 
the new equity capital can be used for firms’ general business purposes or simply for market 
timing objectives. The difference in the financing purposes can affect the market reactions to 
the proposed equity issuance. In general, investors expect managers to invest the newly 
mobilised capital into positive NPV projects. Indeed, Walker and Yost (2008) documented that 
higher abnormal returns are associated with issues that are aimed at specific investment plans. 
It may be because of the market perception that detailed capital expenditure purpose can be 
viewed as a reliable signal of future lucrative investments. In addition, the refinancing purpose 
                                                          
23 Asquith and Mullins (1986) define ‘offering dilution’ as the ratio of the change in the equity value of the 
issuer around an announcement of the issue proceeds. 
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may not necessarily result in positive market responses as the reduced financial leverage will 
dissipate the issuer’s tax shield benefits and debtholder’s monitoring power (Graham 2000). 
f. Underwriter reputation 
Booth and Smith (1986) theoretically and empirically provided supporting evidence for the 
certification hypothesis put forward by Klein and Leffler (1981). The authors argued that 
issuers tend to employ and pay underwriters for their issue prices to be certified in order to be 
fairly consistent with inside information. They further claimed that the certification value can 
be greater if the issuers are able to use a specialist, such as an investment banker. This 
certification hypothesis is supported by other theoretical and empirical work, namely, Eckbo 
and Masulis (1992) and Slovin, Sushka and Lai (2000), which prove that underwriting serves 
as a mechanism for minimising the adverse selection costs incurred by outside investors. 
Agreeing with these assumptions, Helou and Park (2001) developed a technique to extract the 
signalling component from the underwriter reputation effect and found both of these were 
significantly and positively related to SEO announcement abnormal returns. Cooney, Kato and 
Schallheim (2003) also demonstrated that equity issue underwriters acted as certifiers of firm 
quality and bearers of underwriting risk to explain the positive market reactions to SEO 
announcements in Japan. 
However, in contrast to the views of Eckbo and Masulis (1992) and Slovin, Sushka and Lai 
(2000), Armitage (2002) found in that rights issues that were less than 50% underwritten 
elicited larger abnormal returns than other rights issues that were more broadly underwritten, 
and the low underwritten open offers were no different from high underwritten open offers 
after controlling for discount. The author further showed that average abnormal returns of 
underwritten open and rights offers were 2.9% and −2.6%, respectively, which should have 
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been similar given the equal underwriting risk between these two types if the previous 
predictions were true.  
g. Market conditions 
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) argued that market reactions to equity issues can be more 
favourable under certain market conditions. Using an aggregate volume of equity issues to 
capture market conditions, the authors found that the level of negative price response was 
approximately 200 basis points smaller in hot markets, as characterised by high equity issue 
volume, than in cold markets, represented by low equity issue volume. The results support the 
hypothesis of windows of opportunity in which benefits for hot-market equity issuers are 
partially due to the decrease in information asymmetry. 
3.2.2.3 Seasoned equity offerings and issuers’ environmental risk 
The impact of issuer environmental risk on the level of market reactions to announcements of 
equity offerings has been under-researched. Prior studies have mainly investigated the 
relationships between corporate environmental performance or risk and financial performance. 
More recent papers have examined the environmental effects on other aspects of corporate 
finance, such as cost of capital, SEO discounts and access to external finance. Most of these 
studies focused on the US market since this is a relatively new area of study and there is a 
shortage of data as well as consensus on good measures of such a broad term as environmental 
performance or risk. This section will review all of these issues to support the development of 
the hypothesis on the relationship between environmental risk and SEO announcement 
abnormal returns as discussed in the following sections. 
A vast amount of literature has been dedicated to investigating the impacts of corporate 
environmental performance on financial performance, and mixed results have been reported 
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(e.g., Horváthová 2010; Przychodzen & Przychodzen 2015). Despite the unsettled findings, a 
majority of literature in this area has agreed that polluters—firms that are associated with lower 
environmental performance or higher environmental risk—financially underperform (i.e., 
experience worsened profitability, asset value or stock return) non-polluters (e.g., Albertini 
2013; Feldman, Soyka & Ameer 1997; Konar & Cohen 2001). Another set of literature has 
produced empirical evidence on the effects of environmental regulations on equity risk and 
returns and shown mixed findings depending on the environmental friendliness of each of the 
industries and the firms’ ability to pass the additional costs associated with the new regulations 
on to their customers (e.g., Ramiah, Martin & Moosa 2013).  
Better environmental risk management has been proven to lead to a lower cost of capital. For 
example, Sharfman and Fernando (2008) employed a sample of firms from Standard and Poor’s 
500 and documented that firms that improved their environmental risk management benefited 
from reduced cost of equity, particularly because of a decrease in stock volatility as captured 
by beta. Similarly, Chava (2014) found that firms that were associated with environmental 
concerns, such as hazardous chemicals, substantial emissions and climate change concerns, 
needed to compensate their stock investors significantly more than firms without such 
environmental issues.  
Improvement in environmental performance has also been shown to result in easier access to 
external financing. For example, B Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim (2014) used a cross-country 
sample of firms and reported that the firms with higher environmental ratings faced fewer 
financial constraints. The results held true for other aspects of corporate social responsibility 
as well, such as social and corporate governance performance. The authors attributed the better 
access to external capital to two main channels: (1) reduction in agency costs due to the 
improvement in stakeholder engagement and (2) reduction in information asymmetry due to 
improvement in firm transparency. 
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Firms with better environmental profiles can also reduce equity issue costs. For example, Chan 
and Walter (2014) studied the investment performance of a sample of 748 environmentally 
friendly firms in the US and found that these ‘green’ firms enjoyed lower SEO discounts and 
initial public offering (IPO) under-pricings and higher post-issue market performance 
compared with a control group. 
3.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
It was expected that the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) and the market timing 
theory of Baker and Wurgler (2002) would hold true in the Australian SEO markets. In other 
words, there is an information asymmetry between the managers and investors, and the 
informed managers tend to act in the interests of the existing shareholders at the cost of new 
investors. Therefore, an announcement of public equity offer was expected to signal firm 
overvaluation and therefore elicit negative abnormal returns. However, an announcement of 
rights offer was expected to be less unfavourable because of (1) less dilution of voting rights 
and monitoring power (Eckbo & Masulis 1992), and (2) lower flotation cost (Hansen 1988), 
relative to an SEO in a developed market such as Australia. 
Hypothesis 3.1A: Stock markets react significantly and negatively to SEO and rights offer 
announcements. 
Hypothesis 3.1B: The negative reactions are more pronounced for SEOs relative to rights 
offers. 
There is evidence that firms associated with better environmental performance or lower 
environmental risk financially outperform other environmentally underperforming firms in 
terms of profitability, stock return (Albertini 2013; Feldman, Soyka & Ameer 1997; Konar & 
Cohen 2001), cost of equity (Chava 2014; Sharfman & Fernando 2008), access to external 
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finance (Cheng, B, Ioannou & Serafeim 2014) or equity issue discount (Chan & Walter 2014) 
and so on. As a result, the worsened financial performance was expected to worry investors, 
who would require higher compensation for higher environmental risk. In addition, given that 
the environmental information of firms is not frequently and mandatorily communicated to the 
investors, the worries would be exacerbated accordingly. Hence, outside investors, who are 
subject to relatively higher information asymmetry, were expected to react more negatively 
when a polluter issued new shares to the public. However, that negative reaction was expected 
to be smaller in a better information environment associated with a rights offer.  
Hypothesis 3.2A: Ceteris paribus (i.e., that issuer, issue and market characteristics are fixed), 
polluters produce lower SEO announcement abnormal returns relative to non-polluters. 
Hypothesis 3.2B: The difference in abnormal returns between polluters and non-polluters is 
larger for SEOs relative to rights offers. 
Environmental regulations can contribute considerably to the total level of a firm’s 
environmental risk. Hence, in a period when environmental policies are tougher and increasing 
uncertainty exists in the policy implementation, polluters, the main targets of the environmental 
regulations, will relatively increase their environmental risk. Again, the lack of frequent 
communication of the increasing environmental risk to outside investors will make the 
polluters’ information asymmetry problem more severe, which will worsen the stock market 
reaction to SEOs. With regard to types of equity issues, the environmental effects were 
expected to be more pronounced in poorer information environments associated with SEOs in 
comparison with rights offers. 
Hypothesis 3.3A: Ceteris paribus (i.e., that issuer, issue and market characteristics are fixed), 
relative to non-polluters, SEO announcement abnormal returns of polluters reduce more 
following environmental policy change (i.e., the post-Kyoto ratification period). 
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Hypothesis 3.3B: The impact of the post-Kyoto period on announcement abnormal returns of 
polluters is more pronounced for SEOs relative to rights offers.  
The possible negative impact of growing environmental risk on an equity issuer will be relieved 
if a third party can certify the current quality and future cash flows of the issuer. That special 
service can be provided through underwriting contracts and better certification effect would be 
offered by reputable underwriters, such as the biggest investment banks by market shares 
(Cooney, Kato & Schallheim 2003; Eckbo & Masulis 1992; Helou & Park 2001; Slovin, 
Sushka & Lai 2000). Therefore, in a relatively poorer information environment associated with 
an SEO, the inverse relationship between the issuer’s environmental risk and SEO 
announcement abnormal returns would be expected to be stronger given the absence of such 
quality certifiers. 
Hypothesis 3.4: Ceteris paribus (i.e., that issuer, issue and market characteristics are fixed), 
the impact of environmental policy change on the relationship between issuers’ environmental 
risk and SEO announcement abnormal returns is more pronounced for issues that are not 
underwritten or are underwritten by non-reputable investment banks. 
3.4 DATA DESCRIPTION 
3.4.1 SEO and Rights Offer Announcements 
Equity offer announcements of all ASX public companies from 2001 to 2013 were sourced 
from the Bloomberg database. Relevant information regarding issuer identity and issue 
characteristics associated with each announcement was also collected from Bloomberg. Firm 
financial characteristics were extracted from the Morningstar DatAnalysis database, and firm 
stock prices and market index were collected from Datastream. All data were matched using 
the stock listing code, which is the unique identifier of each announcing issuer. SEOs and rights 
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offers were the main types of equity issues investigated in this study for two reasons: (1) they 
represent different levels of information environments, thereby providing strong robustness 
tests; and (2) they are the main equity offer types in Australia, accounting for about 85% of all 
issues over the sample period (see Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1: Distribution of Type of Equity Offer by Year 
Offer Type   SEO   Rights   Other   Total 
Year  N %   N %   N %   N % 
2001  46 46.94  6 6.12  46 46.94  98 100 
2002  12 11.21  11 10.28  84 78.50  107 100 
2003  25 27.47  4 4.40  62 68.13  91 100 
2004  23 23.96  1 1.04  72 75.00  96 100 
2005  118 40.00  0 0.00  177 60.00  295 100 
2006  377 59.84  164 26.03  89 14.13  630 100 
2007  342 49.49  288 41.68  61 8.83  691 100 
2008  171 40.62  206 48.93  44 10.45  421 100 
2009  383 46.03  388 46.63  61 7.33  832 100 
2010  575 61.30  299 31.88  64 6.82  938 100 
2011  544 58.43  268 28.79  119 12.78  931 100 
2012  574 57.86  285 28.73  133 13.41  992 100 
2013  435 52.98  284 34.59  102 12.42  821 100 
Total   3,625 52.21   2,204 31.74   1,114 16.04   6,943 100 
This table provides distribution of types of equity offers by year for the sample period 2001–2013. SEOs are identified as ‘Primary 
Share Offering’ and rights offers are classified as ‘RIGHTS’ in the Bloomberg database. Others consist of all other types, including 
primary share offerings together with accelerated bookbuild, best efforts, block, bought deal, DRP shortfall, etc.; private placement; 
and secondary share offering. SEOs and rights offers are the main types of offer to be investigated in this study.  
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Table 3.1 provides the distribution of the types of equity offers by year for the sample period 
2001–2013. SEOs are identified as ‘Primary Share Offering’ and rights offers are classified as 
‘RIGHTS’ in the Bloomberg database. Others consist of all other types, including primary 
share offerings together with accelerated bookbuild, best efforts, block, bought deal, DRP 
shortfall and so on; private placement; and secondary share offering.  
Equity issuances dramatically changed throughout the sample period in terms of both size and 
type structure. Specifically, the number of announced deals increased by almost 700%, from 
around 100 issues per year from 2001 to 2004, and suddenly surged to almost 300 deals in 2005 
and more than 600 issues in 2006, and kept rising steadily to above 800 offers per year from 
2009 to 2013. The sample period also witnessed a remarkable restructuring of offer type with 
fewer rights issues being executed during the first five years, representing less than 10%, before 
surging to around 300 deals or approximately 30% of the annual total issues. SEOs were 
relatively more stable during the whole sample period with regard to contributing to the whole 
sample equity issues per year, whereas the other types reduced significantly in their presence, 
from 50% in 2001 to merely just over 10% in 2013 in the total. In total, the sample consists of 
3,625 SEOs and 2,204 rights offers, which together account for almost 85% of all equity offer 
announcements in Australia over the sample period. 
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Table 3.2: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of SEOs and Rights 
Variable Definition Data source 
  SEO   Rights 
  N Mean SD   N Mean SD 
  
     
    
Panel A: Main variables  
POLLUTER 
Dummy variable indicating whether an announcing issuer operates in a 
polluting industry 
Bloomberg & 
DatAnalysis 
 3,625 0.654 0.476 
 
2,204 0.618 0.486 
POST 
Dummy variable indicating whether an issue is announced in the post-Kyoto 
period 
 3,625 0.740 0.439 
 
2,204 0.785 0.411 
POLLUTER*POST Interaction term of POLLUTER and POST dummies  3,625 0.512 0.500  2,204 0.490 0.500 
       
    
Panel B: Control variables 
LNASSETS Log transformation of total assets DatAnalysis  3,379 17.404 2.238  1,993 16.738 2.245 
ROA Return on total assets DatAnalysis  3,379 −0.312 0.652  1,993 −0.459 0.847 
D/E Ratio of long-term debt to equity DatAnalysis  3,352 0.297 2.229  1,977 0.347 2.839 
CASH Ratio of cash balance to total assets DatAnalysis  3,354 0.265 0.261  1,978 0.280 0.281 
TOBINQ 
Tobin’s Q = (Total assets + market value of equity − book value of equity) / 
total assets 
DatAnalysis  3,378 2.724 5.388 
 
1,992 2.337 5.654 
REVOL 
Standard deviation of daily stock return over 100 trading days from −109 to 
−10 relative to announcement date 
Datastream  2,845 0.058 0.045 
 
1,790 0.066 0.048 
RUNUP 
Cumulative return of daily stock return over 100 trading days from −109 to 
−10 relative to announcement date 
Datastream  3,625 0.107 0.557 
 
2,204 −0.068 0.587 
LNPROCEEDS Log transformation of issue proceeds Bloomberg  3,595 15.435 1.831  2,082 15.128 1.846 
DEBTREPAY Dummy variable indicating an issue’s purpose is to repay debt Bloomberg  3,625 0.015 0.122 
 
2,204 0.005 0.070 
UDWRITER Dummy variable indicating an issue is underwritten Bloomberg  3,625 0.589 0.492  2,204 0.022 0.147 
REPUDWRITER 
Dummy variable indicating an issue is underwritten by reputable 
underwriter(s) (top 10 by market share) 
Bloomberg  3,625 0.179 0.384 
 
2,204 0.006 0.077 
MKTRUNUP 
Cumulative daily market return over 100 trading days from −109 to −10 
relative to announcement date 
Datastream   3,625 0.031 0.097 
  
2,204 0.017 0.127 
The table presents the variable names, definitions, data sources and descriptive statistics for the main and control variables for SEO and rights offer samples considered in this study. 
The statistics include the number of observations (N), the mean and standard deviation (SD). The primary source is the Bloomberg database from which SEO and rights issue 
announcements were collected. The announcing issuer’s identity, e.g., ASX listing code and firm’s name, issuer and issue characteristics were then obtained from each 
announcement. The issue announcement was matched with firm characteristics from the Morningstar DatAnalysis database using the announcing issuer’s identity. The issuers’ and 
market stock prices were sourced from Datastream. 
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Table 3.2 presents the variable names, definitions, data sources and descriptive statistics for 
the main and control variables for SEO and rights offers separately. The main variables are a 
POLLUTER dummy, which is equal to one if an announcing issuer operates in a polluting 
industry and zero otherwise (see Section 1.2 for a detailed definition of polluters); a POST 
dummy, which receives one if an issue was announced in the post-Kyoto period, the more 
stringent environmental regulation period that started in 2008; and an interaction term, 
POLLUTER*POST. With regard to the main variables, a majority of SEO announcements were 
made by polluters, with 65% of SEOs and 61.8% of rights offers. Further, most of the 
announcements were made after the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in Australia, with 74% of 
SEOs and 78.5% of rights issues. Control variables consisted of all key accounting-based (size, 
profitability, leverage, cash holding, growth opportunity) and market-based financial (return 
volatility, return run-up) characteristics of issuing firms as well as the issue attributes 
(proceeds, purpose, underwriting) and market conditions (market return run-up). The number 
of observations differed across variables depending on the availability of each data source.  
3.4.2 Polluting and Non-Polluting Issuers 
As discussed in Section 1.2, firms classified into one of the nine following GICS industries 
were defined as polluters: (1) oil, gas and consumable fuels; (2) electric utilities; (3) gas 
utilities; (4) independent power producers and energy traders; (5) multi-utilities; (6) chemicals; 
(7) construction materials; (8) metals and mining; (9) paper and forest products (CDP 2012). 
Firms identified in other GICS industries were defined as non-polluters. 
Panel B of Table 3.4 displays the number of observations (N), means and standard deviations 
(SD) for issuer and issue characteristics of polluters and non-polluters for SEO and rights offer 
samples. It also reports the two-tailed t test of the mean difference in each characteristic 
between polluters and non-polluters. Specifically, for the SEO sample, relative to non-
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polluters, polluters were smaller in size, less profitable, lower leveraged, holding more cash, 
more volatile in stock return, issuing smaller proceeds and less likely to be underwritten by 
reputable investment banks. Similarly, regarding rights offers, relative to non-polluters, 
polluters were smaller in size, less leveraged, holding more cash, having less growth 
opportunities, more volatile in stock return, issuing smaller proceeds and less likely to be 
underwritten by reputable investment banks. Regarding underwriting data, SEOs were 
significantly more broadly covered by underwriting contracts compared with rights offers. 
Specifically, only 2.2% of polluters’ and non-polluters’ rights issues were underwritten in 
contrast to 58.2% of polluters’ and 60.2% of non-polluters’ SEOs that were underwritten. This 
is understandable as underwriting services are costly and normally required in cases of high 
manager–investor information asymmetry, which is more severe for SEOs than for rights 
offers.  
3.5 METHODOLOGY 
3.5.1 Calculation of Announcement Abnormal Returns 
The first step was to calculate abnormal returns over various event windows that contained the 
announcement date for each firm. Following the literature, the standard event study 
methodology proposed by Mikkelson and Partch (1986) was adopted. Specifically, for each 
firm, abnormal returns were calculated using a market model with parameters being estimated 
over an estimation window of (−109, −10) (a 100-day period beginning 109 days before and 
ending 10 days before the announcement date of day 0), of the form:  
    =    +        +      (3.1)  
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where     is the individual announcing firm i’s log return on day t within the 100-day 
estimation window;     is the log return on the ASX All Ordinaries index on day t;    and    
are the parameters to be estimated over the estimation window.  
Abnormal returns (    ) were then defined as the residuals or prediction errors (   ) of this 
model, specified as follows: 
     =     −      +         (3.2) 
where      is the abnormal return of announcing firm i on day t within the event window, and 
            are estimated using Equation 3.1. For the purpose of this study, daily abnormal 
returns of 11 days ranging from five days before to five days after the announcement day (day 
0) were examined for statistics and significance. 
The abnormal returns were then standardised to conduct the tests of statistical significance, as 
follows: 
      =  
    
   
  (3.3) 
    =  [  
 [1 +  
1
 
+  
(    −     )
 
∑      −      
  
   
]]
 
   (3.4)  
where     is the respective standard deviation of the prediction errors obtained from the market 
model;   
  is the residual variance of the market model regressions for announcing firm i; M is 
the number of days in the estimation window (100); and     is the mean market return over the 
estimation period.  
For each event day t, a Z statistic was computed to test the null hypothesis that      = 0 as 
follows: 
 90 
  =          √ (3.5) 
where       is the mean      ; and N is the number of       in the sample. 
The formulas to calculate cumulative abnormal returns and standardised cumulative abnormal 
returns over event window (  ,   ) are as follows: 
    (  ,   ) =        
  
    
(3.6)  
     (  ,   ) =  
∑    
  
       
    −     + 1
 (3.7) 
For the purpose of this study, five conventional event windows including two asymmetric (two-
day CAR(−1,0), five-day CAR(−3,1)) and three asymmetric ones (three-day CAR(−1,1), 
seven-day CAR(−3,3), and 11-day CAR(−5,5)) were investigated for statistics and 
significance. For each event window (  ,   ), the Z statistic was computed to test the null 
hypothesis that     (  ,   ) =  0 as follows: 
  =       (  ,   )   √ (3.8) 
where      (  ,   ) is the mean      (  ,   ); and N is the number of      (  ,   ) in the 
sample. 
To control for the possibility that abnormal returns were not normally distributed, in addition 
to parametric tests, non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank tests were employed for all the daily 
and cumulative abnormal returns mentioned above to confirm the results. The Wilcoxon signed 
rank test had a null hypothesis of no difference in magnitudes between the negative and positive 
abnormal returns (or cumulative abnormal returns). 
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3.5.2 Regression Models 
In the second stage, to test the effect of polluters and the post-Kyoto period on the magnitude 
of stock price reaction to SEO announcements, cross-sectional OLS regressions were run with 
cumulative abnormal returns estimated in the first stage as the dependent variables. The 
baseline regression models were as follows:  
     =    +             +             
 
   
 (3.9) 
     =    +         +             
 
   
 (3.10) 
     =    +             ∗       +              
 
   
+ (Industry & Year) FE (3.11) 
where      is the cumulative abnormal return of announcing issuer i;           is a dummy 
indicating whether announcing issuer i is a polluter;       is a dummy indicating whether 
announcing issuer i is observed in the post-Kyoto period;           ∗       is an 
interaction term; and           are a list of issuer, issue and market characteristics of 
announcing issuer i. All variables are defined in Table 3.2. 
In Equation 3.9, the coefficient of the POLLUTER dummy,   , captures the mean difference 
in cumulative abnormal return between polluting and non-polluting issuers for the whole 
sample period 2001–2013. In Equation 2.10, the coefficient of POST dummy,   , measures the 
mean difference in cumulative abnormal returns between the post- and pre-Kyoto periods of 
all sample firms (all announcing issuers). Of interest is the coefficient of the interaction term 
in Equation 3.11,   , which represents the change in cumulative abnormal return for polluting 
relative to the change in cumulative abnormal return for non-polluting issuers subsequent to 
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the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in Australia. A negative    is consistent with the market 
expectation that the change in the environmental policy subsequent to the Kyoto ratification 
would reinforce the negative impact of information asymmetry associated with SEO issuers on 
firm market value. In Equation 3.11, POLLUTER and POST dummies are not included as their 
impacts on cumulative abnormal return are absorbed by industry and year fixed effects. 
3.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section first discusses the univariate results with regard to the stock market reaction to 
announcements of SEO and rights offers for the full sample and for subsamples of polluters 
and non-polluters. The multivariate results relating the cumulative abnormal returns to the 
issuer, issue and market variables are then reported to confirm the results obtained from the 
univariate tests. One asymmetric event window (5-day CAR(−3,1)) was selected for the main 
regressions and two symmetric windows (3-day CAR(−1,1) and 7-day CAR(−1,1)) for the 
robustness checks. These event windows were chosen as the best options after all relevant 
criteria were considered, including (1) capturing leaking information, (2) minimising effects of 
confounding events, (3) reflecting weak delayed reactions and (4) following traditions of event 
study. 
3.6.1 Univariate Analysis on Seasoned Equity Offerings Announcement Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns 
Table 3.3 displays abnormal returns around public and rights issue announcements in Australia 
during the sample period 2001–2013. The abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns 
were calculated using the market model and standard event study methodology as discussed in 
Section 3.5.1. Panel A reports the daily abnormal returns for two samples of announcements 
of SEOs and rights offers, ranging from five days before to five days after the announcement 
day (day 0) with corresponding mean (%), SD, Z statistics and non-parametric Wilcoxon signed 
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rank test statistics. Panel B presents similar statistics for various cumulative abnormal returns 
around the announcement day, including two asymmetric (2-day CAR(−1,0), 5-day 
CAR(−3,1)) and three symmetric ones (3-day CAR(−1,1), 7-day CAR(−3,3), and 11-day 
CAR(−5,5)). 
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Table 3.3: Abnormal Returns Around SEO and Right Announcements in Australia 
  SEO   Rights 
Event day or window (0: 
announcement day) 
Mean (%) SD (%) z test 
Wilcoxon 
signed rank test 
  
Mean (%) SD (%) z test 
Wilcoxon 
signed rank test 
     
         
Panel A: Daily Abnormal Returns (ARs) 
−5 −0.18 6.72 −2.99 *** −3.25***  −0.10 7.24 −0.81 −0.14
−4 0.10 6.51 −0.30 −3.60***  −0.03 7.48 −0.39 0.29
−3 −0.14 6.52 −2.32 ** −3.32***  −0.04 6.85 −0.19 1.05
−2 −0.23 6.54 −2.06 ** −3.96***  0.07 7.32 0.68 −0.32
−1 −0.25 6.26 −2.61 *** −4.47***  0.40 13.65 3.25*** 1.33
0 −0.19 10.72 −19.66 *** −4.68***  −0.30 7.13 −1.71* −1.82* 
1 −0.23 6.14 −3.59 *** −3.71***  0.00 6.32 0.14 0.77
2 −0.11 6.84 −0.29 −3.48***  −0.14 6.51 −1.07 −0.46
3 −0.23 6.30 −1.66 * −3.33***  0.07 7.76 1.12 0.14
4 −0.12 6.29 −1.28 −3.82***  −0.06 7.26 −0.83 0.38
5 0.20 7.86 1.55 −2.04**  −0.03 7.03 0.17 −0.86
              
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
(−1;0) −0.44 12.23 −12.06 *** −5.83***  0.10 15.25 1.09 −1.21
(−1;1) −0.67 13.35 −7.75 *** −6.05***  0.09 16.43 0.96 −0.42
(−3;1) −1.05 15.20 −4.06 *** −6.69***  0.12 18.45 0.97 −0.38
(−3;3) −1.38 17.16 −2.69 *** −7.16***  0.05 20.27 0.83 −0.63
(−5;5) −1.39 21.17 −1.24  −5.92***   −0.17 23.71 0.10  −0.83  
The table presents abnormal returns around SEO and rights issue announcements in Australia during the sample period 2001–2013. The abnormal 
return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) were calculated using the market model and standard event study methodology. The estimation 
window for calculating the market model parameters was (−109, −10). AR and CAR were tested for significance using a two-tailed z test. The Wilcoxon 
signed rank test had a null hypothesis of no difference in magnitudes between the negative and positive ARs (or CARs). The *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Overall, SEOs presented stronger announcements effects relative to rights offers. Specifically, 
the markets reacted statistically and significantly to SEO announcements with an average 
abnormal return on the announcement date of −0.19%. There is strong evidence of information 
leakage in the case of SEOs with significant negative market responses being observed in the 
days prior to the announcement day. The cumulative abnormal returns better capture the full 
impacts of announcement effects, showing that the magnitude of the negative reactions 
increased as the event window extended. For example, the average cumulative abnormal return 
associated with public offer announcements over two-day (−1,0), three-day (−1,1), five-day 
(−3,1) and seven-day (−3,3) were −0.44%, −0.67%, −1.05% and −1.38%, respectively. 
However, the negative reactions were only significant at the 10% level on the date of 
announcements of rights offers as confirmed by both the z test and the Wilcoxon test, even 
though the size of abnormal return was relatively larger at −0.3%. The sign of market reactions 
on the day before and after the rights announcement day were mixed and insignificant, leading 
to cumulative abnormal returns being insignificantly different from zero over all the event 
windows examined. These results are consistent with evidence reported in US markets, in 
which SEOs were deemed to exhibit higher asymmetric information between managers and 
outside investors and dilute the voting rights for the existing shareholders (Eckbo 2008; Eckbo 
& Masulis 1992; Smith 1977). In other words, Hypotheses 1A and 1B are supported by the 
univariate analysis. 
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics on Polluting and Non-Polluting Issuers 
Variable 
SEO     Rights 
Polluter   Non-Polluter   t stat of 
mean diff. 
(P v. NP) 
 
Polluter  Non-Polluter  t stat of 
mean diff. 
(P v. NP) N Mean SD   N Mean SD     N Mean SD   N Mean SD   
                      
Panel A: Dependent variables 
CAR(−3,1) 1,861 −0.016 0.124  949 0.000 0.196  −2.52 ***  1,031 −0.005 0.147  637 0.011 0.233  −1.64* 
CAR(−1,1) 1,863 −0.011 0.097  950 0.002 0.185  −2.47 ***  1,032 −0.004 0.119  638 0.010 0.218  −1.71* 
 
           
 
         
Panel B: Control variables 
LNASSETS 2,343 17.021 1.809  1,036 18.270 2.802  −15.49 ***  1,336 16.393 1.778  657 17.439 2.852  −10.01*** 
ROA 2,343 −0.346 0.655  1,036 −0.234 0.641  −4.61 ***  1,336 −0.473 0.842  657 −0.432 0.856  −1.02
 
D/E 2,341 0.216 1.514  1,011 0.485 3.334  −3.22 ***  1,335 0.159 1.630  642 0.738 4.368  −4.27*** 
CASH 2,343 0.286 0.260  1,011 0.218 0.257  6.95 ***  1,336 0.302 0.283  642 0.233 0.271  5.10*** 
TOBINQ 2,342 2.649 3.810  1,036 2.892 7.866  −1.21 
 
 1,335 2.105 3.237  657 2.807 8.683  −2.61*** 
REVOL 1,881 0.061 0.040  964 0.054 0.053  3.97 ***  1,134 0.068 0.042  656 0.064 0.056  1.69* 
RUNUP 2,369 0.106 0.551  1,256 0.108 0.568  −0.07 
 
 1,363 −0.072 0.577  841 −0.061 0.602  −0.45
 
LNPROCEEDS 2,346 15.250 1.699  1,249 15.782 2.012  −8.36 ***  1,273 14.861 1.755  809 15.548 1.906  −8.42*** 
DEBTREPAY 2,369 0.013 0.114  1,256 0.019 0.137  −1.41 
 
 1,363 0.005 0.072  841 0.005 0.069  0.12
 
UDWRITER 2,369 0.582 0.493  1,256 0.602 0.490  −1.15 
 
 1,363 0.022 0.147  841 0.023 0.149  −0.09
 
REPUDWRITER 2,369 0.119 0.323  1,256 0.294 0.456  −13.40 ***  1,363 0.004 0.060  841 0.010 0.097  −1.74* 
MKTRUNUP 2,369 0.031 0.094   1,256 0.030 0.102   0.30    1,363 0.015 0.125   841 0.020 0.129   −0.83  
The table displays numbers of observations (N), means and standard deviations (SD) for dependent variables (CARs) and control variables (issuer and issue characteristics) 
of polluters and non-polluters for SEO and rights offers samples. It reports two-tailed t test of the mean difference in each characteristic between polluters and non-polluters. 
All control variables are defined as in previous tables. The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Panel A of Table 3.4 shows the summary statistics on three-day CAR(−1,1) and five-day 
CAR(−3,1) and the test of mean difference in cumulative abnormal returns between polluters 
and non-polluters. Again, the difference was stronger and more robust for SEOs relative to 
rights offers. Evidently, on average, polluters produced 1.6% lower CAR(−3,1) and 1.3% lower 
CAR(−1,1) than non-polluters when they issued SEOs and the differences were significant at 
the 1% level. Even though the magnitude of difference in cumulative abnormal returns was 
quite similar for rights offers, the differences were only significant at 10%. In other words, 
Hypotheses 2A and 2B are supported by the univariate analysis. 
3.6.2 Regression Analysis on Seasoned Equity Offerings Announcement Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns 
This section presents the multivariate analysis of the impacts of polluters compared with non-
polluters on the size of market response to SEO and rights announcements. Analysis of the 
change of the responses for polluters relative to the change for non-polluters in the period of 
tougher environmental regulations following the Kyoto Protocol ratification in Australia is also 
presented. The five-day cumulative abnormal returns CAR(−3,1) was selected as the main 
dependent variable in all multiple regressions to best capture the full announcement effect as 
suggested in the univariate analysis. 
Table 3.5 displays the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions of five-day cumulative 
abnormal returns CAR(−3,1) on POLLUTER dummy (Model (1)), POST dummy (Model (2)), 
an interaction term POLLUTER*POST (Models (4) and (5)), or all three dummies (Model (3)) 
and controls. In Models (1) to (4), the only control was for firm-level accounting and market-
based characteristics. In Model (5), a further control was implemented for issue, issuer and 
market characteristics. Models (4) and (5) include industry and year dummies and exclude 
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POLLUTER and POST dummies as their explanatory powers are absorbed by the industry and 
year fixed effects. 
Table 3.5: Environmental Risk and SEO Announcement Abnormal Returns 
Dep. Var. 5-Day CAR 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ind. Var           
POLLUTER −0.020**  0.009   
 [−2.13]  [1.16]   
POST  −0.008 0.017*   
  [−1.59] [1.68]   
POLLUTER*POST   −0.037*** −0.033*** −0.034*** 
   [−3.04] [−2.72] [−2.70] 
LNASSETS −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.000 
 [−0.91] [−0.53] [−0.86] [−0.31] [−0.07] 
ROA 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 [4.72] [4.55] [4.45] [3.99] [3.95] 
D/E −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.005 −0.005 
 [−1.32] [−1.31] [−1.32] [−1.31] [−1.30] 
CASH −0.007 −0.010 −0.010 −0.012 −0.012 
 [−0.60] [−0.76] [−0.77] [−0.90] [−1.01] 
TOBINQ 0.001** 0.002** 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 
 [2.18] [2.47] [2.08] [2.34] [2.26] 
REVOL −0.014 −0.017 −0.001 0.029 0.051 
 [−0.12] [−0.15] [−0.00] [0.25] [0.41] 
RUNUP −0.048*** −0.048*** −0.048*** −0.049*** −0.051*** 
 [−10.36] [−10.32] [−10.49] [−10.35] [−8.89] 
LNPROCEEDS     −0.000 
     [−0.09] 
DEBTREPAY     0.028 
     [1.27] 
MKTRUNUP     0.046 
     [1.46] 
Constant 0.047 0.025 0.033 0.025 0.018 
 [1.09] [0.74] [0.84] [0.62] [0.34]       
(Industry & Year) FE No No No Yes Yes 
      
Observations 2,619 2,619 2,619 2,614 2,591 
R-squared 0.044 0.041 0.046 0.061 0.061 
The table displays the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions of 5-day cumulative abnormal 
returns CAR(−3,1) around SEO announcements on POLLUTER dummy (Model (1)), POST 
dummy (Model (2)), or an interaction term POLLUTER*POST (Model (3), (4) and (5)) and 
controls. Issuers’ characteristics are included in Models (1) to (4). Both issuers’ and issues’ 
characteristics are included in Model (5). Industry and year fixed effects are included in Models 
(4) to (5). Robust t statistics are reported in brackets. All the explanatory variables are defined in 
previous tables. The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Model (1) of Table 3.5 shows that on average, ceteris paribus, that is, the issuers’ 
characteristics, the five-day cumulative abnormal returns around SEO announcements of 
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polluters was significantly 2.0% lower than those of non-polluters. Model (2) shows that the 
POST did not have significant explanatory power over cumulative abnormal returns in general, 
indicating that cumulative abnormal return was indistinguishable between pre- and post-Kyoto 
periods. Model (3) further documents that the coefficient of POLLUTER was not significant 
meaning that in the pre-Kyoto period, five-day cumulative abnormal returns of polluting and 
non-polluting issuers did not differ, while the coefficient of POST was 0.017 and significant at 
the 10% level, meaning that cumulative abnormal returns of non-polluters in the post-Kyoto 
period were 1.7% higher than those in the pre-Kyoto period. Most noticeably, in Model (3), 
the coefficient of the interaction term POLLUTER*POST was −0.037 and significant at the 1% 
level, indicating that the difference in five-day cumulative abnormal returns around SEO 
announcements between polluters and non-polluters in the post-Kyoto period was 3.7% lower 
than the difference between them in the pre-Kyoto period. In other words, relative to non-
polluters, stock investors of polluters experienced a reduction of 3.7% in five-day cumulative 
abnormal returns around SEO announcements subsequent to the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol in Australia. These difference-in-differences results were also observed in Models (4) 
and (5), where the levels of relative reduction in cumulative abnormal returns were 3.3% and 
3.4%, respectively. In short, these results confirm the findings drawn from the univariate 
analysis, supporting Hypotheses 2A, 2B, 3A and 3B. 
3.6.3 Regression Analysis on Rights Announcement Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
This section presents a similar multivariate analysis to that reported in Table 3.5 for a sample 
of rights offer announcements. These tests were aimed at checking the robustness of 
regressions results on SEO announcements. As explained in the literature review and 
hypothesis development sections, rights offers are made primarily to existing shareholders, 
who are subject to less information asymmetry and diluted voting power problems than outsider 
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investors. Hence, the negative market reaction to equity issue announcements of polluters was 
expected to be weaker for rights in comparison with SEOs.  
Table 3.6: Environmental Risk and Rights Announcement Abnormal Returns 
Dep. Var. 5-Day CAR 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ind. Var           
POLLUTER −0.015  −0.0004   
 [−1.14]  [−0.02]   
POST  0.003 0.015   
  [0.37] [0.94]   
POLLUTER*POST   −0.018 −0.021 −0.024 
   [−0.83] [−0.94] [−0.96] 
LNASSETS 0.001 0.002 0.001 −0.001 −0.0002 
 [0.57] [0.96] [0.53] [−0.28] [−0.01] 
ROA 0.015** 0.014** 0.015** 0.014** 0.015** 
 [2.47] [2.47] [2.48] [2.23] [2.44] 
D/E 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0004 0.0002 
 [0.59] [0.80] [0.61] [0.33] [0.16] 
CASH 0.034** 0.035** 0.034** 0.039** 0.039** 
 [1.97] [2.01] [1.98] [2.25] [1.98] 
TOBINQ 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 −0.001 −0.001 
 [0.42] [0.71] [0.39] [−0.90] [−0.87] 
REVOL −0.077 −0.086 −0.081 −0.116 −0.066 
 [−0.66] [−0.77] [−0.70] [−1.11] [−0.59] 
RUNUP −0.058*** −0.057*** −0.057*** −0.055*** −0.061*** 
 [−6.74] [−6.87] [−6.74] [−5.70] [−5.29] 
LNPROCEEDS     −0.001 
     [−0.11] 
DEBTREPAY     0.100 
     [1.16] 
MKTRUNUP     0.091* 
     [1.94] 
Constant −0.008 −0.033 −0.020 0.011 0.012 
 [−0.23] [−0.92] [−0.54] [0.24] [0.22] 
      
(Industry & Year) FE No No No Yes Yes 
      
Observations 1,507 1,507 1,507 1,506 1,438 
R-squared 0.045 0.044 0.046 0.069 0.072 
The table presents the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions of 5-day cumulative abnormal 
returns CAR(−3,1) around rights announcements on POLLUTER dummy (Model (1)), POST 
dummy (Model (2)), or an interaction term POLLUTER*POST (Models (3), (4) and (5)) and 
controls. Issuers’ characteristics are included in Models (1) to (4). Industry and year fixed effects 
are included in Models (4) to (5). Both issuers’ and issues’ characteristics are included in Model 
(5). Robust t statistics are reported in brackets. All the explanatory variables are defined in 
previous tables. The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Five regression results with identical variables to those in Table 3.5, except that the dependent 
variable was five-day cumulative abnormal returns around rights announcements, are reported 
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in Table 3.6. Models (1) through (5) of Table 3.6 consistently document negative coefficients 
on POLLUTER dummy and interaction term POLLUTER*POST. However, the negative 
coefficients were not statistically significant at any traditional levels. As expected, the negative 
market reaction was stronger in the poorer information environment that is inherent to SEOs. 
In rights offers, probably better access to firm’s inside information including environmental 
information helps exiting shareholders to better anticipate environmental risk. In addition, 
relatively stable voting rights can maintain the monitoring power of such shareholders over the 
firm’s environmental risk. Combined, these advantages cause information asymmetry to be 
less serious when firms issue equity in the form of rights offers. 
3.6.4 Analysis Conditional on Quality of Underwriting Services 
To test Hypothesis 3.4, a difference-in-differences multivariate analysis of cumulative 
abnormal returns around SEO announcements was conducted, conditional on underwriting 
quality. The regressions results are displayed in Table 3.7. In particular, the sample was split 
based on whether an SEO issue was underwritten (Model (5)) or not (Model (6)). The 
underwritten SEOs were further divided based on whether the issues were underwritten by a 
top 10 (Model (3)) or non-top 10 (Model (4)) underwriter, or by a top 4 (Model (1)) or non-top 
4 investment bank (Model (2)). The reasons for these divisions are threefold. First, underwriters 
can certify the quality of an issuing firm and thus relieve investors’ concerns over the negative 
economic impact of environmental risk (the certification hypothesis). An SEO issue was 
defined in this study as underwritten if the issue had data on the ‘bookrunner’ column24 
extracted from the Bloomberg database. Second, the quality of the certification effect may be 
more highly regarded by investors if reputable investment banks underwrite the issue (the 
reputation hypothesis). An SEO issue is defined as underwritten by reputable investment banks 
                                                          
24 This column lists all names of lead underwriters if an issue is underwritten and is left blank otherwise.  
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if at least one of the lead underwriters is listed on the top 10 underwriters by market share 
(altogether accounting for 81.6% of the market share) as recorded by Bloomberg.25 Third, the 
most reputable underwriters can guarantee the quality of the issuer even further, thereby 
probably attracting positive responses from the investors. This prediction was tested by 
focusing the analysis on the top 4 underwriters by market share. 
This analysis was conducted only on SEOs and not on rights offers for two reasons: (1) few 
rights issues are underwritten, and (2) previous analysis showed weak evidence on the impact 
of environmental risk on rights announcement abnormal returns. This fact is understandable 
because the relatively low level of information asymmetry associated with rights issues 
disincentivises issuers from using costly underwriting services. For each condition, the public 
offer sample was partitioned into two subsamples accordingly and the same model regressions 
run on both, testing for the difference in estimated coefficients on the interaction term 
POLLUTER*POST.  
                                                          
25 The top 10 underwriters for primary seasoned equity offerings by market share in descending order are (1) UBS, 
(2) Macquarie, (3) Goldman Sachs, (4) JP Morgan, (5) Bank of America Merrill Lynch, (6) Deutsche Bank, (7) 
Credit Suisse, (8) Citi, (9) RBS and (10) Morgan Stanley. These were the top 10 underwriters for the Australian 
market over the sample period 2001–2013 as provided by Bloomberg. We also tested the hypothesis using the top 
4 underwriters according to the literature and the results were similar. 
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Table 3.7: Environmental Risk and SEO Announcement Abnormal Returns, 
Conditional on Underwriting Quality 
Panel A: Regression results conditional underwriting qualities 
Dep. Var.   5-Day CAR 
Underwriting Quality 
Top 4 
Underwritten 
 Non-Top 4 
Underwritten 
 Top 10 
Underwritten 
 Non-Top 10 
Underwritten 
 All 
Underwritten 
 All Non-
Underwritten 
Model  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Ind. Var.                        
POLLUTER*POST       0.050* 
     −0.016       0.014      −0.006      −0.008    −0.053** 
 [1.80]  [−1.17]  [0.73]  [−0.40]  [−0.67]  [−2.42] 
LNASSETS  −0.001 
 0.001  −0.004  0.004  0.0004  −0.004 
 
 [−0.17] 
 [0.60]  [−1.06]  [1.11]  [0.19]  [−1.27] 
ROA  0.055 
 0.024***  0.035  0.026***  0.026***  0.012** 
 
 [1.25] 
 [2.86]  [1.57]  [2.94]  [3.36]  [2.07] 
D/E  −0.002 
 −0.001  0.001  −0.002  −0.002  −0.004 
 
 [−0.37] 
 [−0.39]  [0.30]  [−0.50]  [−0.73]  [−1.04] 
CASH  −0.017 
 0.005  −0.013  0.007  0.001  −0.033 
 
 [−0.24] 
 [0.30]  [−0.32]  [0.41]  [0.09]  [−1.52] 
TOBINQ  −0.001 
 0.002*  0.0003  0.003**  0.002*  0.001 
 
 [−0.13] 
 [1.69]  [0.19]  [2.24]  [1.76]  [1.10] 
REVOL  0.332 
 −0.145  −0.447  −0.073  −0.129  0.100 
 
 [0.39] 
 [−0.92]  [−0.78]  [−0.44]  [−0.86]  [0.68] 
RUNUP  −0.029 
 −0.060***  −0.038**  −0.063***  −0.057***  −0.044*** 
 
 [−1.11] 
 [−8.02]  [−2.12]  [−7.88]  [−8.11]  [−6.71] 
Constant  0.024 
 0.015  0.102  −0.051  0.010  0.090 
 
 [0.14] 
 [0.26]  [1.21]  [−0.77]  [0.24]  [1.36] 
 
 
           
(Industry & Year) FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
 
           
Observations  234 
 1,277  417  1,094  1,511  1,103 
R-squared  0.129 
 0.113  0.067  0.119  0.093  0.083              
Panel B: P-value of two-tailed test of difference in coefficient of POLLUTER*POST 
Model (1) v. (2):  0.022**          
Model (3) v. (4):  0.397          
Model (5) v. (6):  0.060*          
Model (1) v. (6):  0.002***          
Model (3) v. (6):   0.017**                    
Panel A of the table displays the results of the impact of polluters and the post-Kyoto period on the SEO 
announcement abnormal returns, conditional on the underwritten quality of the issue. The status includes issues 
underwritten by top 4 (Model (1), by non-top 4 (Model (2) or by top 10 (Model (3)) underwriter; by non-top 10 
investment bank (Model (4)); by any investment bank (Model (5)); and not underwritten (Model (6)). Industry 
and Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses. All the 
explanatory variables are defined in previous tables. Panel B of the table reports the chi-squared two-tailed test 
(p-value) of the differences in the coefficients of the interaction term POLLUTER*POST across models. The *, 
** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Panel A of Table 3.7 shows that, consistent with expectations, the coefficient on the interaction 
term was only significantly negative on the subsample indicating non-underwritten SEOs 
(Model (6)). However, the coefficients on the interaction term were negative but insignificant 
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on the subsamples of non-top 4 (Model (2)) and non-top 10 (Model (4)) underwritten SEOs. 
Interestingly, the coefficients on the interactions were positive if the SEOs were underwritten 
by a top 10 or top 4 investment bank, but only significant for those underwritten by a top 4 
underwriter.  
Panel B of Table 3.7 reports the two-tailed chi-squared tests (p-value) of differences in the 
coefficients of the interaction term between any two models. The test results indicate that the 
explanatory power of the interaction term was significantly higher for SEOs that were 
underwritten by a top 4 than those underwritten by a non-top 4, indistinguishable between top 
10 and non-top 10, and significantly lower for non-underwritten relative to underwritten SEOs. 
Regarding the level of the reputation of the underwriter, the effect of the interaction on 
cumulative abnormal returns was significantly higher for SEOs that were underwritten by 
either a top 4 or a top 10 over those that were non-underwritten. However, the difference was 
more significant at 1% for the top 4 as compared with 5% for the top 10 underwriters. In sum, 
the results reveal that underwriters can certify the value of SEO issuers, hence relieving 
investors’ concerns about the increasing information asymmetry and environmental risk 
associated with the issuers. And the certification value increases with the reputation of the 
underwriting investment banks. 
3.7 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
This section presents three robustness tests. First, the event windows over which the cumulative 
abnormal returns were calculated were altered, and then a similar multivariate analysis was 
performed using the same model specifications as in the main tests. Second, a further control 
was implemented for the endogeneity concerns by adopting the PSM technique. 
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3.7.1 Alternative Event Windows 
In addition to the asymmetric five-day event window CAR(−3,1) around SEO announcements 
that was used for the main empirical analysis, some alternative standard symmetric windows 
were adopted such as three-day CAR(−1,1) and seven-day CAR(−3,3) for robustness checks. 
The same model specifications as in the main tests were run, except that three-day CAR (−1,1) 
(Models (1) to (3)) and seven-day CAR(−3,3) (Models (4) to (6)) were used as dependent 
variables. The results are reported in Table 3.8. The regression results show that the conclusions 
drawn above using CAR(−3,1) are confirmed and robust across various event windows. 
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Table 3.8: Alternative Event Windows around SEO Announcements 
Ind. Var. 3-Day CAR   7-Day CAR 
Model (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var.               
POLLUTER −0.018*    −0.014*   
 [−1.94]    [−1.86]   
POST  −0.006    −0.013  
  [−1.25]    [−1.57]  
POLLUTER*POST   −0.017*    −0.026* 
   [−1.67]    [−1.94] 
LNASSETS −0.001 −0.001 −0.001  −0.0001 0.0004 0.002 
 [−0.87] [−0.50] [−0.42]  [−0.04] [0.19] [0.88] 
ROA 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.014***  0.025*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 
 [3.60] [3.47] [3.13]  [3.94] [3.73] [3.68] 
D/E −0.004 −0.004 −0.004  −0.005** −0.005** −0.005 
 [−1.23] [−1.21] [−1.15]  [−2.42] [−2.37] [−1.33] 
CASH −0.008 −0.010 −0.010  −0.001 −0.003 −0.004 
 [−0.69] [−0.83] [−0.89]  [−0.07] [−0.22] [−0.28] 
TOBINQ 0.001 0.001** 0.001  0.002** 0.002** 0.002*** 
 [1.63] [1.98] [1.57]  [2.41] [2.42] [2.82] 
REVOL −0.001 −0.007 0.018  −0.005 0.005 0.053 
 [−0.01] [−0.07] [0.18]  [−0.05] [0.06] [0.33] 
RUNUP −0.027*** −0.026*** −0.026***  −0.069*** −0.069*** −0.070*** 
 [−6.67] [−6.62] [−6.40]  [−11.03] [−11.07] [−12.13] 
Constant 0.041 0.020 0.019  0.012 0.005 −0.047 
 [1.03] [0.68] [0.55]  [0.30] [0.12] [−0.96]         
Industry FE No No Yes  No No Yes 
Year FE No No Yes  No No Yes         
Observations 2,622 2,622 2,617  2,622 2,622 2,617 
R-squared 0.023 0.020 0.035   0.062 0.062 0.079 
The table displays the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions of 3-day cumulative abnormal returns 
CAR(−1,1) around SEO announcements on POLLUTER dummy (Model (1)), POST dummy (Model (2)), or an 
interaction term POLLUTER*POST (Model (3)) and controls. Industry and year fixed effects are included in 
Model (3). Results on similar regressions with 7-day CAR(−3,3) as the dependent variables are documented in 
Models (4) to (6). Robust t statistics are reported in brackets. All the explanatory variables are defined in previous 
tables. The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
3.7.2 Further Control for Endogeneity: Propensity Score Matching Technique 
This subsection further demonstrates the robustness of the results using PSM. This method can 
reach two objectives: (1) a tool to alleviate possible endogeneity concerns and (2) an alternative 
way to compute abnormal returns. In the ‘traditional’ event study technique used in the main 
tests above, an abnormal return of a firm’s announcement is calculated as the difference 
between real return and expected return, which is estimated using market model regressing on 
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past returns. This conventional technique can be subject to estimation errors, leading to 
miscalculated abnormal returns around the announcement. The PSM technique can resolve this 
problem by providing a better way to capture expected return, which is the real return on 
matching firm(s). A matching firm of each announcing firm is defined as a firm that (1) did not 
announce any SEOs in the same year as the announcing firm, but (2) had similar characteristics 
that resulted in a similar propensity of announcement to the announcing firm. To ensure the 
quality of the matching process, the matching selection criteria were further restricted to (1) 
one nearest neighbour and (2) s around the announcing firm’s propensity score. 
The propensity scores or the predicted probabilities of announcing SEOs were obtained by 
running a logit regression model as follows: 
           
=    +                 +            +    /      +            
+            +               +  (Industry & Year) FE +    (3.12) 
where             is a dummy variable that receives one if firm i announced a SEO in 
year t and zero otherwise;              is the total assets of firm i in year (t – 1);         
is the ROA of firm i in year (t − 1);  /      is the ratio of long-term debt to equity of firm i in 
year (t – 1);          is the ratio of cash balance over total assets of firm i in year (t – 1); 
        is a dummy that receives one if firm i paid a cash dividend in year (t – 1) and zero 
otherwise; and            is the ratio of market value over book value of total assets of firm 
i in year (t – 1); a list of GICS industry and year dummies is also included. 
Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns were then computed as follows: 
     =     −     (3.13) 
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    (  ;   ) =        
  
    
(3.14) 
where     is the real return of announcing firm i on the date t within the event window;     is 
the real return of matching firm c of firm i on the same date t; and     (  ;   ) is the cumulative 
abnormal return over the event window (  ;   ). 
Table 3.9: SEO Announcement Abnormal Returns Using Propensity Score Matching 
Panel A: 5-Day CAR(−3,1)     
SEO 
Polluter 
(%) 
Non-Polluter 
(%) 
 Mean Diff. 
(P–NP) 
T stat. 
(P–NP) 
Pre-Kyoto 1.93 3.05  −1.12 −0.60 
Post-Kyoto −1.84 1.10  −2.94 −2.39** 
Mean diff. (Post–Pre) −3.77 −1.96    
T stat. (Post–Pre) −2.51*** −1.03    
      
Panel B: 3-Day CAR(−1,1)     
SEO 
Polluter 
(%) 
Non-Polluter 
(%) 
 Mean Diff. 
(P–NP) 
T stat. 
(P–NP) 
Pre-Kyoto 1.97 2.48  −0.51 −0.32 
Post-Kyoto −2.16 1.27  −3.43 −3.06*** 
Mean diff. (Post–Pre) −4.13 −1.22    
T stat. (Post–Pre) −3.12*** −0.67    
      
Panel C: 7-Day CAR(−3,3)     
SEO 
Polluter 
(%) 
Non-Polluter 
(%) 
 Mean Diff. 
(P–NP) 
T stat. 
(P–NP) 
Pre-Kyoto 3.08 3.62  −0.54 0.28 
Post-Kyoto −1.91 1.07  −2.98 1.91* 
Mean diff. (Post–Pre) −4.99 −2.55    
T stat. (Post–Pre) −2.56*** −1.22       
The table displays the results of the two-tailed t test of mean difference in CARs around 
SEO announcements, between polluters and non-polluters, in the pre-Kyoto relative to 
the post-Kyoto periods. The abnormal returns were calculated as the difference in real 
returns between an issuer and its match using propensity score matching (nearest 
neighbour within 5% calibre) technique. Three event windows were used: 5-day 
CAR(−3,1), 3-day CAR(−1,1) and 7-day CAR(−3,3). The *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
After obtaining PSM-based cumulative abnormal returns around SEO announcements, a t test 
of mean difference in these cumulative abnormal returns between polluters and non-polluters, 
in the pre-Kyoto relative to post-Kyoto periods, was conducted. Table 3.9 displays the results 
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of the univariate difference-in-differences analysis. The results over three difference event 
windows—CAR(−3,1) (Panel A), CAR(−1,1) (Panel B), and CAR(−3,3) (Panel C)—point to 
the same direction that the difference in cumulative abnormal returns between polluters and 
non-polluters was insignificant in the pre-Kyoto period but significantly negative in the post-
Kyoto period. This is because polluters significantly decreased cumulative abnormal returns 
whereas non-polluters did so insignificantly subsequent to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
in Australia. In sum, the PSM-based SEO cumulative abnormal return comparison results 
provide supporting evidence for the main tests, confirming Hypotheses 3.2A, 3.2B, 3.3A and 
3.3B. 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
SEOs are the most important direct source of finance for firms. However, firms announcing 
SEOs immediately experience a drop in stock prices that represents a floating cost associated 
with the issue. This chapter revisited the theoretical predictions of Myers (1984), Myers and 
Majluf (1984) and Baker and Wurgler (2002), who attributed the negative market reaction to 
an issuer’s information asymmetry. To do so, the study exploited a change in environmental 
regulations in Australia commencing with the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in December 
2007 and investigated the stock market reaction to SEO announcements made by perceived 
high emitting firms, or polluters. While there is an increasing need from investors for 
environmental information to evaluate costs and benefits associated with new stringent 
environmental regulations, such information is still not made publicly available on either a 
voluntary or a compulsory basis. Therefore, the Kyoto ratification represents an exogenous 
information asymmetry of the polluters. In particular, the SEO stock market reaction was 
compared between polluters and controlling non-polluters before and after the Kyoto 
ratification. The quasi-natural experimental setting allowed the usual econometric 
identification challenges observed in previous studies to be overcome. 
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Through a difference-in-differences empirical strategy, several important findings have been 
documented. First, relative to non-polluters, polluters significantly reduced cumulative 
abnormal returns around SEO announcements subsequent to the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol in Australia. However, the drop in cumulative abnormal returns was no longer 
significant if the SEOs were underwritten, and even changed sign into a positive value if the 
underwriters were the most reputable investment banks, that is, the top 4 by market share. 
Further, similar difference-in-differences analysis on a sample of rights announcements 
showed an insignificant change in cumulative abnormal returns for polluters as compared with 
non-polluters following the shift in the environmental policies. These results were robust after 
controlling for various event windows, and endogeneity concerns (using PSM).  
The results suggest that the change in environmental regulations has led to further public 
uncertainty about the performance and future prospects of polluters, thereby increasing the 
information asymmetry between managers and outside investors. Such asymmetry is relatively 
larger in SEOs, where additional equity is offered to the public, including both existing 
shareholders and outside investors, who possess less inside information and monitoring power 
over the issuer. Meanwhile, rights offers are primarily made to the existing shareholders, who 
suffer from less information asymmetry and diluted voting powers. The results also suggest 
that one way to mitigate the information asymmetry associated with an SEO is to employ 
underwriting services whereby investment banks certify the issuer’s quality to outside 
investors. Further, the certification value increases if the underwriter’s reputation level is high.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Environmental Risk, Financial Constraints, Dividend Payouts and  
Stock Market Reaction 
--- 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Because of the market frictions that negate the perfection of assumptions of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958)—that are, information asymmetry, agency or tax issues—firms face constraints 
in accessing external capital to fulfil all their desired investments. The level of a firm’s financial 
constraints, in turn, affects its key financial decisions and performance. Therefore, a huge 
amount of literature has been dedicated to evaluating such constraints and their impact. Studies 
have demonstrated that a firm’s demand for external finance is mainly determined by its levels 
of investments, growth opportunities and availability of internally generated funds (e.g., 
Almeida & Campello 2007; Almeida, Campello & Weisbach 2004; Fazzari, Hubbard & 
Petersen 1987; Hadlock & Pierce 2010; Kaplan & Zingales 1997; Lamont, Polk & Saa-Requejo 
2001; Whited & Wu 2006). Hence, the existing measures26 of a firm’s financial constraints 
mostly comprise financial factors that capture these determinants. However, the increasing 
environmental risk currently facing firms may imply an extra source of financial 
consequences—such as withdrawing from profitable but environmentally sensitive projects or 
incurring higher environment-related costs—for outside financial providers. These 
consequences could make stakeholders less willing to provide further capital, for example, by 
                                                          
26 The three most popular composite indexes of financial constraints are Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) (Kaplan & 
Zingales 1997; Lamont, Polk & Saa-Requejo 2001), Whited-Wu (WW) (Whited & Wu 2006) and Hadlock-Pierce 
(HP) (Hadlock & Pierce 2010). Other studies use unidimensional indicators, such as size, cash holdings, collateral, 
investment-cash flow and cash-cash flow sensitivities (e.g., Almeida & Campello 2007; Almeida, Campello & 
Weisbach 2004; Erel, Jang & Weisbach 2015). More recent studies have conducted text-based analysis to capture 
financial constraints (e.g., Hoberg & Maksimovic 2015). 
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limiting access to or raising costs of tappable funds, leading to a potential reduction in firm 
value and future growth (e.g., Chava 2014; Cheng, B, Ioannou & Serafeim 2014; Sharfman & 
Fernando 2008). Therefore, this type of non-financial risk may represent an important but 
under-researched contributor to corporate financial constraints.  
To help fill this void, this chapter presents an empirical investigation of the impact of corporate 
environmental risk on financial constraints, and the change in this impact following the 
introduction of more stringent environmental policies. To capture financial constraints 
comprehensively, this study examined both internal (i.e., cash flow and cash holdings) and 
external (i.e., bank loans and SEOs) financial sources of polluting firms with a particular focus 
on their cash dividend policies, and is among the first to do so. 
Environmental risk may negatively affect a firm’s financial constraints for several reasons. 
First, environmental risk has been demonstrated to be negatively related to environmental 
performance (e.g., Semenova & Hassel 2008). In turn, better corporate environmental 
performance can lead to improved financial performance (Ambec & Lanoie 2008; Clarkson et 
al. 2011; Hart & Ahuja 1996; King & Lenox 2001). This evidence leads to the prediction that 
firms facing higher environmental risk may have lower financial performance. For example, 
firms operating in environmentally sensitive industries (e.g., the highest GHG emitters and 
energy consumers) are more likely to incur additional costs such as clean-up and compliance 
spending, lifting the firms’ operating expenses and putting pressures on their profitability. 
Second, the potentially unfavourable financial consequences of environmental risk may lead 
to a reduction in the level of internally generated funds, forcing firms to seek costly external 
sources to finance their desired investments, making the financial performance even worse. 
Supporting this hypothesis, a few studies have empirically established a negative relationship 
between environmental responsibility and firm capital constraints. For example, B. Cheng, 
Ioannou and Serafeim (2014) documented that better corporate social responsibility scores lead 
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to overall easier access to external finance, as indicated by lower Kaplan-Zingales (KZ), 
Whited-Wu (WW) and Hadlock-Pierce (HP) indexes, and this association holds for both social 
and environmental dimensions. In addition, Chava (2014) and Sharfman and Fernando (2008) 
provided evidence that an improved management of environmental risk can benefit firms 
through lower cost of capital, including cost of equity and debt. 
The present study differs from the aforementioned studies by testing the impact of 
environmental risk on corporate financial constraints through corporate cash dividend policies. 
In the literature, cash dividend payout ratio has been widely adopted as a reliable indicator of 
corporate financial constraints. This is because of market frictions, such as information 
asymmetry, agency and transactions costs, that increase the cost of external capital relative to 
internal capital, resulting in under-investment, lower operating performance and lower firm 
value (Myers & Majluf 1984). For those firms that face a higher cost of external funds (i.e., 
financially constrained firms), one solution to mitigate these unfavourable effects is to resort 
to internal financial resources, including cash flow and cash holdings (Denis & Sibilkov 2009). 
That is, firms facing external financing constraints can use accumulated retained earnings 
(after-tax profits net of dividends) or liquid assets to fund desired expenditures on a timely 
basis. Consistent with this view, studies have often characterised constrained firms as omitting 
or cutting cash dividends and holding excessive cash (e.g., Almeida, Campello & Weisbach 
2004; Faulkender & Wang 2006; Moyen 2004; Opler et al. 1999). While it takes time to see 
investors’ reactions to cash holding policies, a dividend payout policy normally receives 
immediate market responses because of its compulsory periodical disclosure and direct 
financial impact on the existing shareholders. Hence, investors often consider dividend 
announcements an important signal of a firm’s financial health, that is, in terms of profitability 
and financial constraints (Aharony & Swary 1980; Asquith & Mullins Jr 1983). An alternative 
way to reimburse profits to shareholders is stock repurchase. However, this type of payout 
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policy is non-recurring while dividend payments recur, and therefore receives less market 
attention (Brickley 1983).  
This study has extended the literature by analysing one main question: How does 
environmental risk affect corporate financial constraints and dividend payouts? To address this 
question, a sample of firms listed on the ASX was employed and a difference-in-differences 
empirical strategy adopted to taking advantage of a shift in the stringency of environmental 
regulations that commenced with the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the Australian 
Government at the end of 2007. Specifically, the study compared the probability of paying cash 
dividends between perceived polluting firms and their controlling counterparties, non-
polluters, in the pre- and post-Kyoto periods. Further, attention was paid to a subgroup of 
dividend-paying firms only and a similar comparison conducted on the payers’ financial 
performance in both the short and the long term. Short-term performance was captured through 
market reaction (cumulative abnormal returns) around the day when a firm goes ex-dividend. 
Long-term performance was measured through both accounting-based profitability measures 
such as ROA and return on equity, and market-based BHARs for one to two years after the ex-
dividend day.  
Australia provides a unique setting to test the linkage between environmental risk and firm 
financial constraints for the following reasons. First, according to the Climate Change Review 
Update 2011, Australia is the most polluting nation in the developed world based on GHG 
emissions per capita (Garnaut 2011). As a result, Australian policymakers have enacted a large 
number of new and stringent environmental regulations with which firms have to strictly 
comply (Moosa & Ramiah 2014; Ramiah, Martin & Moosa 2013). Second, banks, the main 
providers of corporate debt financing in Australia, have committed to being environmentally 
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responsible through voluntary involvement in key global environmental protection initiatives.27 
In addition, market participants have been increasingly aware of the indirect impact of banks 
on the natural environment via granting loans to firms associated with environmentally 
sensitive activities.28 These facts have led to tightened lending policies imposed on firms that 
are exposed to higher environmental risk, making it harder for those firms to access external 
financing (i.e., being restricted to higher interest rates, smaller loans or shorter maturities) 
(Chava 2014). Nevertheless, very few studies have investigated the relationship between 
corporate environmental risk and financial constraints, especially in Australia. 
Most notably, in 2007, Australia signed the Kyoto Protocol at the Bali Climate Change 
Conference and implemented the NGER Act. Internationally, the Kyoto Protocol was signed 
by the member countries of the UNFCCC in 1997 and came into effect in 2005 (UNEP 2006). 
The Protocol is an internationally binding agreement whereby participating countries commit 
to cutting down GHG emissions to satisfy national reduction targets (Talberg & Swoboda 2013; 
UNEP 2006). The ratification of the Kyoto Protocol means that Australia officially shares in 
the global efforts to mitigate climate change, a key global issue challenging sustainable 
development. Further, the implementation of the NGER Act makes Australia one of the few 
countries that requires mandatory reporting on carbon emissions at the corporate level, thus 
making organisations accountable for their carbon emissions (Lodhia & Martin 2011). Since 
the ratification, the Australian Government has demonstrated a strong commitment to 
environmental protection through ratifications of a series of stringent environmental policies, 
                                                          
27 All four of the major Australian banks (the Big 4 banks, who account for more than 80% of the lending market), 
the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ), the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), 
the National Australia Bank Limited (NAB) and Westpac Banking Corporation (Westpac), are signatories to the 
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) Statement by Financial Institutions and the Equator Principles 
(EP) (International Financial Corporation, 2013, UNEP, 1997). 
28 One notable recent example is the extensive protest involving messages from over 100,000 Australians asking 
the CEOs of Australia’s Big 4 banks to rule out financing the Abbot Point coal port expansion on the Great Barrier 
Reef. Financing for this project was refused by some of the world’s biggest banks, such as HSBC, Deutsche Bank, 
the Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays and Citibank because it is estimated that the project will triple Australia’s 
carbon emissions, locking the country into at least 30 more years of coal-fired power. 
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including the Climate Change Review in 2008 and its update in 2011, the CPRS in 2008, the 
renewable energy scheme in 2010, to list just a few (Moosa & Ramiah 2014; Ramiah, Martin 
& Moosa 2013). These policies are part of the Australian Government’s solutions to the issue 
of being an energy-intensive economy with the highest level of per capita emissions in the 
OECD group (Garnaut 2011). 
Therefore, the Kyoto ratification provides an opportunity for a quasi-natural experiment to 
resolve two issues in the existing literature. First, the Kyoto ratification is popularly considered 
the starting point of a stricter environmental regulatory period29 (Ramiah, Martin & Moosa 
2013). Therefore, using the ratification as a cut-off point allows estimation of the financial 
impact of stringent environmental policies at the aggregate level by comparing the association 
of environmental risk and firm financial constraints between the pre- and post-Kyoto periods. 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is scant evidence on the impact of non-
financial regulations such as environmental policies on firm financial constraints. Second, the 
ratification serves as an exogenous regulatory shock that mainly affects polluters (the treatment 
group), which by definition are firms operating in the highest emitting industries as opposed to 
non-polluters in lower emitting industries (the control group). In this setting, endogeneity 
concerns (i.e., causality effects) can be significantly relieved (Angrist & Krueger 1999). 
Using a sample of 19,292 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2013, the study first 
confirmed that environmental risk is a determinant of corporate financial constraints. In 
particular, it was found that polluters relied more heavily than non-polluters on internal 
financial resources by cutting cash dividends and holding more cash. In addition, this reliance 
became stronger in the post-Kyoto period, indicating that polluters’ financial constraints 
increase as the level of stringency of environmental policies rises. When the financial 
                                                          
29 The Kyoto adoption was the first act of former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd after he was sworn in on 3 December 
2007 (Ramiah et al., 2013). 
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constraints became even more severe in the post-Kyoto period, only internally generated funds 
seemed insufficient for polluters to satisfy all their financial needs, for example, because of 
prolonged negative earnings, if they did not give up investments. This view is supported by a 
further observation that polluters had to be more active in pursuing external financial sources, 
that is, by more frequently announcing bank loans and SEOs. 
If financial constraints increase more for polluters in a stricter environmental regulatory period, 
the polluters who can still pay cash dividends may send a stronger signal regarding their 
financial health to the market and therefore receive a positive reaction. Consistent with this 
prediction, the study’s second finding was that in the short term, the market reacted more 
positively when polluters went ex-dividend30 in the post-Kyoto period and the effect was 
concentrated on the most financially constrained payers. Further, among firms who went ex-
dividend, polluters (polluting payers) financially outperformed (i.e., experienced higher 
operating performance and BHARs) non-polluters in the one to two years subsequent to the 
ex-dividend day.  
These findings make several contributions to the literature. First, they confirm the previous 
observation that financially constrained firms tend to rely more heavily than unconstrained 
firms on inside financial resources by cutting dividends and increasing cash holdings. 
Secondly, they provide supporting evidence for the signalling role of dividend payments 
through which good-quality firms communicate their financial health and future prospects with 
investors, thus separating themselves from non-payers. Thirdly, they identify that increasing 
environmental risk significantly drives corporate financial constraints. This evidence can act 
                                                          
30 In Australia, firms pay dividends twice a year. The first one is called an interim dividend, and is usually paid in 
the first half of a calendar year, mostly in March. This interim dividend is much smaller and therefore conveys 
less information regarding firm performance than the second one, the final dividend, which is often paid in the 
second half of the year. We rely on the final dividend ex-date to capture the market reaction because of its high 
level of importance to investors (Balachandran et al. 2012). 
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as a mechanism to better understand the environmental–financial performance relationship that 
has been the subject of a long-standing debate in the literature. Finally, they establish the role 
of stringent environmental policies in enforcing the financial impact of environmental risk. 
Overall, these findings provide important directions for corporate financial managers who 
pursue an optimal financing plan in light of their firms’ exposures to environmental risk and 
implications for environmental regulators who seek financial tools to protect the natural 
environment. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 provides a review of related 
literature. Section 4.3 presents the development of testable hypotheses. Section 4.4 is devoted 
to a description of the data collection and summary statistics. Section 4.5 discusses the research 
methodology. The empirical results are displayed and analysed in Section 4.6. Robustness tests 
are presented in Section 4.7. Finally, Section 4.8 provides a conclusion and implications. 
4.2 RELATED LITERATURE 
4.2.1 Financial Constraints 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argued that in perfect and complete markets, firms can fund all 
positive NPV investment opportunities. In other words, investment and growth are not 
dependent on internal capital. However, in reality, market frictions are present, such as 
information asymmetry and agency or transaction costs, leading to firms’ inability to pursue 
all value-increasing projects. For example, Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrated that capital 
market imperfections increase the cost of externally generated finance relative to finance 
generated internally. Firms that have to raise external funds at a high cost to finance desired 
investments are referred to as financially constrained.31 Consequently, financially constrained 
                                                          
31 The term financial constraints can be used interchangeably with capital constraints or financing constraints.  
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firms may have to abandon some profitable investments (Campello, Graham & Harvey 2010) 
including strategic activities such as inventory investment (Carpenter, Fazzari & Petersen 
1998) or R&D spending (Hall & Lerner 2010; Himmelberg & Petersen 1994), adversely 
affecting their operating performance, value and future growth (Denis & Sibilkov 2009). 
Theoretical models of financial constraints arguably draw on two underlying assumptions. The 
first is that financial constraints are characterised by the curvature of the curve of capital supply 
(e.g., Almeida & Campello 2002; Stiglitz & Weiss 1981; Whited & Wu 2006). Specifically, 
the more inelastic the supply of capital, the more costly the additional external finance available 
to the firms. The second and broader notion is based on the model proposed by Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1987), according to whom financial constraints are characterised by the 
wedge between a firm’s cost of external capital and its opportunity costs of internally generated 
funds. The bigger the wedge, the more severe the financial constraints a firm faces.  
4.2.2 Financial Constraints and External Funds 
Regarding financing behaviours, financially constrained firms can be externally characterised 
as being unable to borrow and dependent on bank loans (or subject to credit or debt constraints), 
and unable to issue equity or equity constraints (Lamont, Polk & Saa-Requejo 2001). For 
example, Mizen and Tsoukas (2012) studied Asian corporate bond markets throughout the 
Asian crisis and the global financial crisis and found that firms classified as financially 
constrained experienced a greater reduction in bond prices or higher external finance premia. 
Similarly, Sufi (2009) reported that firms associated with low cash flows or covenant violations 
(i.e., financially constrained firms) are less likely to obtain bank lines of credit. Further, 
Gopalan, Udell and Yerramilli (2011) and Behr, Norden and Noth (2013) showed that those 
who are more likely to be financially unhealthy, such as small and private firms, tend to be 
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more dependent on bank lending because closer relationships with banks, especially state-
owned ones, will extend their access to credit and capital market services.  
Constrained firms normally exhibit a high level of information asymmetry, making it even 
more costly to raise funds by issuing equity. Consistent with this view, H. Lin and Paravisini 
(2013) documented a positive association between financial constraints, as represented by a 
lack of access to credit, and firm risk, as measured by both idiosyncratic risk (i.e., volatility of 
operating cash flows) and systematic risk (i.e., correlation between firm stock and market 
returns). Consistently, using a sample of growing manufacturing firms, Lamont, Polk and Saa-
Requejo (2001) found that financially constrained firms generated lower stock returns than 
unconstrained firms. 
4.2.3 Financial Constraints and Internally Generated Funds 
If the cost of external capital increases, financially constrained firms tend to rely more heavily 
on internal capital, which possesses cost advantages (Fazzari, Hubbard & Petersen 1987). 
Therefore, empirical evidence frequently depicts financially constrained firms as omitting or 
paying low dividends to retain more earnings, and holding more cash in anticipation of future 
liquidity shocks (Denis & Sibilkov 2009). 
4.2.3.1 Financial constraints and cash dividends 
Cash dividends represent the most important payout policies through which firms return 
significant amounts of internally generated capital to shareholders. In the model of perfect 
markets of Miller and Modigliani (1961), payout policy is irrelevant to firm value because 
investors can easily replicate any patterns of payments by suitably buying or selling equity. 
However, in practice, market frictions such as information asymmetry and agency and 
transaction costs are present, causing such replications to bring a cost. 
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Studies have consistently reported a positive association between high dividend payouts and 
firm performance (e.g., Aharony & Swary 1980; Asquith & Mullins Jr 1983; Kalay & 
Loewenstein 1985; Pettit 1972). Therefore, dividend policy has long been considered a good 
indicator of firm financial health. For example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1987) argued 
that financially constrained firms are characterised by paying low dividends, whereas 
unconstrained firms tend to have higher payout ratios. Similarly, Almeida, Campello and 
Weisbach (2004) used payout ratio to identify constrained firms and found that low-dividend-
paying firms are likely to save more cash out of cash flows, or be more financially constrained. 
Likewise, Moyen (2004) found that low-dividend firms tend to have an investment policy that 
is more sensitive to cash flow fluctuations than that of high-dividend firms. Applying a 
simulated method of moments to a dynamic model to estimate the level of financing costs, 
Hennessy and Whited (2007) further documented that marginal equity flotation and bankruptcy 
costs are higher for low-dividend companies. Many other studies have also employed dividend 
payout ratios to capture financial constraints, showing a consensus among researchers in this 
regard (e.g., Denis & Sibilkov 2009; Faulkender & Wang 2006).  
4.2.3.2 Financial constraints and cash holdings 
Holding cash represents both costs and benefits to firms. The costs of reserving cash are in the 
form of a lower rate of return on these liquid assets as the result of a low liquidity premium and 
tax disadvantages. The benefits of holding cash are twofold: (1) saving transaction costs of 
raising capital and not necessarily liquidating illiquid assets when payments are required (i.e., 
transaction cost motivation) and (2) timely fulfilling of investment needs in case other funding 
sources are not available or are unreasonably costly (i.e., precautionary motivation). Moreover, 
with the market frictions that drive high transactions costs and expensive external capital, the 
benefits of accumulating cash are boosted.  
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Empirical evidence broadly supports this view by relating financially constrained firms to high 
cash holdings. For example, Opler et al. (1999) found that high-cash-holding firms are 
characterised by small size or low bond ratings (e.g., having below investment grade or no 
bond ratings) that limit firm access to capital markets. Similarly, Kim, Mauer and Sherman 
(1998) and Harford (1999) documented a positive relationship between cash holdings and 
industry cash flow volatility. Hence, firms reserve more cash as a response to greater cash flow 
volatility, which then increases firm risk and the cost of external finance.  
Studies have further demonstrated that constrained firms are likely to accumulate more cash 
because cash holdings are marginally more valuable for constrained firms than for 
unconstrained firms. Faulkender and Wang (2006) associated both level and change in cash 
holdings to firm excess stock return and reported robust positive results with more pronounced 
effects for firms classified as financially constrained. The greater associations for constrained 
firms are interpreted as evidence that the value of cash is higher for constrained firms than for 
unconstrained firms. Further, Denis and Sibilkov (2009) attributed the higher value of cash 
holdings for unconstrained firms to their better capacity to conduct value-increasing investment 
projects that might otherwise be abandoned. 
4.2.4 Financial Constraints and Environmental Risk 
Several attempts to establish the relationship between corporate environmental performance 
and financial constraints have been conducted recently. The early evidence converges to a point 
that better environmental performance or better management of environmental risk can lead to 
a reduction in capital constraints. This evidence is interpreted as a mechanism to better 
understand the environmental–financial performance relationship puzzle (Cheng, B, Ioannou 
& Serafeim 2014).  
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Supporting this argument, Sharfman and Fernando (2008) examined 267 US firms and showed 
that improvement in environmental risk management results in a lower cost of capital that is 
derived from a lower cost of equity capital, a switch from equity to debt funding, and greater 
tax benefits associated with the added debts. Likewise, B. Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim (2014) 
documented that access to external finance is more favourable (i.e., leads to lower scores on 
the KZ, WW and HP indexes) for firms with better corporate social responsibility scores and 
this association holds for both the social and the environmental dimensions. Consistently, El 
Ghoul et al. (2011) found that improved corporate social responsibility, including in 
environmental policies, leads to a lower cost of equity, whereas firms’ participation in two ‘sin’ 
industries, tobacco and nuclear power, boosts their cost of equity. In addition, Chava (2014) 
showed that better environmental performance reduces not only cost of equity but also cost of 
debt (i.e., lower bank lending interest rates).  
4.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Firms facing higher environmental risk (i.e., polluters) were expected to suffer from higher 
financial constraints. Constrained firms encounter difficulties in accessing external financial 
markets, for example, through higher cost of debt and equity (Chava 2014; Cheng, B, Ioannou 
& Serafeim 2014; El Ghoul et al. 2011; Sharfman & Fernando 2008). When the cost of external 
capital rises, constrained firms tend to resort to internal financial resources, including retained 
earnings and cash holdings, which have cost advantages over external resources (Fazzari, 
Hubbard & Petersen 1987). These findings led to the present study’s prediction that firms 
associated with higher environmental risk would be likely to omit or pay low dividends, that 
is, to retain more earnings and hold more cash on their balance sheets in anticipation of future 
liquidity shocks.  
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In the period when environmental regulations were stricter, perceived polluting firms, the main 
affected parties, were expected to face even more serious financial constraints than non-
polluting firms. This is because of (1) higher compliance costs, (2) abandonment of lucrative 
but environmentally sensitive investments and (3) stricter market views imposed on them 
(Dobler, Lajili & Zéghal 2014). In such period of growing environmental risk, polluters’ 
probability and level of cutting dividends and holding cash were expected to significantly 
increase relative to the previous period. 
Hypothesis 4.1: Polluters are less likely to pay cash dividends and probability decreases more 
for polluters relative to non-polluters in the post-Kyoto period. 
Hypothesis 4.2: Polluters hold more cash and cash holdings increase more for polluters 
relative to non-polluters in the post-Kyoto period. 
Despite using more internal capital when environmental risk increases, polluters still need to 
seek costly external finance if they do not give up their desired investments. There are two 
main reasons for this: (1) polluters are likely to incur prolonged negative earnings because of 
environmentally related costs such as clean-up or compliance expenses, leading to insufficient 
internally generated cash flows; and (2) internal funds are more limited and normally account 
for a small fraction of firm size; for example, the ratio of cash to assets often ranges from 10% 
to 20% and the ratio of dividend to market value of equity usually falls between 1% and 3%. 
Therefore, polluters were expected to be more active in obtaining external capital; that is, they 
would be more likely to announce successful bank loans and SEO issues. In addition, this 
phenomenon was predicted to be more frequently observed when environmental risk increased 
following the introduction of more stringent environmental policies. 
Hypothesis 4.3: Polluters rely more heavily on external financing sources and that reliance 
increases more for polluters relative to non-polluters in the post-Kyoto period. 
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Less constrained firms, that is, those who are more profitable and are able to tap into cheaper 
external funds, have a higher propensity to pay cash dividends since it is very costly for 
constrained firms to pay dividends and subsequently use expensive external finance for their 
spending (Almeida, Campello & Weisbach 2004; Fazzari, Hubbard & Petersen 1987; Moyen 
2004). Hence, during the period of high environmental risk, only a few polluters were expected 
to be able to pay cash dividends and these would be the most financially healthy firms. 
Strategically, firms may choose to pay dividends to communicate their good financial 
performance to investors who have become increasingly concerned about the possibly adverse 
economic impacts of higher environmental risk. In other words, dividend-paying polluters were 
expected to financially outperform their counterparties in both the short and the long run. In 
particular, polluting payers were expected to receive a more positive stock market reaction and 
exhibit better operating performance subsequent to the ex-dividend date, especially in the more 
stringent environmental regulatory period. 
Hypothesis 4.4: In the short term, the market reacts more positively when polluters go ex-
dividend and that market reaction increases more for polluters relative to non-polluters in the 
post-Kyoto period. 
Hypothesis 4.5: In the long term, among firms that go ex-dividend, polluters (polluting payers) 
exhibit higher operating performance and abnormal returns relative to non-polluters (non-
polluting payers) in the post-Kyoto period.  
4.4 DATA DESCRIPTION 
4.4.1 Polluters and Non-Polluters 
As discussed in Section 1.2, firms classified into nine following GICS industries were defined 
as polluters: (1) oil, gas and consumable fuels; (2) electric utilities; (3) gas utilities; (4) 
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independent power producers and energy traders; (5) multi-utilities; (6) chemicals; (7) 
construction materials; (8) metals and mining; and (9) paper and forest products (CDP 2012). 
Firms identified in other GICS industries were defined as non-polluters. 
Table 4.1 provides the summary statistics and a t test of the mean difference in the main 
financial characteristics between polluters and non-polluters. The yearly cash dividend 
payments and other financial characteristics of all ASX public companies from 2001 to 2013 
were sourced from the Morningstar DatAnalysis database. Firms’ GICS industries used to 
classify polluters and non-polluters were also extracted from Morningstar DatAnalysis. Panel 
A of Table 4.1 reports the test results on four indicators of dividend policy, including a dividend 
dummy (DIVDUM), dividend yield (DIVYIELD), dividend payout ratio (DIVPAYOUT) and 
dividend per share (DIVSHARE). Panel B depicts the test results on other firm fundamentals, 
comprising size (LNASSETS), profitability (ROA), leverage (D/E), cash holdings (CASH), 
growth opportunity (TOBINQ) and tangibility (TANG). Specifically, relative to non-polluters, 
polluters were less likely to pay dividends and also paid fewer dividends, as shown by lower 
DIVDUM, DIVYIELD, DIVPAYOUT and DIVSHARE. Further, polluters were smaller in size, 
less profitable, lower leveraged, holding more cash, presenting higher growth opportunities 
and investing less in fixed assets. 
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Table 4.1: Variable Definitions, Descriptive Statistics on Polluters and Non-Polluters 
Variable Definition 
Polluter   Non-Polluter   t test of mean diff. 
(P–NP) N Mean SD   N Mean SD  
Panel A: Dependent Variables         
  
DIVDUM 
Dummy variable indicating whether a firm pays 
positive cash dividends in a particular year 
10,574 0.105 0.307  12,560 0.486 0.500 
 
−0.381*** 
DIVYIELD Ratio of cash dividends to market value of equity 9,946 0.005 0.021  12,025 0.027 0.040  −0.022*** 
DIVPAYOUT Ratio of cash dividends to earnings 10,114 0.041 0.231  12,248 0.217 0.422  −0.176*** 
DIVSHARE 
Ratio of cash dividends to weighted average of 
outstanding shares 
10,097 0.021 0.098  12,220 0.076 0.165 
 
−0.055*** 
         
 
  
Panel B: Control Variables         
  
LNASSETS Log transformation of total assets 10,562 16.774 2.124  12,496 17.888 2.427  −1.114*** 
ROA Ratio of earnings to total assets 10,128 −0.382 0.933  12,215 −0.201 0.848  −0.181*** 
D/E Ratio of long-term debt to book value of equity 10,553 0.105 0.411  12,391 0.279 0.610  −0.174*** 
CASH Ratio of cash balance to total assets 10,562 0.320 0.294  12,497 0.197 0.251  0.123*** 
TOBINQ 
Tobin’s Q = (Total assets + market value of equity 
− book value of equity) / total assets 
10,546 2.416 3.779  12,375 2.280 4.060 
 
0.135*** 
TANG Ratio of fixed assets to total assets 10,291 0.167 0.242   9,655 0.177 0.204   −0.010*** 
The table presents the variable names, definitions, descriptive statistics and t test of mean difference for the main and control variables for polluters and non-
polluters. The statistics include the number of observations (N), the mean and standard deviation (SD). The primary source is the Morningstar DatAnalysis 
database, from which firms’ GICS industries and fundamentals were collected. The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Figure 4.1 plots the dividend payout ratio of polluters and non-polluters year on year from 2001 
to 2013. The payout ratio of polluters was always below that of non-polluters for every single 
year during the sample period. Despite fluctuations on the ratio observed for both polluters and 
non-polluters, a clear trend can be identified, that is, that polluters constantly reduced whereas 
non-polluters increased their cash distributions out of net earnings to their shareholders. The 
trends strengthened after 2007, when the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in Australia: the lowest 
and highest numbers for polluters and non-polluters are recorded at opposite ends of the 
timespan. Specifically, polluters paid out the most in 2008 (4.11%) and the least in 2013 
(3.54%), whereas non-polluters distributed cash dividends the most in 2013 (27.77%) and the 
least in 2009 (21.75%). It can be seen that the dividend payout ratio of polluters faces 
downward, deviating away from that of non-polluters increasingly over time. 
 
Figure 4.1: Dividend Payout Ratio of Polluters and Non-Polluters 
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4.4.2 Payers and Non-Payers 
A firm was defined to be a cash dividend payer for a particular year if it had a positive cash 
dividend payment available in that year, and to be a non-payer if it had a zero dividend payout. 
Firms with missing data on the cash dividend payment (i.e., from a cash flow statement) were 
excluded. Table 4.2 displays the t test of mean difference on financial characteristics between 
payers and non-payers in the pre- and post-Kyoto periods. The differences were very similar 
in the two periods and consistently indicate that payers were less financially constrained than 
non-payers. Specifically, the t test results all show that relative to non-payers, payers were 
bigger in size, more profitable, using higher leverage, holding less cash, having less growth 
opportunities and investing more in fixed assets. 
Table 4.2: Test of Mean Difference between Dividend Payers and Non-Payers 
  
Payer   Non-Payer   t test of mean diff. 
(Payer–Non-Payer) 
N Mean   N Mean  
LNASSETS 7,214 19.589 
 15,799 16.362  3.227*** 
ROA 7,205 0.075 
 15,096 −0.454  0.528*** 
D/E 7,117 0.377 
 15,782 0.119  0.257*** 
CASH 7,214 0.112 
 15,800 0.318  −0.207*** 
TOBINQ 7,118 1.552 
 15,758 2.702  −1.150*** 
TANG 5,378 0.255   14,530 0.142   0.113*** 
The table displays the t test of mean difference in some financial characteristics between payers and 
non-payers. A payer was defined as a firm that had a positive cash dividend payment available for a 
particular year in the Morningstar DatAnalysis database. The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table 4.3 reports the numbers and fractions of payer years and non-payer years announcing at 
least one of three types of external funds: bank loans, primary SEOs and rights. Specifically, 
the proportions of payer years announcing these types of capital are 4.75%, 5.78% and 2.31%, 
and these figures for non-payer years are 2.04%, 11.32% and 8.69%, respectively. In general, 
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12.84% of payer years announced at least one of these, as compared with 22.05% of non-payer 
years doing so. Consistently, the external finance dependency index (EXDEP), which is a ratio 
of the number of announcing to non-announcing firms, for payers and non-payers are 13.85% 
and 27.40%, respectively, meaning that non-payers were more dependent on external finance 
or more financially constrained than payers. 
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Table 4.3: External Finance of Dividend Payers and Non-Payers 
Variable Definition 
Payer (N = 7,218)  Non-payer (N = 15,916)   t test of mean diff. 
(Payer–Non-Payer) Mean (%) SD (%)  Mean (%) SD (%)  
BANKLOAN 
Dummy indicating whether a firm announced 
a bank loan 
4.75 21.28  2.04 14.14 
 
2.71*** 
PRISEO 
Dummy indicating whether a firm announced 
issue of primary SEOs 
5.78 23.33  11.32 31.68 
 
−5.54*** 
RIGHT 
Dummy indicating whether a firm announced 
issue of rights 
2.31 15.03  8.69 28.17 
 
−6.38*** 
EXFIN 
Dummy indicating whether a firm announced 
one of three external financing sources 
12.84 35.43  22.05 42.74 
 
−9.20*** 
EXDEP 
Ratio of external finance announcing to non-
announcing firms 
13.85   27.40 
      
The table provides a t test of mean difference in the numbers of firm-years announcing bank loans, primary seasoned equity offerings and rights 
between cash dividend payers and non-payers. The external finance dependency index (EXDEP) was calculated by the number of firm-years
announcing at least one of these three external financing sources divided by the number of non-announcing. The *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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4.4.3 Ex-Dividend Goers 
To test Hypothesis 4.4 and 4.5, the study needed to rely on a subsample of dividend-paying 
firms. Payers were defined as those who had ex-dividend date data available in the Datastream 
database.32 By definition, dividend payments are made to stockholders recorded at the closing 
of trading on the cum-dividend day, which is the day preceding the ex-dividend day. In other 
words, investors who buy stocks on the ex-dividend day do not have any claims to the dividends 
previously declared. Of course, a firm must pay dividends to be able to go ex-dividend.  
To test the market reaction around the ex-dividend day of polluters and non-polluters, the ex-
dividend day was matched with the stock return, which was calculated by taking a logarithm 
of the price index of day t over that of the day before (t − 1). By design, the price index had 
already been adjusted for the level of dividend payments so that daily abnormal returns before, 
on and after the ex-dividend day were comparable and not affected by the price drop on the ex-
day because of dividends (see Section 4.5.2 for a detailed discussion).33 To investigate post-
dividend long-run operating performance, accounting-based financial data such as return on 
equity and ROA one year subsequent to the ex-dividend year were extracted from the 
Moningstar DatAnalysis database. To compute post-dividend long-run abnormal returns, the 
ex-dividend day was matched with the monthly price indexes of the ex-dividend goer and the 
market (ASX All Ordinaries) sourced from Datastream. The BHAR was calculated by taking 
                                                          
32 In Australia, earnings and dividends are normally announced concurrently. If we use announcement date as 
employed by other studies on dividend issues outside of Australia, this “dual-announcement” phenomenon will 
make it difficult to distinguish between earnings and dividend effects. For this purpose, the use of ex-dividend 
date is better since it represents a pure dividend effect. 
33 The Price Index (PI) data item sourced from Datastream represents the closing price of a stock as a percentage 
of its value on the base date (i.e., the first date on which Datastream has data for the index) adjusted for capital 
changes (e.g., dividend payments or stock splits). On ex-dividend day, the closing prices on all preceding days 
will be reduced by the amount of dividend payment per share (which causes price drop on ex-day), making the 
price index of one particular stock always comparable over time. Hence, return on an ex-day (Log(PIit/PIit-1)) is 
comparable to that on cum-day as well as other days before and after the ex-day for the same stock. 
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the difference between the monthly compounded firm stock return and the monthly 
compounded market return (see Section 4.5.2 for a detailed discussion). 
4.5 METHODOLOGY 
4.5.1 Calculation of Short-Term Abnormal Returns 
Short-term abnormal returns were calculated using the following equation: 
     =     −      +          (4.1) 
where     and     are log returns (Log(PIit/PIi(t–1)) and Log(PImt/PIm(t–1)), and PIit and PImt are 
price indexes of ex-dividend firm i and market m (ASX All Ordinaries) on day t, respectively. 
     is the abnormal return of ex-dividend firm i on day t within the event window, and 
            are estimated using market model regressions over a 100-day period beginning 109 
days before and ending 10 days before the ex-dividend day 0.  
The abnormal returns were then standardised to conduct the tests of statistical significance, as 
follows: 
      =  
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   
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 
    (4.3) 
where     is the respective standard deviation of the prediction errors obtained from the market 
model;   
  is the residual variance of the market model regressions for ex-dividend firm i; M is 
the number of days in the estimation window (100); and     is the mean market return over the 
estimation period.  
For each event day t, a Z statistic was computed to test the null hypothesis that      = 0, as 
follows: 
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  =          √  (4.4) 
where       is the mean      ; and N is the number of       in the sample. 
The formulas to calculate cumulative abnormal returns and standardised cumulative abnormal 
returns over event window (  ,   ) are as follows: 
    (  ,   ) =        
  
    
 (4.5) 
     (  ,   ) =  
∑    
  
       
    −     + 1
 (4.6) 
For the purpose of this study, three conventional event windows, three-day CAR(−1,1), seven-
day CAR(−3,3) and 11-day CAR(−5,5), were investigated for statistics and significance. For 
each event window (  ,   ), the Z statistic was computed to test the null hypothesis that 
    (  ,   ) =  0, as follows: 
  =       (  ,   )   √  (4.7) 
where      (  ,   ) is the mean      (  ,   ); and N is the number of      (  ,   ) in the 
sample. 
4.5.2 Calculation of Long-Term Abnormal Returns 
Long-term abnormal returns were computed using the following formula: 
       =  (1 +     )
 
   
−   (1 +    )
 
   
 (4.8) 
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where       is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for ex-dividend firm i in k months 
subsequent to the ex-dividend day.    (   ) is the monthly return of ex-dividend firm i (market 
m). The market portfolio is the ASX All Ordinaries, which is used as a benchmark.  
For the purpose of this study, three long-term windows, six-month BHAR6m, 12-month 
BHAR12m and 24-month BHAR24m, were investigated for statistics and significance. 
4.5.3 Regression Models 
To test each hypothesis, the study adopted a two-stage approach. In the first stage, univariate 
analysis was performed on the difference of a relevant variable (Y) between polluters and non-
polluters in the pre- and post-Kyoto periods. A t test was adopted in the first stage. In the second 
stage, multiple regressions of variable Y were run on a list of other variables, including the 
main ones (POLLUTER dummy, POST dummy and an interaction term POLLUTER*POST) 
and controls. Each set of regressions comprised four equations in the following forms: 
    =            +            (4.9) 
    =        +            (4.10) 
    =            ∗        +            + (         &     )    (4.11) 
where Yit is the dependent variable Y of firm i for time t. The Ys for Hypothesis 4.1 are 
DIVDUM, DIVYIELD, DIVPAYOUT and DIVSHARE; for Hypothesis 4.2 the Y is CASH; for 
Hypothesis 4.3 it is EXFIN; for Hypothesis 4.4 the Ys are CAR(−1,1) and CAR(−3,3); and for 
Hypothesis 4.5 they are ROE1y, ROA1y, TANG1y, LNASSETS1y and BHAR12m and 
BHAR24m. POLLUTERit is a polluter dummy indicating whether firm i in year t was a polluter; 
POSTit is a post-Kyoto dummy indicating whether firm i was observed in time t, that is, on or 
after 2008. CONTROLjit is a vector of control variable j of firm i in time t. Year dummies were 
included to control for economic conditions and industry dummies were included to control for 
industry fixed effects. 
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4.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section discusses the hypothesis testing results. For each hypothesis, the first step was the 
univariate analysis, in which the t tests of the mean difference in corresponding variables Ys 
between pre- and post-Kyoto periods were provided. The univariate analysis was followed by 
multiple regression analysis in which the variables Ys were regressed over a list of other 
variables to confirm the results from the univariate analysis. 
4.6.1 Are Polluters More Likely to Cut Dividends? 
First, Hypothesis 1 was tested by answering the question: Are polluters more likely to cut 
dividends? Four indicators Ys of dividend policy were taken into consideration: dividend 
dummy (DIVDUM), dividend yield (DIVYIELD), dividend payout ratio (DIVPAYOUT) and 
dividend per share (DIVSHARE).  
4.6.1.1 Univariate analysis on dividend payouts 
Table 4.4 displays the t test of mean difference between polluters and non-polluters in the pre- 
and post-Kyoto periods regarding DIVYIELD (Panel A), DIVPAYOUT (Panel B) and 
DIVSHARE (Panel C). All three panels present quite similar patterns, indicating that polluters 
paid significantly fewer dividends relative to non-polluters and the difference was significantly 
larger in the post- than in the pre-Kyoto period. This is because of a reduction in the level of 
dividend payments of polluters in contrast to an increase in those of non-polluters subsequent 
to the Kyoto ratification. 
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Table 4.4: Dividend Policy between Polluters and Non-Polluters 
Panel A: Dividend Yield               
DIVYIELD Polluter  Non-Polluter  
t test of mean 
diff. (P–NP) 
Pre (%) 0.66  2.31  −1.64*** 
Post (%) 0.44  3.22  −2.78*** 
t test (Post–Pre) −0.22 ***  0.92***    
         
Panel B: Dividend Payout Ratio      
DIVPAYOUT Polluter  Non-Polluter  
t test of mean 
diff. (P–NP) 
Pre (%) 6.02  21.29  −15.27*** 
Post (%) 2.77  22.16  −19.39*** 
t test (Post–Pre) −3.25 ***  0.87***    
         
Panel C: Dividend Per Share       
DIVSHARE Polluter  Non-Polluter  
t test of mean 
diff. (P–NP) 
Pre (%) 2.72  7.23  −4.51*** 
Post (%) 1.56  7.96  −6.40*** 
t test (Post–Pre) −1.16 ***   0.73***       
The table provides the t test of mean difference in dividend policy (represented by 
dividend yield, dividend payout and dividend per share) between polluters and non-
polluters, in the pre- and post-Kyoto periods. The *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Specifically, Panel A of Table 4.4 shows that the dividend yield of polluters was 1.64% lower 
than that of non-polluters in the pre-Kyoto period, and this gap increased to 2.78% in the post-
Kyoto period. This is due to the dividend yield of polluters, which reduced by 0.22% from 
0.66% to 0.44%, whereas that of non-polluters rose by 0.92%, from 2.31% to 3.22%, between 
the pre- and post-Kyoto periods. Similarly, Panel B reveals that the dividend payout ratio of 
polluters was 15.27% smaller than that of non-polluters in the pre-Kyoto period, and this 
difference increased to 19.39% in the post-Kyoto period. This is because the polluters reduced 
the dividend payout ratio by 3.25%, from 6.02% to 2.77%, whereas non-polluters kept that 
ratio relatively unchanged, from 21.29% to 22.16%, subsequent to the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Likewise, Panel C demonstrates that the dividend per share of polluters decreased by 
1.16% whereas that of non-polluters increased by 0.73%, leading to the difference in that ratio 
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between polluters and non-polluters expanding from 4.51% to 6.40% between the post- and 
the pre-Kyoto periods.  
4.6.1.2 Regression analysis on dividend payouts 
In the univariate analysis, polluters were shown to pay fewer cash dividends (i.e., lower ratios 
of dividend yield, payout and per share) than non-polluters and that difference was significantly 
larger in the post- than in the pre-Kyoto period. The study tested whether these results held 
after controlling for other factors that might drive firm dividend policy. To do so, multiple 
regressions were run using Equations 4.9 through 4.11 for each proxy of dividend policy, that 
is, DIVDUM, DIVYIELD, DIVPAYOUT and DIVSHARE, which acted as the dependent 
variables. Of interest are the estimated coefficients of the main independent variables, 
including POLLUTER, which captured the difference in dividend payments between polluters 
and non-polluters, and POLLUTER*POST, which captured the difference in differences in the 
post- relative to the pre-Kyoto period. Negative coefficients of POLLUTER and 
POLLUTER*POST variables were consistent with the prediction that polluters would be more 
likely to cut cash dividends. 
Control variables were size (LNASSETS), profitability (ROA), leverage (D/E), cash holdings 
(CASH), growth opportunities (TOBINQ) and investment (TANG) because these variables have 
been suggested in the literature to possibly explain the dividend payouts. For models that 
specified DIVDUM as the dependent variable, logit regressions were adopted because 
DIVDUM is a binary variable. For models using DIVYIELD, DIVPAYOUT and DIVSHARE as 
the dependent variables, Tobit regressions with a left limit of zero were adopted because these 
variables are all non-negative. These techniques and controls have been broadly employed in 
prior studies (e.g., L Allen et al. 2012; Balachandran et al. 2012; Caliskan & Doukas 2015; 
Denis & Osobov 2008). 
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Table 4.5.1: Environmental Risk and Probability of Paying Dividends 
Model Type Logit 
Dep. Var. DIVDUM 
Model No. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ind. Var.         
POLLUTER −2.039***  −1.685***  
 [−16.77]  [−12.58]  
POST  −0.472*** −0.119  
  [−7.29] [−1.47]  
POLLUTER*POST   −0.742*** −0.733*** 
   [−5.24] [−4.96] 
LNASSETS 0.758*** 0.713*** 0.786*** 0.807*** 
 [20.97] [21.75] [20.69] [22.71] 
ROA 6.476*** 8.138*** 6.427*** 5.546*** 
 [9.53] [10.93] [9.28] [8.42] 
D/E 0.024 0.197** −0.004 −0.161* 
 [0.30] [2.55] [−0.05] [−1.79] 
CASH −1.017*** −2.150*** −0.964*** −0.363 
 [−3.96] [−7.91] [−3.74] [−1.46] 
TOBINQ −0.019 −0.042 −0.027 0.027 
 [−0.63] [−1.40] [−0.87] [1.08] 
TANG 0.005 −1.034*** −0.021 0.103 
 [0.02] [−4.75] [−0.10] [0.46] 
CONSTANT −13.605*** −12.945*** −14.023*** −15.385*** 
 [−21.02] [−22.09] [−20.77] [−16.17] 
     
(Industry & Year) FE No No No Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 19,292 19,292 19,292 19,198 
Pseudo R-squared 0.56 0.51 0.57 0.59 
The table displays the results of logit regressions of the probability of paying dividends 
(DIVDUM) on POLLUTER dummy, POST dummy and POLLUTER*POST interaction 
term, and other firm fundamentals as controls. Z statistics based on firm-clustered robust 
standard errors are reported in brackets. All the explanatory variables are defined in 
previous tables. The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
The regression results confirm the univariate analysis and Hypothesis 1. Specifically, Table 
4.5.1 reports logit regression results with DIVDUM as dependent variables using Equations 4.9 
through 4.11. The significantly negative coefficients of POLLUTER in Models (1) and (3) 
indicate that, overall, polluters were less likely to pay cash dividends and that was also the case 
in the pre-Kyoto period. Further, the significantly negative coefficients of POLLUTER*POST 
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in Models (3) and (4) show that polluters reduced the probability of paying dividends more 
than non-polluters did, leading to a larger difference in that probability between polluters and 
non-polluters subsequent to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. One way of interpreting the 
economic meaning of estimated coefficients in such a non-linear model as logit is by explaining 
the marginal effects. However, this task can be challenging because marginal effects are non-
linear functions of the coefficients and magnitudes of the explanatory variables (Doidge, 
Karolyi & Stulz 2013). Thus, interpreting interaction terms in terms of marginal effects can 
even be much harder because the marginal effects are different across observations (Ai & 
Norton 2003) and statistical tests can be uninformative and misleading (Greene 2010). 
However, a logit regression is linear in the log-odds metric; hence, log-odds as well as odds 
ratio34 (exponentiated coefficients) display constant effect of an explanatory variable on the 
binary dependent variable, which is the probability of paying dividends in this case. Therefore, 
the study reports estimated coefficients and interprets odds ratios in logit regressions with the 
presence of an interaction term for simplicity (see, e.g., Buis 2010; Doidge, Karolyi & Stulz 
2013; Kolasinski & Siegel 2010). For example, in Model (3), the estimated coefficient of 
POLLUTER dummy is −1.685, meaning that the odds of polluters paying dividends is equal to 
0.185 (e−1.685) times that of non-polluters for the pre-Kyoto period. In addition, in Model (3), 
the estimated coefficient on POLLUTER*POST interaction term is −0.742, indicating that the 
difference in the dividend-paying odds between polluters and non-polluters in the post-Kyoto 
period is 0.476 (e−0.742) times that in the pre-Kyoto period. 
                                                          
34 The odds ratio of paying dividends is by definition the ratio of probability of paying dividends over the 
probability of not paying. The probability of not paying is given by one minus the probability of paying. 
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Table 4.5.2: Environmental Risk and Dividend Yield  
Model Type Tobit (Left Limit = 0) 
Dep. Var. DIVYIELD 
Model No. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ind. Var.         
POLLUTER −0.056***  −0.043***  
 [−16.93]  [−12.40]  
POST  −0.004** 0.008***  
  [−2.30] [3.76]  
POLLUTER*POST   −0.025*** −0.023*** 
   [−6.82] [−6.24] 
LNASSETS 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 [14.04] [13.29] [13.94] [14.59] 
ROA 0.085*** 0.108*** 0.083*** 0.067*** 
 [4.02] [4.26] [3.99] [3.65] 
D/E 0.004* 0.009*** 0.004 −0.002 
 [1.71] [4.44] [1.57] [−0.86] 
CASH −0.022*** −0.049*** −0.021*** −0.005 
 [−2.94] [−6.41] [−2.88] [−0.70] 
TOBINQ −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 
 [−1.32] [−0.62] [−1.34] [−0.81] 
TANG 0.012** −0.016*** 0.012** 0.014** 
 [2.15] [−2.79] [2.23] [2.39] 
CONSTANT −0.251*** −0.276*** −0.254*** −0.304*** 
 [−13.40] [−13.08] [−13.56] [−10.86] 
     
(Industry & Year) FE No No No Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 18,940 18,940 18,940 18,896 
Pseudo R-squared 9.48 7.90 9.56 10.8 
The table displays the results of Tobit regressions (left limit of 0) of dividend yield 
(DIVYIELD) on POLLUTER dummy, POST dummy and POLLUTER*POST 
interaction term, and other firm fundamentals as controls. T statistics based on firm-
clustered robust standard errors are reported in brackets. All the explanatory variables are 
defined in previous tables. The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.5.3: Environmental Risk and Dividend Payout Ratio 
Model Type Tobit (Left Limit = 0) 
Dep. Var. DIVPAYOUT 
Model No. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ind. Var.         
POLLUTER −0.436***  −0.358***  
 [−14.07]  [−10.16]  
POST  −0.082*** −0.024  
  [−4.57] [−1.24]  
POLLUTER*POST   −0.165*** −0.155*** 
   [−3.85] [−3.76] 
LNASSETS 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.132*** 0.138*** 
 [18.32] [18.15] [18.28] [18.42] 
ROA 2.936*** 3.349*** 2.906*** 2.656*** 
 [28.40] [31.57] [28.37] [27.20] 
D/E 0.090*** 0.128*** 0.086*** 0.018 
 [3.19] [5.39] [3.03] [0.84] 
CASH −0.337*** −0.588*** −0.315*** −0.195*** 
 [−4.64] [−7.89] [−4.40] [−2.72] 
TOBINQ −0.047*** −0.052*** −0.049*** −0.038*** 
 [−5.03] [−5.12] [−5.03] [−4.19] 
TANG 0.034 −0.235*** 0.032 0.034 
 [0.60] [−4.04] [0.56] [0.54] 
CONSTANT −2.519*** −2.550*** −2.538*** −2.911*** 
 [−18.09] [−18.35] [−18.12] [−15.52] 
     
(Industry & Year) FE No No No Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 19,282 19,282 19,282 19,238 
Pseudo R-squared 0.47 0.44 0.47 0.50 
The table displays the results of Tobit regressions (left limit of 0) of dividend payout ratio 
(DIVPAYOUT) on POLLUTER dummy, POST dummy and POLLUTER*POST 
interaction term, and other firm fundamentals as controls. T statistics based on firm-
clustered robust standard errors are reported in brackets. All the explanatory variables are 
defined in previous tables. The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.5.4: Environmental Risk and Dividend Per Share 
Model Type Tobit (Left Limit = 0) 
Dep. Var. DIVSHARE 
Model No. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ind. Var.         
POLLUTER −0.171***  −0.132***  
 [−11.65]  [−8.90]  
POST  −0.036*** −0.003  
  [−5.40] [−0.35]  
POLLUTER*POST   −0.078*** −0.075*** 
   [−5.76] [−5.38] 
LNASSETS 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.087*** 
 [16.41] [16.80] [16.43] [16.36] 
ROA 0.295*** 0.353*** 0.287*** 0.239*** 
 [4.07] [4.23] [4.00] [3.80] 
D/E −0.012 0.002 −0.013 −0.028*** 
 [−1.30] [0.26] [−1.47] [−2.85] 
CASH −0.055* −0.134*** −0.049* −0.002 
 [−1.92] [−4.63] [−1.71] [−0.07] 
TOBINQ 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 
 [4.46] [4.12] [4.22] [5.46] 
TANG 0.033 −0.065*** 0.031 0.058** 
 [1.34] [−2.60] [1.27] [2.32] 
CONSTANT −1.571*** −1.582*** −1.581*** −1.766*** 
 [−16.68] [−17.26] [−16.74] [−14.11] 
     
(Industry & Year) FE No No No Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 19,206 19,206 19,206 19,161 
Pseudo R-squared 0.77 0.70 0.77 0.84 
The table displays the results of Tobit regressions (left limit of 0) of dividend per share 
(DIVSHARE) on POLLUTER dummy, POST dummy and POLLUTER*POST interaction 
term, and other firm fundamentals as controls. T statistics based on firm-clustered robust 
standard errors are reported in brackets. All the explanatory variables are defined in previous 
tables. The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Regarding the levels of dividend payments, polluters also paid fewer dividends than non-
polluters and the difference was significantly greater in the post-Kyoto period. This is 
confirmed by the Tobit regression results displayed in Tables 4.5.2, 4.5.3 and 4.5.4. 
Specifically, the consistently negative coefficients of POLLUTER and POLLUTER*POST in 
these regressions show that dividend yield, payout ratio and per share of polluters were all 
smaller than those of non-polluters, and polluters decreased these ratios more than non-
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polluters did subsequent to the Kyoto ratification. Together, these results advocate the 
argument that environmental risk has an impact on firm dividend policies, supporting 
Hypothesis 4.1.  
4.6.2 Do Polluters Hold More Cash? 
Secondly, Hypothesis 4.2 was tested by answering the question: Do polluters hold more cash? 
Two indicators of cash holdings adopted for this testing purpose were ratio of cash balance 
over total assets (CASH) and ratio of cash balance over market value of equity (CASHMVE). 
4.6.2.1 Univariate analysis on cash holdings 
Table 4.6 displays the t test of mean difference between polluters and non-polluters in the pre- 
and post-Kyoto periods regarding CASH (Panel A) and CASHMVE (Panel B). The two panels 
present quite similar patterns, indicating that polluters held significantly more cash than non-
polluters and the difference was larger in the post- than in the pre-Kyoto period. This is because 
polluters increased their cash holdings more than non-polluters did subsequent to the Kyoto 
ratification. For example, Panel A shows that polluters increased their ratio of cash to assets by 
0.32%, from 31.82% to 32.14%, whereas non-polluters reduced their cash holdings by 0.03%, 
from 19.76% to 19.72%. This caused the gap in cash to assets between polluters and non-
polluters that expanded from 12.06% to 12.41% subsequent to the ratification. 
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Table 4.6: Cash Holdings of Polluters and Non-Polluters 
Panel A: Ratio of Cash-to-Total Assets         
CASH Polluter  Non-Polluter  
t test of mean diff. 
(P–NP) 
Pre (%) 31.82  19.76  12.06*** 
Post (%) 32.14  19.72  12.41*** 
t test (Post–Pre) 0.32  −0.03    
         
Panel B: Ratio of Cash-to-Market Value of Equity    
CASHMVE Polluter  Non-Polluter  
t test of mean diff. 
(P v. NP) 
Pre (%) 19.95  18.64  1.31*** 
Post (%) 27.53  24.76  2.77*** 
t test (Post–Pre) 7.58***   6.12***       
The table provides the t test of mean difference in cash holdings (cash to total assets, 
and cash to market value of equity) between polluters and non-polluters, in the pre-
and post-Kyoto periods. The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
4.6.2.2 Regression analysis on cash holdings 
In the univariate analysis, polluters were demonstrated to hold more cash, that is, have higher 
ratios of cash to total assets and cash to market value of equity, than non-polluters and that 
difference was significantly larger in the post- than in the pre-Kyoto period. These results were 
tested to determine whether they held after controlling for other factors that might have driven 
the firm cash holdings. To do so, multiple regressions were run using Equations 4.9 through 
4.11 for each proxy of cash holdings, that is, CASH, which acted as the dependent variable. Of 
interest are the estimated coefficients on the main independent variables, including 
POLLUTER, which captured the difference in cash holdings between polluters and non-
polluters, and POLLUTER*POST, which captured the difference in differences in cash 
holdings in the post- relative to the pre-Kyoto period. Positive coefficients of POLLUTER and 
POLLUTER*POST variables were consistent with the prediction that polluters would hold 
more cash than non-polluters. 
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Control variables were size (LNASSETS), profitability (ROA), leverage (D/E), dividend dummy 
(DIVDUM), growth opportunities (TOBINQ) and investment (TANG) because these variables 
have been suggested in the literature to possibly determine cash holdings. Pooled OLS 
regressions were adopted in all models and the standard errors were adjusted for clustering of 
observations at firm and year levels. These techniques and controls have been broadly 
employed in prior studies (e.g., Chen, Y et al. 2015; Harford 1999; Harford, Mansi & Maxwell 
2012; Opler et al. 1999). 
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Table 4.7: Environmental Risk and Cash Holdings 
Model Type Pooled OLS 
Dep. Var. CASH 
Model No. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ind. Var.         
POLLUTER 0.050***  0.042***  
 [6.40]  [8.56]  
POST  0.007 −0.005  
  [1.40] [−1.09]  
POLLUTER*POST   0.015** 0.025*** 
   [2.17] [2.79] 
LNASSETS −0.028*** −0.027*** −0.028*** −0.030*** 
 [−15.99] [−15.52] [−25.79] [−16.04] 
ROA 0.005 0.005 0.006** 0.005 
 [1.36] [1.29] [2.26] [1.36] 
D/E −0.028*** −0.032*** −0.027*** −0.025*** 
 [−7.01] [−7.64] [−7.68] [−6.70] 
DIVDUM −0.030*** −0.052*** −0.029*** 0.006 
 [−3.89] [−7.73] [−5.76] [0.90] 
TOBINQ 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 
 [10.82] [10.46] [21.31] [9.43] 
TANG −0.260*** −0.250*** −0.259*** −0.253*** 
 [−25.76] [−24.45] [−32.05] [−23.06] 
CONSTANT 0.741*** 0.761*** 0.746*** 0.765*** 
 [24.62] [24.89] [41.01] [15.59] 
 
    
(Industry & Year) FE No No No Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
    
Observations 19,292 19,292 19,292 19,247 
Adjusted R-squared 0.255 0.248 0.255 0.299 
The table displays the results of pooled OLS regressions of ratio of cash to assets 
(CASH) on POLLUTER dummy, POST dummy and POLLUTER*POST interaction 
term, and other firm fundamentals as controls. T statistics based on firm-clustered 
robust standard errors are reported in brackets. All the explanatory variables are defined 
in previous tables. The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
The regression results confirm the univariate analysis and Hypothesis 4.2. Specifically, Table 
4.7 shows the regressions results with CASH as the dependent variable. In Model (1), the 
estimated coefficient of POLLUTER is 0.050, meaning that, in general, the ratio of cash to total 
assets of polluters was 5.0% higher than that of non-polluters. In Model (3), the coefficients of 
POLLUTER and POLLUTER*POST are 0.042 and 0.015, respectively, indicating that in the 
pre-Kyoto period, the difference in the cash to assets ratio between polluters and non-polluters 
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was 4.2% and this difference increased by 1.5% in the post-Kyoto period. The coefficient of 
POLLUTER*POST remained positive and significant at 1% after year and industry dummies 
were jointly included, confirming the robustness of the results. Overall, both univariate and 
regression results suggest that polluters increased cash reserves more than non-polluters, as a 
response to the increase in financial constraints facing polluters after the Kyoto Protocol was 
signed off in Australia.  
4.6.3 Do Polluters Rely More Heavily on External Financing? 
Thirdly, the study compared how actively polluters and non-polluters obtained external 
finance. To do so, all firm announcements of bank loans from the SIRCA database and SEOs 
from the Bloomberg database were collected because these are the most important sources of 
external capital for Australia firms. Then a count was made of the number of announcements 
of each external financing source and the total number of these for polluters and non-polluters 
for the whole sample period, and for pre- and post-Kyoto separately. 
4.6.3.1 Overall comparison of external finance dependence 
Table 4.8 provides comparisons of the magnitude of external finance dependence between 
polluters and non-polluters for the whole sample period 2001–2013. Panel A shows that the 
fractions of polluters announcing bank loans, primary SEOs and rights were 3.38%, 14.26% 
and 9.84%, or equivalently, 27.15% of polluters announcing at least one type of external funds. 
In contrast, these numbers for non-polluters were 2.59%, 5.86%, 4.23% and 12.48%, 
respectively. An indicator was then developed of external capital dependence, which is equal 
to the number of firms announcing at least one out of three of the aforementioned external 
financing sources over the number of firms not announcing any of those. The higher the index 
was, the more dependent on external finance the firms were. This external finance dependence 
index (EXDEP) scores for polluters and non-polluters were 35.59% and 13.84%, respectively, 
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clearly revealing that, in general, polluters relied more heavily on external finance than non-
polluters. 
Table 4.8: External Finance between Polluters and Non-Polluters 
Variable 
Polluter (N = 10,635)   Non-Polluter (N = 12,587)   t test of mean 
diff. (P–NP) Mean (%) SD (%)  Mean (%) SD (%)  
BANKLOAN 3.38 18.08  2.59 15.87  0.80*** 
PRISEO 14.26 34.97  5.86 23.49  8.40*** 
RIGHT 9.84 29.78  4.23 20.14  5.60*** 
EXFIN 27.15 46.45  12.48 34.03  14.67*** 
EXDEP 35.59   13.84       
The table provides the t test of mean difference in the number of firms announcing bank loans, primary 
seasoned equity offerings and rights between polluters and non-polluters for the whole sample period. 
The external finance dependency index was calculated by the number of firm-years announcing at least 
one out of these three external financing sources divided by the number of non-announcing firm-years. 
The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 
 
4.6.3.2 Pre- versus post-Kyoto comparison of external finance dependence 
Table 4.9 depicts the t test of difference in the external finance dependence between polluters 
and non-polluters in the pre- and post-Kyoto periods. In the pre-Kyoto period, the proportions 
of polluters announcing bank loans, primary SEOs and rights were 2.89%, 8.55% and 5.30%, 
giving rise to some 16.25% of polluters announcing at least one type of external capital. These 
numbers significantly increased, to 3.75%, 18.54%, 13.23% and 35.29%, respectively. 
Similarly, the percentages also rose for non-polluters, from 1.10%, 4.41%, 1.79% and 7.16% 
in the pre-Kyoto period to 4.31%, 7.55%, 7.07% and 18.66% in the post-Kyoto period. As can 
be seen, the levels of increases were higher for polluters, especially regarding primary SEOs 
and rights, leading to a bigger gap in the numbers of external finance announcements between 
polluters and non-polluters in the post-Kyoto period. 
 150 
Table 4.9: External Finance between Polluters and Non-Polluters, Pre- and Post-Kyoto 
Panel A: Pre-Kyoto Period               
Variable 
Polluter (N = 4,550)  Non-polluter (N = 6,756)  t test of mean 
diff. (P–NP) Mean (%) SD (%)  Mean (%) SD (%) 
 
BANKLOAN 2.89 16.77  1.10 10.42  1.80*** 
PRISEO 8.55 27.96  4.41 20.54  4.14*** 
RIGHT 5.30 22.40  1.79 13.26  3.51*** 
EXFIN 16.25 38.37  7.16 26.41  9.09*** 
EXDEP 18.63  7.52    
         
Panel B: Post-Kyoto Period        
Variable 
Polluter (N = 6,085)  Non-Polluter (N = 5,831)  t test of mean 
diff. (P v. NP) Mean (%) SD (%)  Mean (%) SD (%)  
BANKLOAN 3.75 18.99  4.31 20.32  −0.57
PRISEO 18.54 38.86  7.55 26.42  10.99*** 
RIGHT 13.23 33.88  7.07 25.63  6.16*** 
EXFIN 35.29 50.15  18.66 40.26  16.63*** 
EXDEP 51.82  22.16    
      
   
t test of mean diff. (Post v. Pre)       
BANKLOAN 0.85***  3.22***  
 
PRISEO 9.99***  3.13***  
 
RIGHT 7.93***  5.27***  
 
EXFIN 19.03***  11.49***  
 
EXDEP 33.19   14.63       
The table provides a t test of mean difference in the numbers of firms announcing bank loans, 
primary seasoned equity offerings and rights between polluters and non-polluters. The external 
finance dependency index was calculated by the number of firm-years announcing at least one out 
of the three external financing sources divided by the number of non-announcing. Panels A and B 
report results for pre- and post-Kyoto periods, respectively. The *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 
 
Turning to the external capital dependence index (EXDEP), the ratios of external finance 
announcing to non-announcing polluters were 18.63% and 51.82% for the pre- and post-Kyoto 
periods respectively. However, these ratios were merely 7.52% and 22.16% for non-polluters. 
These caused the gap in the dependency index between polluters and non-polluters to increase 
from 11.11% to 29.66% following the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. The big difference in 
the differences suggests that the polluters relied more heavily on external finance, and that the 
reliance increased more for polluters than for non-polluters subsequent to the Kyoto ratification 
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in Australia. This further confirms that financial constraints became more serious for polluters 
when the environmental regulations were tougher, reinforcing Hypotheses 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. 
4.6.4 Does the Market React More Positively When Polluters Pay Dividends? 
Next, this section turns attention to a subgroup of dividend-paying firms that were defined as 
having ex-dividend day data in Datastream. Even though Australian firms pay dividends twice 
a year, once in the first half of the calendar year and once in the second half of the year, the 
study focuses only on firms that went ex-dividend for the second payments, or ‘final’ 
dividends, because firms pay significantly larger amounts in the second payment than in the 
first, hence sending more informative signals regarding the payers’ financial heath and 
receiving more market attention (Balachandran et al. 2012). Payers who have negative earnings 
in the same year as the ex-dividend year were also excluded because the price impacts of these 
firms may be different from those of positive earning payers. 
To investigate the short-term market reactions when polluters went ex-dividend, the difference 
in the differences in abnormal returns was examined around the ex-dividend day between 
polluters and non-polluters, and between the pre- and post-Kyoto periods. 
4.6.4.1 Univariate analysis on ex-day abnormal returns 
Table 4.10 displays the daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns ranging from 
five days before to five days after the ex-day of all ex-dividend going firms. The z test results 
in Panel A indicate that abnormal returns were significantly positive on every single day prior 
to the ex-day and the highest surge was on the cum-day, at 0.29%. In contrast, abnormal returns 
were significantly negative for every single day on and after the ex-day and the biggest drop 
was on the ex-day, at −0.63%. The magnitudes of negative abnormal returns were larger than 
those of positive cumulative abnormal returns, leading to significantly negative cumulative 
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abnormal returns around the ex-day, for example, three-day CAR(−1,1) of −0.77%, seven-day 
CAR(−3,3) of −0.65%, and 11-day CAR(−5,5) of −0.55%. These results suggest that after 
adjusting stock prices for dividend per share, stock return was still significantly lower on and 
following the ex-day relative to the cum-date, which is consistent with prior studies (e.g., see 
Eades, Hess & Kim 1984). 
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Table 4.10: Ex-Dividend Day Abnormal Returns 
Event day or window (0: 
announcement day) 
Overall (N = 5,011)   Polluter (N = 591)   Non-Polluter (N = 3,724) 
Mean (%) SD (%) z stat   Mean (%) SD (%) z stat   Mean (%) SD (%) z stat 
 
              
Panel A: Daily Abnormal Returns (ARs) 
−5 0.19 2.71 7.60***  0.23 2.65 2.79*** 
 0.24 2.81 9.17*** 
−4 0.21 2.87 6.27***  0.12 2.99 0.20
 0.23 3.01 6.04*** 
−3 0.23 2.74 33.84***  −0.12 2.80 −0.31
 0.32 2.92 10.14*** 
−2 0.10 2.71 5.33***  0.16 3.87 1.87* 
 0.09 2.59 3.97*** 
−1 0.29 2.33 10.60***  0.33 2.35 3.22*** 
 0.32 2.41 9.30*** 
0 −0.63 5.24 −40.31***  −1.17 8.60 −17.47*** 
 −0.71 3.69 −30.65*** 
1 −0.43 4.58 −15.21***  −0.82 10.94 −6.48*** 
 −0.40 2.88 −13.32*** 
2 −0.17 2.73 −127.74***  −0.23 3.72 −0.93
 −0.20 2.67 −5.23*** 
3 −0.04 2.58 −1.65*  0.14 3.43 0.25
 −0.06 2.45 −2.72*** 
4 −0.13 2.53 −7.07***  0.17 2.89 0.41
 −0.19 2.64 −7.17*** 
5 −0.16 3.26 −5.52***  −0.20 2.83 −0.46
 −0.13 2.37 −3.64*** 
      
       
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
(−1;1) −0.77 6.40 −25.85***  −1.66 10.73 −11.97*** 
 −0.79 4.86 −20.00*** 
(−3;3) −0.65 7.62 −50.90***  −1.71 11.21 −7.50*** 
 −0.64 6.77 −10.76*** 
(−5;5) −0.55 9.13 −40.22***   −1.39 12.65 −5.10***   −0.49 8.05 −7.26*** 
The table reports daily abnormal returns (ARs) (in Panel A) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) (in Panel B) around the ex-dividend day (event day 
0), for the whole sample and polluter and non-polluter subsample. Abnormal returns were calculated by taking the difference between real returns and 
expected returns on a particular day around the ex-day. Expected returns were estimated using the market model over a 100-day estimation window 
(−109,−10) relative to the ex-day. All calculations used daily price indexes that were adjusted for all capital changes, including dividend payments on ex-
day, and were sourced from Datastream. The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4.11 provides summary statistics and the t test of mean difference in the cumulative 
abnormal returns and other financial characteristics of ex-dividend polluters (polluting payers) 
and ex-dividend non-polluters (non-polluting payers). Panel A of Table 4.11 shows that, 
overall, the market reacted more negatively when polluters went ex-dividend. In particular, ex-
day CAR(−1,1), CAR(−3,3) and CAR(−5,5) of polluters were 0.9%, 1.1% and 0.9% lower than 
those of non-polluters, respectively, and the differences in cumulative abnormal returns were 
statistically significantly at 1% for CAR(−1,1) and CAR(−3,3), and 5% for CAR(−5,5). Panel 
B reveals that relative to non-polluting payers, polluting payers were bigger in size 
(LNASSETS), using higher financial leverages (D/E), holding less cash (CASH), having lower 
growth opportunities (TOBINQ), higher return volatility prior to ex-dividend day (REVOL) and 
larger dividend per share (DIVSHARE). However, other characteristics, including profitability 
(ROA), dividend yield (DIVYIELD) and dividend payout ratio (DIVPAYOUT), were 
indistinguishable between polluting and non-polluting payers.  
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Table 4.11: Comparison of Polluting and Non-Polluting Payers 
Variable 
Polluter (N = 591)   
Non-polluter 
(N = 3,724) 
  t test of mean 
diff. (P v. NP) 
Mean SD   Mean SD   
         
Panel A: Dependent variables 
CAR(−1,1) −0.017 0.107  −0.008 0.049  −0.009*** 
CAR(−3,3) −0.017 0.112  −0.006 0.068  −0.011*** 
CAR(−5,5) −0.014 0.127  −0.005 0.081  −0.009** 
 
        
Panel B: Control variables 
LNASSETS 21.033 1.994  19.546 2.176  1.487*** 
ROA 0.118 0.101  0.116 0.114  0.002
 
D/E 0.488 0.790  0.399 0.768  0.089*** 
CASH 0.101 0.138  0.115 0.147  −0.014** 
TOBINQ 1.573 0.732  1.678 1.466  −0.105* 
REVOL 0.024 0.017  0.022 0.012  0.002*** 
DIVYIELD 0.046 0.091  0.050 0.059  −0.004
 
DIVPAYOUT 0.714 0.043  0.716 0.014  −0.002
 
DIVSHARE 0.258 0.346   0.200 0.380   0.058*** 
The table presents the variable names, descriptive statistics and t test of mean difference 
in the main and control variables between polluters and non-polluters who went ex-
dividend. The statistics include the mean and standard deviation (SD). The primary source 
is the Morningstar DatAnalysis database, from which firms’ GICS industries and 
fundamentals were collected, and Datastream, from which stock returns and ex-days were 
extracted. All firms with negative net earnings in ex-dividend years were excluded. The *, 
** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table 4.12 reports the difference-in-differences univariate analysis on ex-day cumulative 
abnormal returns between polluting and non-polluting payers in the pre- and post-Kyoto 
periods. Similar patterns were observed for both CAR(−1,1) (in Panel A) and CAR(−3,3) (in 
Panel B), which indicates that the significantly negative difference in the pre-Kyoto period 
changed to an insignificant difference between polluters and non-polluters in the post-Kyoto 
period. This is because of a significantly larger increase in cumulative abnormal returns of 
polluters relative to non-polluters subsequent to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. For 
example, polluters significantly increased ex-date CAR(−3,3), by 2.05%, whereas non-
polluters insignificantly raises CAR(−3,3), by 0.22% on average, leading to a narrowing in the 
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gap of CAR(−3,3) between polluters and non-polluters, from a significant −1.92% to an 
insignificant −0.1%. These results suggest that there was a significant change in the stock 
behaviours around the ex-dividend day of polluters and non-polluters subsequent to the Kyoto 
ratification. That is, stock investors were more in favour of polluting payers, thus bidding 
higher when these polluters went ex-dividend in the post-Kyoto period than in the pre-Kyoto 
period. This evidence advocates the prediction that paying dividends during the time when 
accessing external finance was tougher (i.e., the post-Kyoto period) helped polluters to send a 
signal of relatively better financial health (i.e., fewer financial constraints) to the stock markets. 
The good signal was then translated into an improvement in the stock market reaction around 
the ex-day of polluting payers subsequent to the Kyoto ratification, supporting Hypothesis 4.4. 
Table 4.12: Ex-Dividend Day Abnormal Returns between Polluting and Non-Polluting 
Payers 
Panel A: Three-day CAR(−1,1)             
CAR(−1,1) Polluter  Non-Polluter  
t test of mean 
diff. (P v. NP) 
Pre (%) −2.52  −0.95  −1.57*** 
Post (%) −0.72  −0.64  −0.08  
t test (Post–Pre) 1.80**  0.31*    
         
Panel B: Seven-day CAR(−3,3)      
CAR(−3,3) Polluter  Non-Polluter  
t test of mean 
diff. (P v. NP) 
Pre (%) −2.68  −0.76  −1.92*** 
Post (%) −0.63  −0.54  −0.10  
t test (Post–Pre) 2.05**  0.22    
         
Panel C: Eleven-day CAR(−5,5)      
CAR(−5,5) Polluter  Non-Polluter  
t test of mean 
diff. (P v. NP) 
Pre (%) −2.26  −0.74  −1.52*** 
Post (%) −0.43  −0.26  −0.18  
t test (Post–Pre) 1.83*   0.49*       
The table reports the t test of mean difference in ex-dividend day cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) between polluters and non-polluters, in the pre- and post-
Kyoto periods. The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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4.6.4.2 Regression analysis on ex-day abnormal returns 
The next step was to test whether the univariate results stayed unchanged after controlling for 
other factors that might have affected the ex-day cumulative abnormal returns. To do so, 
multiple regressions of cumulative abnormal returns as estimated in the previous section were 
run on a list of independent variables, including the main ones (POLLUTER, POST, 
POLLUTER*POST) and controls (firm fundamental and dividend policy proxies), adopting 
Equations 4.9 through 4.11. The seven-day CAR(−3,3) was selected as the dependent variable 
in the main tests and the three-day CAR(−1,1) was used for robustness checks. 
Table 4.13 documents the CAR(−3,3) regression results. Models (1) to (4) report results using 
specifications of Equations 4.9 through 4.11. In Models (5) to (7), Equation 4.11 was rerun to 
further control for dividend policy by including either DIVSHARE, DIVYIELD or DIVPAYOUT 
as an additional control variable, respectively. The results were consistent with the 
aforementioned univariate analysis. Specifically, in Model (1), the estimated coefficient of 
POLLUTER of −0.007 means that, on average, after controlling for firm fundamentals, 
polluters produced CAR(−3,3) that was 0.7% lower than non-polluters did when they went ex-
dividend. However, the difference in cumulative abnormal returns was mainly observed in the 
pre-Kyoto period, as shown by the coefficient of POLLUTER of −0.013 in Model (3), which 
means that CAR(−3,3) was 1.3% smaller for polluters than for non-polluters in the pre-Kyoto 
period. Interestingly, that gap significantly narrowed, by 1.5%, as indicated by the coefficient 
of the interaction term POLLUTER*POST in Model (3), which is statistically significant at the 
1% level. The positive coefficient of the POLLUTER*POST was consistent across all 
remaining models that controlled for year and industry fixed effects and level of dividend 
payouts. These results provide supporting evidence for the financial-constraint-signalling role 
of cash dividend payout decisions. 
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Table 4.13: Environmental Risk and Ex-Day Short-Term Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns 
Model Type OLS 
Dep. Var. Ex-Day CAR(−3,3) 
Model No. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ind. Var.        
POLLUTER −0.007**  −0.013***     
 [−2.01]  [−2.73]     
POST  0.009*** 0.006**     
  [3.50] [2.29]     
POLLUTER*POST   0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 
   [2.17] [2.18] [2.17] [2.15] [2.18] 
LNASSETS −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.005*** −0.005*** −0.005*** −0.005*** 
 [−3.76] [−5.11] [−4.33] [−5.88] [−5.42] [−5.93] [−5.90] 
ROA −0.009 −0.014 −0.010 −0.011 −0.011 −0.011 −0.014 
 [−0.55] [−0.85] [−0.60] [−0.67] [−0.67] [−0.64] [−0.84] 
D/E −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 
 [−0.09] [−0.05] [−0.01] [−0.43] [−0.43] [−0.42] [−0.36] 
CASH 0.004 −0.0005 −0.0003 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 
 [0.43] [−0.06] [−0.03] [0.56] [0.57] [0.68] [0.60] 
TOBINQ 0.002 0.003** 0.0022* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002 0.003* 
 [1.49] [2.09] [1.80] [1.82] [1.82] [1.64] [1.92] 
REVOL −0.481*** −0.573*** −0.543*** −0.698*** −0.698*** −0.706*** −0.706*** 
 [−4.66] [−5.49] [−5.16] [−6.07] [−6.07] [−6.05] [−6.14] 
DIVSHARE     −0.0004   
     [−0.10]   
DIVYIELD      −0.004  
      [−0.16]  
DIVPAYOUT       −0.002 
       [−1.53] 
CONSTANT 0.053*** 0.066*** 0.060*** 0.103** 0.102** 0.104** 0.103** 
 [3.54] [4.53] [3.97] [2.53] [2.49] [2.57] [2.55] 
        
(Industry & Year) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 3,985 3,993 3,985 3,985 3,985 3,971 3,985 
Adjusted R-squared 0.010 0.012 0.014 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.032 
The table displays the results of OLS regressions of ex-day CAR(−3,3) on POLLUTER dummy, POST dummy 
and POLLUTER*POST interaction term, and other firm accounting and market-based characteristics as controls. 
T statistics are reported in brackets. All the explanatory variables are defined in previous tables. The *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
To further test the signalling effect of dividends, the ex-dividend sample was split into two 
subsamples of constrained and unconstrained firms and identical regressions (using Equation 
4.11) run on the two subsamples. If the financial-constraint-signalling role of dividends held 
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true, there should have been a bigger positive coefficient of the POLLUTER*POST on the more 
constrained subgroup. Three measurements of financial constraints were employed for this 
purpose, including size (total assets), cash holdings (ratio of cash to assets) and financial 
leverage (ratio of long-term debt to book value of equity), in which smaller size, higher cash 
holdings or lower leverage are typical characteristics of more constrained firms. These 
indicators have been widely used in the literature to capture financial constraints (e.g., see 
Almeida, Campello & Weisbach 2004; Denis & Sibilkov 2009). Panel A of Table 4.14 reports 
the regression results using each indicator median as the splitter, and Panel B identifies the 
constrained and non-constrained payers into the first (top 25%) and fourth (bottom 25%) 
quartiles of the indicator values. Consistent with the predictions, the estimated coefficient of 
POLLUTER*POST was only significant on the constrained subsample with a bigger positive 
value relative to what is recorded on the non-constrained group. The test of coefficient 
difference in Panel B further showed that the difference was statistically significant. These 
results indicate that the signalling effect was more pronounced for more financially constrained 
payers.  
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Table 4.14: Environmental Risk and Ex-Day Short-Term Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Conditional on Financial Constraints 
Model Type OLS 
Dep. Var.  Ex-Day CAR(−3,3) 
FC Criteria Size (LNASSETS)  Cash Holding (CASH)  Leverage (D/E) 
Panel A: Above versus Below Median 
 FC  UC  FC  UC  FC  UC 
 Below Median   Above Median   Above Median   Below Median   Below Median   Above Median 
POLLUTER*POST 0.052***  0.006  0.037***  −0.003
 0.028**  0.002
Test of Coef. Diff. (FC–
NFC) 
0.046  0.040**  0.026 
            
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                  
(Industry & Year) FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
            
Observations 1971  2014  1976  2009 
 1995  1990 
Adjusted R-squared 0.061  0.037  0.027  0.060 
 0.04  0.051                   
Panel B: 1st versus 4th Quartile 
 FC  UC  FC  UC  FC  UC 
 4th Quartile   1st Quartile   1st Quartile   4th Quartile   4th Quartile   1st Quartile 
POLLUTER*POST 0.181***  −0.004
 0.080***  −0.003
 0.049***  −0.002
Test of Coef. Diff. (FC–
NFC) 
0.185*  0.083**  0.050* 
            
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                  
(Industry & Year) FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
            
Observations 957  979 
 975  1,002 
 998  998 
Adjusted R-squared 0.060  0.087   0.046  0.071   0.049  0.081 
The table shows results of OLS regressions of ex-day CAR(−3,3) on POLLUTER dummy, POST dummy and POLLUTER*POST interaction term, and other firm 
accounting and market-based characteristics as controls, conditional on firm financial constraints. Three indicators of financial constraints were used: (1) firm size (log 
of total assets), (2) cash holdings (ratio of cash to total assets) and (3) leverage (ratio of long-term debt to book value of equity). Panel A reports results using the
median value of each indicator as the splitter. Panel B identifies firms into subgroups of top 25% (1st quartile) and bottom 25% (4th quartile) value of each indicator. 
Control variables and year and industries dummies are included in all models. The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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In sum, the regression results suggest that, overall, investors did not like polluters to pay cash 
dividends, as analysed above; cash distributions represent an opportunity cost to dividend 
payers, who may instead need to seek more costly external finance to fund investment needs. 
However, during the post-Kyoto periods, financial constraints were demonstrated to be higher 
and information asymmetries were expected to be larger for polluters as investors are more 
uncertain about future prospects of polluters because of a serious lack of publicly available 
environmental information. In such a situation, polluters that are still able to pay cash dividends 
can relieve investors’ concerns by implying relatively stronger financial ability (i.e., lower 
financial constraints than polluting non-payers). Therefore, the market reacted more positively 
when polluters went ex-dividend in the post-Kyoto period, confirming the second half of 
Hypothesis 4.4. 
4.6.5 Do Polluting Payers Financially Outperform in the Long Run? 
This section discusses the examination of the hypothesis of information content of dividend 
payments conducted by testing whether ex-dividend going polluters financially outperformed 
in the long run. To achieve this objective, two sets of long-term performance measurements 
were used: (1) operating performance, as measured by accounting-based size, tangibility, ROA 
and return on equity in the year after the ex-dividend year; and (2) BHAR in the six to 24 
months subsequent to the ex-dividend day (see Section 4.5.2 for a detailed discussion of the 
measurements). Once again, the difference-in-differences empirical strategy was adopted for 
the investigation purpose.  
4.6.5.1 Univariate analysis on post-dividend long-term performance 
Table 4.15 reports the t test results on the difference in accounting-based performance between 
polluting and non-polluting payers in the pre- and post-Kyoto periods. The four indicators of 
the accounting-based performance used were size (log transformation of total assets; 
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LNASSET1y), tangibility (ratio of fixed assets to total assets; TANG1y), to capture post-
dividend financial constraints, and profitability (ROA1y and ROE1y) to capture post-dividend 
operating performance. Panel A shows that only polluters significantly increased their post-
dividend size, resulting in a larger gap in size between polluters and non-polluters in the post-
Kyoto period. Similarly, Panel B documents that polluters significantly increased their post-
dividend tangibility whereas non-polluters significantly reduced it, giving rise to a greater 
difference in the tangibility following the ratification. The bigger size in general led to a 
reduction in the level of information asymmetry associated with polluters, making it cheaper 
for polluters to access equity capital (Myers & Majluf 1984). Additionally, the higher 
tangibility helped polluters to access debt funding more easily because their collateral values 
increased (Almeida & Campello 2007). In general, the results in Panels A and B indicate that 
financial constraints were relieved more for polluting payers, and this effect was stronger in 
the post-Kyoto period. 
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Table 4.15: Long-Term Operating Performance between Polluting and Non-Polluting 
Payers 
Panel A: Post-Dividend Firm Size 
LNASSETS1y Polluter  Non-Polluter  
t test of mean 
diff. (P v. NP) 
Pre 20.86  19.62  1.24*** 
Post  21.45  19.71  1.74*** 
t test (Post–Pre) 0.59***  0.09    
         
Panel B: Post-Dividend Firm Investment 
TANG1y Polluter  Non-Polluter  
t test of mean 
diff. (P v. NP) 
Pre (%) 42.55  20.47  22.08*** 
Post (%) 46.70  18.56  28.15*** 
t test (Post–Pre) 4.15**  −1.91***    
         
Panel C: Post-Dividend Return on Assets 
ROA1y Polluter  Non-Polluter  
t test of mean 
diff. (P v. NP) 
Pre (%) 1.87  7.02  −5.16* 
Post (%) 5.52  4.29  1.24
t test (Post–Pre) 3.66    −2.74**       
       
Panel D: Post-Dividend Return on Equity 
ROE1y Polluter  Non-Polluter  
t test of mean 
diff. (P v. NP) 
Pre (%) −0.55  16.22  −16.77*** 
Post (%) 10.56  9.88  0.68
t test (Post–Pre) 11.11    −6.34***       
The table reports the t test of mean difference in financial constraints 
(represented by firm size and investment) and profitability (measured by 
return on assets and equity) in the year subsequent to the ex-day, between 
polluters and non-polluters, in the pre- and post-Kyoto periods. The *, ** 
and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
The next step was to test whether the financial constraint relief improved operating 
performance more for polluting payers. Panels C and D of Table 4.15 confirm that the answer 
is yes. Specifically, both post-dividend ROA1y and ROE1y of polluters insignificantly 
increased whereas those of non-polluters significantly decreased following the Kyoto 
ratification. This led to a dramatic change in the difference in this operating performance 
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between polluters and non-polluters, from significantly negative in the pre-Kyoto period to 
insignificant positive value in the post-Kyoto period.  
Table 4.16: Ex-Day Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns between Polluting and Non-
Polluting Payers 
Panel A: 6-month BHAR 
BHAR6m Polluter  Non-Polluter  
t test of mean diff. 
(P v. NP) 
Pre (%) −5.29  −1.65  −3.64** 
Post (%) 1.06  −3.27  4.33*** 
t test (Post–Pre) 6.35***  −1.62**    
         
Panel B: 12-month BHAR 
BHAR12m Polluter  Non-Polluter  
t test of mean diff. 
(P v. NP) 
Pre (%) −13.21  −0.51  −12.70*** 
Post (%) 1.16  −2.71  3.88* 
t test (Post–Pre) 14.37***  −2.20*    
         
Panel C: 24-month BHAR 
BHAR24m Polluter  Non-Polluter  
t test of mean diff. 
(P v. NP) 
Pre (%) −23.54  4.31  −27.84*** 
Post (%) 0.84  −6.31  7.15* 
t test (Post–Pre) 24.37***   −10.62***       
The table reports the t test of mean difference in ex-dividend day buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs) between polluters and non-polluters, in the pre- and post-
Kyoto periods. BHARs were calculated by taking the difference between monthly 
compounded payers’ returns and monthly compounded market returns (proxied by the 
ASX All Ordinaries Price Index). All the price index data were sourced from 
Datastream. The *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
The study then investigated whether the improvement in accounting performance was priced 
by the market. Using BHAR to capture the long-term market reaction following the dividend 
payments (see Section 4.5.2 for detailed formulas), Panels A, B, C of Table 4.16 display quite 
similar directions regarding BHAR6m, BHAR12m and BHAR24m, which are BHARs over six 
months, 12 months and 24 months subsequent to the ex-dividend day. For example, for the 24-
month event window, BHAR24m of polluters significantly increased by 24.37%, from −23.54% 
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to 0.84%, whereas that of non-polluters significantly decreased by 10.62%, from 4.31% to 
−6.31%. This led to the difference in BHAR24m between polluters and non-polluters 
dramatically surging, from significantly −27.84% to significantly 7.15%, following the Kyoto 
ratification. 
4.6.5.2 Regression analysis on post-dividend long-term performance 
In the univariate analysis, polluters were proven to financially outperform (i.e., have higher 
ROA, return on equity and BHARs) than non-polluters up to two years subsequent to ex-day, 
and that difference was significantly larger in the post- than the pre-Kyoto period. The study 
investigated whether these results held after controlling for other factors that might have driven 
post-dividend long-term financial performance. To do so, multiple regressions were run using 
Equations 4.9 through 4.11 with BHARs as the dependent variables. Of interest are the 
estimated coefficients on the main independent variables, including POLLUTER, which 
captured the difference in BHARs between polluters and non-polluters, and 
POLLUTER*POST, which captured the difference in differences in BHARs in the post- versus 
pre-Kyoto period. Positive coefficients of POLLUTER and POLLUTER*POST variables were 
consistent with the prediction that polluters would elicit higher BHARs than non-polluters. The 
24-month BHAR24m was selected as the dependent variable in the main tests and the 12-month 
BHAR12m was used for robustness checks. 
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Table 4.17.1: Environmental Risk and Ex-Day Long-Term Buy-and-Hold Abnormal 
Returns (BHAR24m) 
Model Type OLS 
Dep. Var. 24-Month BHAR24m 
Model No. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ind. Var.               
POLLUTER −0.033  −0.220***     
 [−0.99]  [−4.72]     
POST  −0.061*** −0.109***     
  [−2.79] [−4.65]     
POLLUTER*POST   0.372*** 0.344*** 0.344*** 0.348*** 0.344*** 
   [5.83] [5.54] [5.52] [5.59] [5.53] 
LNASSETS −0.015*** −0.018*** −0.016*** −0.024*** −0.024*** −0.024*** −0.024*** 
 [−2.69] [−3.28] [−2.86] [−3.59] [−3.54] [−3.64] [−3.63] 
ROA −0.179 −0.218 −0.268* −0.088 −0.090 −0.056 −0.105 
 [−1.15] [−1.41] [−1.73] [−0.57] [−0.58] [−0.36] [−0.67] 
D/E 0.003 0.002 −0.0001 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012 
 [0.22] [0.15] [−0.00] [0.79] [0.79] [0.88] [0.82] 
CASH 0.108 0.071 0.096 0.010 0.010 0.109 0.102 
 [1.20] [0.79] [1.07] [1.08] [1.08] [1.17] [1.10] 
TOBINQ −0.012 −0.006 −0.004 −0.032*** −0.032*** −0.035*** −0.031*** 
 [−1.07] [−0.57] [−0.34] [−2.72] [−2.74] [−2.88] [−2.66] 
DIVSHARE     0.011   
     [0.34]   
DIVYIELD      −0.170  
      [−0.99]  
DIVPAYOUT       −0.009 
       [−0.70] 
CONSTANT 0.322*** 0.401*** 0.392*** 0.948*** 0.960*** 0.962*** 0.958*** 
 [2.84] [3.57] [3.41] [5.75] [5.69] [5.81] [5.79] 
        
(Industry & Year) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 3,993 3,993 3,993 3,993 3,993 3,993 3,993 
Adjusted R-squared 0.003 0.005 0.013 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.087 
The table displays the results of OLS regressions of ex-day BHAR24m on POLLUTER dummy, POST dummy 
and POLLUTER*POST interaction term, and other firm accounting and market-based characteristics as controls. 
T statistics are reported in brackets. All the explanatory variables are defined in previous tables. The *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table 4.17.1 documents the BHAR24m regression results. Models (1) to (4) report results using 
specifications of Equations 4.9 through 4.11. In Models (5) to (7), a further control was 
implemented for level of dividend payouts by including DIVSHARE, DIVYIELD or 
DIVPAYOUT as an additional control variable. The coefficient of POLLUTER in Model (1) 
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was −0.033 and not statistically significant, meaning that, overall, BHAR24m of polluters and 
non-polluters were not distinguishable after controlling for other factors. This is attributed to 
the opposite signs of this relationship in the pre- and post-Kyoto periods. Specifically, the 
coefficients of POLLUTER and POLLUTER*POST of −0.220 and 0.372 in Model (3) indicate 
that before the Kyoto ratification, BAHR24m of polluters was on average 22.0% lower than 
that of non-polluters; however, the gap was narrowed down by 37.2% after the ratification. In 
other words, the larger magnitude for the coefficient of the interaction term means that 
BHAR24m of polluters was higher than that of non-polluters after the ratification, which is 
consistent with the univariate evidence. The significant impact of the interaction term on 
BHAR24m is also recorded in Model (4). Regarding the change in BHAR24m over the 
ratification, in general, all ex-dividend goers experienced a significant reduction of 6.1% 
(coefficient of POST of −0.061 in Model (2)) and this is mainly attributed to non-polluters who 
decreased their BHAR24m by 10.9% (coefficient of POST of −0.109 in Model (3)) in the post-
Kyoto period. Consistently, these estimated results were qualitatively the same when more 
controls were taken into consideration in Models (5) through (7).  
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Table 4.17.2: Environmental Risk and Ex-Day Long-Term Buy-and-Hold Abnormal 
Returns (BHAR12m) 
Model Type OLS 
Dep. Var. 12-Month BHAR12m 
Model No. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ind. Var.               
POLLUTER −0.002  −0.104***     
 [−0.08]  [−3.76]     
POST  0.005 −0.020     
  [0.42] [−1.47]     
POLLUTER*POST   0.197*** 0.185*** 0.184*** 0.183*** 0.185*** 
   [5.23] [4.97] [4.94] [4.89] [4.96] 
LNASSETS −0.006* −0.006* −0.005 −0.008** −0.009** −0.008** −0.009** 
 [−1.74] [−1.78] [−1.61] [−2.15] [−2.28] [−2.09] [−2.28] 
ROA 0.075 0.077 0.044 0.177* 0.174* 0.156 0.149 
 [0.82] [0.84] [0.48] [1.90] [1.87] [1.64] [1.58] 
D/E 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 
 [0.78] [0.78] [0.63] [1.40] [1.39] [1.29] [1.47] 
CASH 0.090* 0.093* 0.105** 0.122** 0.122** 0.116** 0.126** 
 [1.71] [1.75] [1.98] [2.20] [2.20] [2.08] [2.27] 
TOBINQ −0.017*** −0.018*** −0.016** −0.029*** −0.029*** −0.027*** −0.027*** 
 [−2.58] [−2.62] [−2.36] [−4.10] [−4.14] [−3.71] [−3.93] 
DIVSHARE     0.014   
     [0.77]   
DIVYIELD      0.111  
      [1.08]  
DIVPAYOUT       −0.015** 
       [−1.99] 
CONSTANT 0.111* 0.107 0.113* 0.365*** 0.382*** 0.356*** 0.382*** 
 [1.65] [1.61] [1.66] [3.70] [3.78] [3.59] [3.86] 
        
(Industry & Year) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 3,993 3,993 3,993 3,993 3,993 3,993 3,993 
Adjusted R-squared 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.063 
The table displays the results of OLS regressions of ex-day BHAR12m on POLLUTER dummy, POST dummy 
and POLLUTER*POST interaction term, and other firm accounting and market-based characteristics as controls. 
T statistics are reported in brackets. All the explanatory variables are defined in previous tables. The *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Similar results were observed when 12-month BHAR12m was used as the dependent variable 
in the regression models reported in Table 4.17.2. In sum, the results show that, in general, 
there was no difference in the long-term abnormal returns between polluters and non-polluters. 
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However, when the environmental regulations were tougher subsequent to the Kyoto 
ratification, polluters who still paid cash dividends could generate higher abnormal returns, 
confirming that the polluting payers were among the most financially healthy firms and, 
therefore, were rewarded by the market. 
4.7 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
This section present three robustness tests. First, Hypothesis 1 was tested by using different 
indicators for corporate dividend policy that are broadly adopted in the literature. The second 
test involved altering the event windows over which the short-term cumulative abnormal 
returns around the ex-day were calculated, and then performing similar multivariate analysis 
using the same model specifications as in the main tests of Hypothesis 4.4. Third, the length of 
time over which the long-term BHARs were computed was changed, and then regression 
models similar to the main tests of Hypothesis 4.5 were run. 
4.7.1 Alternative Proxies for Dividend Policy 
Tables 4.5.2, 4.5.3 and 4.5.4 report regression results using Equations 4.9 through 4.11 with 
DIVYIELD, DIVPAYOUT and DIVSHARE as the dependent variables. As can be seen, the main 
results recorded in Table 4.5.1 for DIVDUM have been qualitatively unchanged, consistently 
showing that polluters paid fewer dividends than non-polluters and the gap was significantly 
larger after the Kyoto ratification. 
4.7.2 Alternative Event Windows for Ex-Day Cumulative Abnormal Return 
In addition to seven-day CAR(−3,3), three-day CAR(−1,1) and 11-day CAR(−5,5) were 
employed as dependent variables to test Hypothesis 4.4. The results were consistent across 
these event windows, confirming that polluters received lower market reaction (lower 
cumulative abnormal return) than non-polluters when going ex-dividend in the pre-Kyoto 
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period. However, when the environmental regulations became more stringent after the Kyoto 
ratification, polluters who could pay dividends sent a strong signal regarding their better 
financial heath to the market, thus generating higher cumulative abnormal returns. 
4.7.3 Alternative Event Windows for Ex-Day Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
Similarly to the results reported for 24 months subsequent to the ex-day, those observed for 12-
month BHARs (Table 4.17.2) indicate that polluters financially outperformed non-polluters in 
the post-Kyoto period. 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, environmental risk was empirically associated to firm financial constraints. To 
comprehensively capture financial constraints, both internal (i.e., cash dividend and cash 
holding policies) and external capital (i.e., bank loans and SEOs) were investigated if firms 
were listed on the ASX. To capture environmental risk, the sample firms were split into two 
groups: perceived polluters, which were firms operating in the highest emitting industries, and 
their controlling counterparties, non-polluters. Taking advantage of a change in the stringency 
of environmental regulations commencing with the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol at the end 
of 2007, which mainly affected polluters, the study was able to adopt a difference-in-
differences empirical strategy and report five main findings as follows. 
The first finding is that polluters were more likely to cut dividends, and the dividend cut was 
stronger for polluters than for non-polluters in the post-Kyoto period when environmental 
regulations were stricter. Second, polluters held more cash and increase their cash reserves 
more in the post-Kyoto period. Third, polluters relied more heavily on external financing and 
the reliance was stronger for polluters than non-polluters following the ratification. Four, in the 
short term, market reactions around ex-dividend day increased significantly more for polluters 
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subsequent to the ratification. Five, in the long term, both the accounting- and the market-based 
financial performance improved more for polluters than for non-polluters in the post-Kyoto 
period. 
These results confirm that environmental risk is a determinant of corporate financial 
constraints, and that the introduction of more stringent environmental regulations reinforces 
this environmental–financial constraints relationship.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
--- 
The effect of growing environmental risk on corporate finance policies has increasingly 
attracted research attention. For example, the high level of public attention paid to 
environmental and social issues has led to a substantial increase in the frequency of information 
disclosure in this regard (Frias‐Aceituno, Rodriguez‐Ariza & Garcia‐Sanchez 2013; Patten 
2002). Additionally, a vast amount of literature has been dedicated to investigating the impacts 
of corporate environmental performance on financial performance, and mixed results have 
been reported (Horváthová 2010; Przychodzen & Przychodzen 2015). Another set of literature 
has contributed empirical evidence on the effects of environmental regulations on equity risk 
and returns, and shown mixed findings depending on the environmental friendliness of each of 
the industries studied (Ramiah, Martin & Moosa 2013). This thesis extends the current 
literature by shedding light on the impact of environmental risk on corporate financing policies, 
in particular, through an investigation of the differences in stock market reactions to 
announcements of various types of financing sources between polluting and non-polluting 
firms in Australia. The detailed findings are as follows.  
As discussed in the first empirical chapter, Chapter 2, it was found that bank loan 
announcements of perceived polluting borrowers elicited positive stock price response relative 
to controlling non-polluting ones, and the difference was significant following the introduction 
of more stringent environmental policies (i.e., the period subsequent to the ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol by the Australian Government). Further, the loan announcement effect was 
even more pronounced among borrowers in poorer information environments. The results were 
robust to various event windows and model specifications. Contrary to the criticism that banks 
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are losing their ‘specialness’, the results suggest that banks can provide certification over 
borrower environmental risk, and that the certification value increases as the level of stringency 
of environmental policies and information asymmetry of borrowers increases. 
As discussed in the second empirical chapter, Chapter 2, it was found that, overall, the stock 
market reacted significantly and negatively to SEO announcements. Further, the market 
responded more negatively to SEO announcements of polluters than to those of controlling 
non-polluters, and the reaction difference was significantly larger in the post-Kyoto period. 
The effect was robust after controlling for various event windows, model specifications and 
endogeneity using PSM. However, the effect was less pronounced if a SEO was underwritten, 
and even turned into positive if the underwriters were the most reputable investment banks. In 
contrast, similar analysis on rights offers showed indistinguishable market reactions between 
polluters and non-polluters. The results provide evidence on how the information asymmetry 
associated with SEO issues drives the negative impact of increasing environmental risk on 
issuer market value, and how this issue can be partially resolved by investment banks through 
underwriting services. 
The third empirical chapter, Chapter 3, documented several findings. First, relative to 
controlling non-polluters, in the post-Kyoto period, polluters were more likely to reduce cash 
dividend payments. Secondly, polluters reserved more cash. Thirdly, polluters more frequently 
announced obtaining external finance such as bank loans or SEOs. Fourthly, the market reacted 
more positively around the days when polluters went ex-dividend and the effect was more 
pronounced for more financially constrained payers. Finally, in one to two years subsequent to 
the ex-dividend day, polluters (polluting payers) exhibited better operating performance and 
higher BHARs than non-polluters (non-polluting payers). These results indicate that firms 
facing higher environmental risk are more likely to encounter financial constraints, and support 
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the view that constrained firms tend to rely more on internal financial resources by cutting 
dividends and holding more cash.  
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